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ABSTRACT
KNOWLEDGE UNDERGROUND: GOSSIPY EPISTEMOLOGY
SEPTEMBER 1996
KAREN C. ADKINS, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON
Ph . D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert J. Ackermann
This dissertation is an attempt to loosen what I see as
a chokehold by which two paramount assumptions constrict our
epistemic endeavors. These Enlightenment assumptions - that
we accept or refute ideas as true based on transparently
clear and orderly methods and criteria, and that individuals
accept or refute truth claims - are still central in
epistemology, despite their many critics (for the first,
Kant, Hegel, James, Quine, Bayes; for the second,
postmodernism, Deleuze and Guattari, Gilbert). Thinking
about gossip as an epistemologically productive concept
provides us with the means to critique those assumptions,
and further attempts to broaden our notion of an
epistemological foundation.
Gossip at first appears to be an unlikely candidate for
such a resurrection, mainly because its treatment by
academics has been dismissive; this dismissal is in part due
to Enlightenment conceptions about truth and falsehood.
Chapter One surveys the social science literature on gossip
and rumor, revealing that social scientists begin with such
vi
restrictive definitions of what gossip is that their
conclusions amount to little more than tautology. Chapter
Two shows that humanists have a slightly different approach
to gossip, but with roughly similar results.
The handful of philosophers who deal directly with
gossip or rumor almost as a unit accept uncritically a
division between "purposive" conversation and "idle"
chatter. To do so, I think, perpetuates a limiting
epistemic foundation on a linguistic level. In contrast, I
argue in Chapter Three that the very existence of something
like gossip proves the inadequacy of the foundat ionalist
myth (at least in its current form)
,
and that to attempt to
understand and use gossip with foundat ionalist tools is
simply a wrong fit. My understanding of gossip is based on
this central fact: we undertake the activity of gossip or
rumor- spreading because we are trying to make sense out of
something -- we need to collect knowledge socially. Gossip
originates from dissonance; it acts as a (necessary)
counterweight to more official information, and can't be
considered apart from official knowledge. We use gossip and
rumor, along with more orthodox sources of information, to
formulate our understanding of ourselves and the world
around us. The extent to which gossip and rumor are spread
is the extent to which the analysis is shared, and not
individualized. Gossip is both a genealogical tool and an
speculative tool.
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INTRODUCTION
GOSSIPING YOUR WAY TO KNOWLEDGE
"A self is a set of reputations"
—F.G. Bailey, Gifts and Poison
1.1 Some Preliminary Commentary
I gossip a lot. Indeed, I have only half-jokingly
remarked to friends that I am the ideal person to carry out
this project, because I have been practically training for
gossip research all my life: when I was ten, I began the
first (no doubt only, and certainly short-lived) Gossip Club
at my elementary school; we met every afternoon at recess on
the parallel bars to evaluate fellow schoolmates, teachers,
and siblings.
I begin this "serious" project so apparently
flippantly, first as a warning for those seeking out
objective analyses of gossip. While I am interested (and
hopefully have succeeded) in sketching a more complete
portrait of gossip than currently exists in the academic
literature, I do so not as an impersonal crusader for
science, but as an unabashed defender, as well as habitual
practitioner, of gossip. While some readers will no doubt
turn away from my evidently hopelessly biased work on this
statement alone, let me assure readers that other gossip
writers who aren't as explicit about their personal
attitudes towards gossip, nonetheless make their prior
prejudices equally as clear in their subsequent, excessively
1
hostile, treatments of the subject. I am merely trying to
lay my cards out on the table before we begin the analysis
game, rather than feigning objectivity at the start, only to
have scabrous invective creep into my "neutral"
investigation as it proceeds (I like my scabrous invective
out in plain sight)
.
Indeed, let me quickly enumerate those initial
assumptions with which I began this project now, before we
get too far in. I began this work as a straightforward
champion of gossip. "Of course it is always right, of
course it is never petty or malicious, anyone who thinks
otherwise is a craven Puritan, " is a pretty fair assessment
of my attitudes towards gossip. Reading the vast assemblage
of gossip- and rumorology has challenged those assumptions,
but only partially. I now think that gossip is an
infinitely more complicated social manifestation than ever
before, and that no one functional reading of gossip (it
makes truth, it distorts it, it lies; it is good, it is bad,
it is just a tool for values) can hope to capture its
inherently multifaceted nature. While I fear that in this
work I still retain too much of the flavor of my original
evangelical attitude towards gossip, I still prefer it to a
feigning of neutrality or a frowning, "judicious" criticism:
I think a blast of unabashed enthusiasm towards gossip's
virtues and functions is probably the best way to prod
others to appreciate gossip as complicated.
2
And I do think that gossip is complicated, in striking
the bulk of the extant academic literature on
the subject. While researching and writing this project has
been startling in a variety of ways, foremost among them was
the discovery that an activity that had provided so much
insight and discovery for me was either ignored or dismissed
by so many theorists on human behavior. While I began this
dissertation almost on a dare (as the ultimate moment of an
extended gossip-conversation with my dissertation advisor)
,
my rapid discovery of the widespread, and largely
trivializing, literature on gossip propelled me to explore
more deeply questions of language and knowledge. Writers on
gossip, it seems to me, are able to cordon it off into a
"safe" zone (affecting only "trivial" personal relations or
being wildly destructive, but in identifiable and
predictable ways)
,
because they have similarly cordoned off
notions of how language works, and how it is we come by
knowledge -- since language is either transparently rational
and purposive or idle and emotional, and since we can
determine what is "really" knowledge versus what is merely
opinion, gossip can easily belong to its own separate (and
certainly unequal) arena. Rethinking gossip as in part a
constructive epistemic force entails rethinking how it is we
communicate, and come to knowledge, with each other.
Of course, rethinking gossip is no small task; for well
over 200 years gossip has almost without exception been
3
i e d, dismissed, and trivialized in both academic and
popular media. Sermons are delivered detailing gossip's
evils, samplers are embroidered counseling sagely against
its practice -- indeed, I even ran across an old trivet in a
junk shop decorated with a female exhorting the user in
bowdlerized German not to "talk so dumb." Largely, then, my
dissertation will consist of a critical reading of the
academic literature on gossip which explains why these
theories (almost without exception) fail to capture the
complicated and convoluted nature of gossip.
A partial reason that I see this happening is evidenced
by the large amount of meta-writing that occurs in writing
about gossip. To be precise, the gossipists I have been
reading, with few exceptions, spend more time writing about
the difficulties in writing about/theorizing about/studying
gossip, than they do in actually reporting and analyzing the
gossip they collect (Sarah Miller, Ori Bet Or, Jorg
Bergmann, and John Beard Haviland come to mind) . This is
true even in cases (Bet Or and Miller) where it's clear that
the authors have an enormous amount of primary information
that they have not only collected but analyzed; one writer
(Bet Or) even explicitly discusses how he could spend 100
pages alone discussing one particular gossip-episode. What
this phenomenon suggests to me, among other things, is that
gossipists are so intent upon credentialling themselves as
doing something legitimate (with something so apparently
4
illegitimate) that they constrain themselves as much as
possible, so as to retain credibility for themselves. It
seems impossible, then, if we consider the bulk of the
literature on gossip, to write about the topic seriously
without simultaneously reducing the topic to complete non-
seriousness
.
Of course, skeptics might contest my more generous
approach towards gossip as being exactly non-serious; to
wit, that my straightforward enthusiasm amounts to an
uncritical assertion of truths to gossip that I cannot
justify, given my lack of disciplinary fidelity. Detractors
could argue that, like the social scientists I so
energetically attack, by my own definition I am simply
setting myself up for success -- if gossip is always already
everywhere and in everything, well then of course it's a
part of knowledge. My dissertation then becomes an amusing
exercise in circularity.
I have two responses to this criticism. First, I think
it's important to recognize that contextualizing approaches
to social science (and more generally, to knowledge-
gathering) are a legitimate and widespread intellectual
movement. Bruno Latour's We Have Never Been Modern (1993)
and Jacques Ranciere's The Names of History (1994) are
simply the most recent (and elegant) examples of this
approach. To crudely summarize, Latour and Ranciere, while
working from vastly different frames of reference (Latour
5
writes about science, politics, and history, using Hobbes
and Boyle as his lenses; Ranciere appraises literary
criticism, politics, and history, using Michelet and
Braudel s European histories and Auerbach 1 s literary
criticism commentary) are both attempting to demonstrate not
just that history is never simply a story-telling, or that
scientific revolutions aren't simply happenings; but that
QB-ly openly and actively combining or contextualizing our
fields of knowledge or inquiry can we make any sense of
them, for in their very structure fields, ages, and
frameworks contain elements of the fields, ages, and
frameworks they are apparently conceived to refute or
differentiate. Their claims best illustrate this notion:
historical science is still and always written as narrative;
the postmodern era is neither postmodern or an era, but
simply a failed attempt at modernity (neatly cleaving into
differently functioning and limited intellectual ages, whose
products themselves are variably and similarly functioning
and limited); scientific advances are political changes; we
have always been premodern (rather than following a linear
development of ages, including "the postmodern"); the
history of the anonymous is written as a history of a
character ("the people"). To generalize about these claims
in the most reductive terms, Ranciere and Latour argue that
yes, we always are trying to focus on just one object of
examination at a time (whether it be a person, an event, a
6
revolutionary change, an object), and that focusing isn't
itself a problem. The point is that focusing on one thing
is focusing on the world, writing the story of the airpump
is writing the story of the Enlightenment, just as writing
the story of gossip is writing the story of the world. The
problem comes when we attempt to convince ourselves that we
need only look at narrow concepts, that we can simply ignore
certain facts or works because they don't "fit" the
paradigm, that we can construct paradigms to describe the
world that are consistent, complete, self-contained, and
absolutely refuting or denying earlier paradigms.
These are just a few of the conceptual sea changes that
Ranciere and Latour, in their different ways, adumbrate.
Those who would argue that such apparent raving relativism
leaves us with no method by which to come to systemic
beliefs about things or events or people (and, perhaps more
to the point, no pre-approved or -legitimized method for
conducting Rigorous Intellectual Inquiry) miss the point.
Our beliefs, our ideas about people and events and changes
and structures, are already pluralistically constructed. It
is we who discredit our own attempts to gain knowledge by
rigidly confining ourselves to tightly circumscribed
domains. We are always inventing anew our own frameworks
for how we think, so our limits are at once nothing and
everything
.
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All this rhapsodizing is simply to say that gossip and
rumor don't just occur as isolated or isolatable phenomena.
While the prose of many gossipists (Rosenbaum and Subrin,
Bergmann) might suggest that gossip is still a highly
cloistered, clandestine activity -- preselected subversive
cells scurrying off to safe spaces to trade dirt in their
own highly technical and impenetrable language — gossip as
it actually happens is simply one activity among countless
in a day. Indeed, gossip is so indistinct as an activity
that many people do not even tag it as an activity (or a
separate activity)
. Therefore, it can hardly make sense to
study gossip as a narrow phenomenon that can only have a
strictly defined content or relevance. For such restraints
do not reflect how we live with gossip, and as gossips,
every day.
To use Ranciere's language, then, I want to write a
narrative of gossip as knowledge. In one sense my task is
similar to my predecessors in gossipology, who wrote
narratives of gossip as an anti-rational community-def iner
and -destroyer. But in another sense, our tasks are
substantively different -- my narrative (I hope) will show
my character of gossip being changed, interacting with other
well-developed, three-dimensional characters. I would read
the others' works on gossip as morality plays, where
characters are absent -- the stage is populated by types
(The Gossip, The Truth) who clash, misunderstand each other,
8
stay separate and opposed, and affect the audience only by
boring it or provoking moral qualms.
1.2 Outline of the Work
Some precision might now be in order. The dissertation
consists of three chapters, the first two being critical
reviews of the extant literature on gossip and rumor, with a
particular consideration of theorists' views on gossip
epistemologically. Chapter One reviews the social science
literature, Chapter Two the writings in the humanities. I
divide the review chapters thus because I discovered, during
the course of my much less disciplinarily organized search
through gossip matter, that apparent similarities in field
training and convention led to roughly similar kinds of
assumptions authors made about their work. To speak
plainly, social scientists tended to get bogged down by
methodology, producing ethnographies that demonstrate
empirical soundness coexistent with primitive, judgmental
notions of gossip. The seventies revolution of thick-
descriptiveness in social science (revealing initial biases
and assumptions, so as to be able to construct a more
complicated portrait of the society or subculture one wishes
to present) seems for the most part to have escaped those
social scientists wishing to study gossip and rumor. Social
science studies of gossip tend to focus only on a very few
types of conversation (explicit, condemnatory, backbiting
9
talk of others
'
genital or imbibative activity)
,
and their
studiers tend to advocate more and less explicitly for the
regulation of, if not the outright censure of, gossip. To
the extent that these writers consider gossip as
epistemically valuable, then, it is only as an object lesson
in falsity.
For their part, humanists tend to focus less on
methodology and more on narrative: what are the stories
gossip tells, and more particularly, what are the stories we
tell about ourselves as we tell these gossip stories? While
this approach promises more complication to gossip (the
practice becomes less singlemindedly about articulating
moral and social rules to each other, using those not
present as pawns)
,
the downside to this approach is that
gossip retains relevance as story only; humanists insist,
with depressing regularity, that gossip is essentially an
individual, or intimate community, activity, and has bearing
on the wider world only in the sense that every human has
versions of these communities. This means, though, that the
matter of gossip becomes irrelevant; its function is purely
generic (a version of talk therapy) . Gossip may contain
epistemic truth, but so privately and particularly that it
surely cannot be a further interest.
I certainly dispute these methodological assumptions
(and argue these assumptions as I present them) , divergent
though they are, and indeed I unite both chapters together
10
in at least one fashion -- virtually every writer on gossip
and rumor (save the small circle of innovative writers from
each discipline, presented at the end of each chapter)
mechanistically reproduces dictionary definitions of gossip
and rumor as valid tools for understanding their topics, and
in so doing drastically restrict the scope and import of
their analyses. The work in Chapter Three, then, begins
with a presentation and defense of an alternative definition
of gossip, as a way in which to open up our field of
consideration. This definition becomes relevant when I
consider issues in epistemology that encourage such an
attitude towards gossip; namely, that justified beliefs
still can have at least some independence from the
communities in which they occur. The primary goal of this
chapter is to argue for a more informal, community-dependent
understanding of epistemology, and subsequently to
demonstrate how gossip contributes to such an informal
epistemology. If gossip is more than simply negative,
necessarily false or distorted tittle-tattle about our
neighbors; if, in other words, gossip is (as I argue) simply
the informal conversation of friendship, then traditional
understandings of epistemology, which rely on highly
formalized, retrospective accountings of what certitude and
proof are may inaccurately represent how we actually go
about collecting knowledge.
11
I see this realignment of epistemology through gossip
occurring in two ways -- first, the informal conversations
we have with friends are a playground for ideas; we can
collect and combine intuitions, observations, analyses, more
randomly, more creatively, and more loosely than we do in
other, more rigid settings. As such, gossip helps us
assemble analyses in a way that a constantly retrospective
analytic epistemology cannot recognize or document. Second,
these traditional understandings of epistemology miss
important preliminary stages of knowledge
-gathering -- where
we decide what we will not pursue in a field of hypotheses,
areas of interest, etc. Gossip importantly helps us to rule
in and out some options, in a unique fashion.
After this analysis, I then practically challenge my
predecessors' habits of writing about gossip and rumor as if
they are either necessarily wrong or necessarily irrelevant
by invoking gossip examples that illustrate knowledge
creation that are both demonstrably true and not bound by
tight community lines. I conclude by suggesting
applications of and further directions for this sort of
research
.
An important methodology note: the bulk of this
dissertation, as I indicated before, consists in a
substantial, and often painstakingly close reading (perhaps
irritatingly so to readers) of theoretical and empirical
texts on gossip. While I acknowledge the length of what
12
might seem to be only secondarily relevant material, I would
like to justify its inclusion for just a moment. In the
first place, no really inclusive review of this literature
exists of which I am aware -- those scholars who as a matter
of course produce literature reviews while preparing their
gossip or rumor monographs have tended to focus only on the
literature from within their disciplines. Hence, the more
strictly literary commentary is typically ignored by the
social scientists, and vice versa. Despite their (I think)
di sc ipl inar i ly influenced differences, there are many
important crossovers in these writers' approaches and
conclusions regarding gossip, and hence I think it is
important to have this material collected. However, and
much more pointedly for me, in the course of my reading this
material I came to the realization that the vast majority of
writers on gossip and rumor seemed to have none but the most
unsophisticated, judgmental conceptions to their subjects,
and that indeed most of this literature really was not
deserving of future serious study. I realize that this is a
serious (not to say audacious) scholarly claim to make, and
in wishing to make it as responsibly as possible, I have
attempted to provide as exhaustive argumentation as I know
how to support this contention. Since in many cases
evidence of the sorts of bias, inappropriate inferences, or
circularity had to be teased out of several passages in
particular texts (or the aggregate of one long argument in
13
the text) rather than in one overt passage, both
presentation of material and criticism are substantial
endeavors. I apologize for my garrulousness.
1.3 One Final Mote
If my already-evident passion for gossip has limited my
ability to analyze and argue its nature and function in any
capacity, the following is the only limitation I genuinely
regret (for any overenthusiast ic argument I would defend as
a necessary counterweight to the overwhelming existence of
vituperative dismissals of chat) : that my genuine
irritation at simplistic and reductive analyses of gossip
has often left me incapable of appreciating, and more
importantly recalling to readers, the sheer pleasure of
gossip. Speaking personally, while I definitely gossip in
part because it enables me to uncover facts, ideas,
speculations to which I might not in other arenas have
access, and because it permits a freer, more elaborate
analysis than many supposedly more "serious" channels
provide, I know that chief among its attractions for me is
the enjoyment it provides. Gossiping is fun, because you
can talk about anything, in unrestrained fashion, at any
length. It's fun because you can have fun doing it you
can be playful, you can be explorative, you can be goofy.
One of the primary limitations of academic analyses of
gossip is that they so typically ignore this aspect of
14
gossip, or if they acknowledge it, by the very structure of
academic writing, they make fun and gossip seem distantly
related, and certainly distant from the reader (recall E.B
White s analogy of humor analysis to frog dissection)
. This
is an appropriately "non- serious " note with which I close
this introduction, in part because it recalls my opening
anecdote and subsequent remarks. The purpose of juxtaposing
"serious", weighty academic reflection and "silly", frothy
gossipy (womanly!) chatter here in part is to remind us of
just how unfairly these two terms are constantly and
absolutely juxtaposed; how having fun can be serious
(indeed, may be the only way to be serious in some
situations)
. I regret that in my enthusiasm for my project
I too have done less than I might otherwise have to repair
that deficiency in gossip analysis; my weakness as a gossip,
indeed, is that I cannot gossip about academics in these
pages seriously enough.
15
CHAPTER 1
WHY GOSSIP IS ALMOST ALWAYS WRONG IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
For almost a century, gossip has been one of the
measures by which social scientists gauge how well they know
the societies they study 1
. Since one important task for
social psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists
alike is to be able to understand the function of a society
(or one of its subsets) as its inhabitants do, having access
to and understanding the gossip of locals is incontestable
proof that the social scientists has established herself as
an insider -- that she knows the scoop. As Max Gluckman
recognizes in his groundbreaking 1963 article, gossip is an
important component of social and community life -- it is
crucial to maintaining cohesion in a community (308)
.
To
understand a community, you must understand its gossip.
Since Gluckman' s article, social scientists have self-
consciously taken up with a vengeance the challenge of
understanding gossip in its social context 2 . Gluckman 's
1See Gluckman (1963) for citations.
2While social scientists have written about gossip or rumor or
included them in their work for most of this century, Gluckman is
the first to recognize gossip explicitly as a critical factor in
understanding how members of a society, or any of its subgroups,
see themselves and each other. To use a crude analogy, prior to
Gluckman, gossip and rumor were relied-upon, if unacknowledged,
social scientific tactics. Gluckman 1 s article "outs" the study of
gossip and rumor as necessary methodological tactics; Gluckman '
s
article legitimates the (subsequently more open) usage of and
reliance upon more "informal" data collection through chat.
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article legitimizes the study of gossip. Already a well-
respected anthropologist, Gluckman produced an elegantly
written, creative essay that acknowledged what should have
been transparently obvious to everyone. Gluckman
' s object
lesson for his fellow ethnographers is simple: if you are
trying to assess/record/document a group of people, the less
intrusive and formal you are, the more complete your
knowledge. So clearly, less formal talk (e.g. talk that is
not simply passive, artificial responding to survey
questions) encourages broader and more exhaustive knowledge
for the ethnographer; as Gluckman says, "[gossip] is part of
the very blood and tissue of [community] life" (1963, 308)
Gluckman
' s essay, in part, encourages a breaking free of
reliance simply on survey techniques for doing social
anthropology, in lieu of a more difficult (but ultimately
more productive) informal collection of informal
conversation. Collecting informal gossip, Gluckman
concludes, is critical for attaining more nuanced portraits
of societies, because it is only through gossip that the
more ambiguous lines of social distinction can even be
perceived. Without gossip, Gluckman suggests, we miss
critical social data, and our resulting social
interpretations are oversimplified (1963, 312-313).
While this proposal would seem liberatory and exciting,
the fact is that academic social science work has responded
sluggishly to the suggestion. The basic flaw of pre-
17
Geertzian social science -- assuming the objectivity and
neutrality of the scientific observer, and his (yes)
unimpaired ability to "read" correctly and fully any society
he chooses to enter (phallic imagery fully intended, thanks)
flourishes unabated in the social science of gossip and
rumor. The flaw of social science researchers' assuming
neutrality and objectivity, as Geertz so elegantly
demonstrates, is that it encourages a lack of self-
ref lexivity amongst its practitioners (22-23)
.
In other
words, ethnographers rushing to study the now-acceptable
social factors of gossip and rumor do not pause to examine
their own assumptions and preconceptions, and to reflect
upon the ways in which those assumptions might be coloring
the data they collect (causing them simply to miss things,
or draw only certain conclusions, or, more predictably, to
draw conclusions that [magically!] match the initial
hypotheses with which they began their projects) 3 .
Certainly there is a range of the kinds of error
gossipists and rumorists make when examining their
3While it is true that after The Interpretation of
Culture anthropological methodology changed both dramatically
and for the better, there are still clear holdovers within the
field (and more broadly within social science) who ignore
Geertz '
s
challenge and continue to study and write from their
own assumed omnipotence and omniscience. Harold Pepinsky
(1991) provides a useful debunking of one such broad lack of
reflexivity, in the field of criminology. Geertz himself
provides a useful reminder that anthropologists' goals should
not be simply to examine all assumptions and preconceptions
(and therefore, implicitly, arrive at a truer omnipotence),
but that instead we should simply compare the interpretations
that ethnography necessarily produces.
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(admittedly unwieldy) topics. But with depressing
regularity, the social scientists whose work I analyze here,
with two exceptions, all produce one facet or another of
that pre-Geertzian methodology; that is, each in his or her
own way seems to have a (n admittedly smaller than pre-
Geertz) general list of (social, conversational,
interpersonal) qualities s/he looks for when researching
gossip; and this or that particularly society or substratum
is simply so much raw data to be processed by the magic
Anthropology Machine, and reproduced as one more
interchangeable analysis. The researcher typically assumes
a complete understanding of the nature of gossip. The
process, though, less clearly resembles genuinely productive
academic work than Calvin's (of Calvin and Hobbes)
Transmogrif ier -- an empty cardboard box into which variant
amounts of imagination and expectation are piled, so as to
convert the simple box into an all-powerful transformative
tool (Calvin's Transmogrif ier turns him into various fish,
fowl and beast regularly)
,
terminated only by the appearance
of one of Calvin's parents, cutting short the fantasy and
resuming the infinitely less interesting (less malleable,
less spectacular) reality.
So how exactly do these Bekins boxes of ethnographic
analysis (claiming grandiose analyses of the nature and
function of gossip while merely reproducing one ordinary
statement after another: "gossip is mean," "gossip is
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petty, "gossip is manipulative") attain their
f ^snsmogri tying status; and how, correlat ively if less
pleasantly, do I see myself in the role of crabby parent to
these overimaginat ive
,
if underproductive social scientists?
Of the social scientists whose work is my primary focus
here, I see three rough groups of the degree and kind of
overdetermining generalization they perpetuate. Crudely
put, the extent to which each writer accepts the dictionary
definition of gossip or rumor as setting the appropriate
range limits to the information for which s/he will look, is
the extent to which the gossipist in question produces
unreflexive and uninstructive analysis. I will divide this
crude observation into a typology with four possibilities.
The first comparison along one axis that defines that
approach social scientists use are these: Do they see
gossip and rumor as primarily passive or active phenomena
(in other words, do gossip and rumor simply reflect a
predefined reality or conception, or do they themselves help
us define how we see things)? The second comparison traces
the writers that treat any kind of truth element, or even
relation to truth, in gossip and rumor (e.g. does it simply
go unconsidered because they're clearly unrelated; does the
thinker consider gossip and rumor to function only to
distort or outright falsify truth conceptions?; or does the
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thinker allow that gossip and rumor could sometimes be
accurate?). Let me illustrate 4 :
Truth Falsity-
Passive see footnote
4
1 . 1 Social
Meteorologists
Active 1.3 Gossipy 1.2 Spin Doctors
Voices
Let me note that these categories are ahistorical; in each
category writers from eras throughout the history of gossip
and rumor social science (roughly, the 1920s through the
present) are represented.
My procedure is as follows; I will begin with the most
egregious (most antiquated, most generalizing) gossipists,
and work up to the most promising. First we have the Social
Meteorologists
,
who are able to understand gossip only as an
entirely passive notion. Gossip reflects social reality and
ranking for these writers; more particularly, gossip is only
4One of the four possibilities is empty; that gossip, can
be both a purely passive phenomena and yet contain meaningful
truth content. My assumption is that writers cannot imagine
gossip in such a seemingly paradoxical context. In other
words, researchers are able to contradict the reputation of
gossip, but only minimally -- something so reputat ionally
suspect can either be manipulat ively truthful (truthful as an
active object of construction)
,
or beyond manipulation
(passive)
,
but only so because of intrinsic falsehood. It
cannot be both beyond manipulation and truthful.
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of interest indirectly (i.e. its reflection of society); its
content tells us nothing. Gossip is a device by which we
take the temperature of a society. As such, gossip and
rumor have no real relation to truth or falsehood -- their
interest or merit stems entirely from their status as social
products. Amusingly enough, this most antiquated group
includes the most recent research.
Holding a more nuanced view of gossip and rumor are the
Spi-n—Doctors
,
who regard gossip and rumor, ultimately, as
hermeneutic devices. These writers grant gossip status as
both interesting and active, and they acknowledge that it's
not simply flatly wrong or malevolently destructive.
However, they stop short of saying it has significant truth
value -- for them, gossip functions to interpret social
rules, values, norms. This can mean disputing, adapting,
individualizing, rejecting, evaluating, or comparing often
important social rules; but ultimately, gossip becomes more
about managing information (e.g. manipulating it, distorting
it)
,
and so here too a (subtler) distinction between truth
and falsehood is maintained, with gossip and rumor
continuing to inhabit the wrong side of that distinction.
With most of the writers in each of these two categories, I
observe the striking continuity of one particular metaphor
or allusion -- that of gossip and rumor as a kind of
poison -- invoked over and over again. While it is true
that F.G. Bailey explicitly refers to gossip as "Gifts and
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Poison in his book of the same title, it is nonetheless
remarkable that so many writers -- many of whom without
citing Bailey return to this imagery as a somehow
accurate, if emphatic, description of the trajectory and
method of gossip and rumor.
Finally, and most intriguingly
,
are the social
scientists (Sarah Elizabeth Miller [1992]
,
Bruno Latour and
Steve Woolgar [1978]
,
Peter DeBenedittis [1993]
,
and the Max
Gluckman of the 1963 article 5 ) who manage both to accord
gossip power as an active entity, and to bestow upon it a
productive (if shadowy) relationship with the truth. While
I have some criticisms of each author, I still regard them
as clearly having the most creative approaches to gossip and
rumor in the social sciences.
One final note: in this chapter, as in the following
one, I consider the literature on gossip and rumor
integratively (theorists on each are to be found in every
section in this chapter) . This is not because I think that
rumor and gossip are interchangeable terms (though they are
often used as such, and indeed, several of the writers here
use them interchangeably) . Rather, I do this mixing first
because the relevant literature often does not draw (or even
5As I will make clear in part 3 of this chapter, the
reason I refer to "the" Max Gluckman here is because there are
two Max Gluckmans - sadly, the Max Gluckman who writes about
gossip after his initial 1963 article inspires an
academic spat within the pages of Man is little more than a
Spin Doctor himself.
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notice) a sharp distinction between gossip and rumor. The
fact that thinkers on rumor and gossip have in fact used
their terms interchangeably (and indeed, cite the
correlative works when writing their own studies; e.g.,
Bergmann's book on gossip cites Allport and Postman's book
on rumor)
,
I think indicates an important conceptual
blurring that takes place in these fields 6
. In short,
since both gossip and rumor are traditionally defined as
what they are not (gossip = non-serious talk; rumor =
propositions without evident justification) rather than what
they are, such derivative definitions lead to the conceptual
confusion. Both are simply different species of non-truth
(assorted versions of "loose talk"); indeed, scholars often
make the close relationship between the two explicit 7
. For
clarity's sake here, I will try to make it explicit whenever
I am referring to observations about rumor or gossip (if
they seem to be used in an exclusive fashion)
.
6There is a distinction to be drawn between gossip and
rumor, though I do not think it follows the standard lines
(differentiated by channel, degree of truthfulness, topic)
commentators observe. Chapter Three will discuss this
distinction in greater detail.
70ne easy example is in Brison's (1988) dissertation,
where she refers to " [rumor that is] allowed to circulate in
the ambiguous realms of gossip" (146) . Clearly, gossip is the
essential conversational channel carrying the content of
rumor
.
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1 . 1 Social Meteorologists
Despite their often painstakingly self-conscious
methodology, and their divergent foci within the general
subjects of rumor and gossip, what unites the social
scientists I think of as social meteorologists is their
fundamentally reductive attitude towards the topic when they
invest their time in it. Ultimately, for these writers,
gossip and rumor can never be more than a simple social
phenomenon whose presence they mark. Its meaning and
significance is transparently clear from the start -- it is
malicious, false, distorting, and creates havoc among
otherwise peaceable people (for it is among these writers
that invocations of "poison" and viral imagery are most
common 8 ) . Because their initial presuppositions about
gossip and rumor are so clear, and so diminished in
character, their analyses are similarly reductive and
diminished. My task here will be to show how this is so.
Jorg Bergmann's Discreet Indiscretions: The Social
Organization of Gossip (1993) is the most recent treatment
of gossip directly contrary to Gluckman's (1963) in terms
of an attempt to understand gossip and appreciate it on many
levels. Indeed, Bergmann himself is unabashed about making
this attack on Gluckman part of his own project; he ignores
Gluckman's article until his final chapter, then presents
8See Adkins (1996) for more detailed analysis of the
implications and conceptual looseness this metaphorical usage
represents
.
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what he sees as the decisive rebuttals of Gluckman's
approach to gossip. Generally, my criticisms of Bergmann
boil down to this: the narrowness of his conception of
gossip, and his methodology, produce an uninformat ively
diminished analysis of gossip and its effect. Since
Bergmann' s treatment embraces the work of earlier
scientific" studies, I will make it the major focus of my
treatment of the social meteorologists.
Discreet Indiscretions
. Bergmann
' s overarching aim
is to justify gossip (by demonstration) as an object of
social analysis -- it is a social interaction like any
other, and it has its own quirks and characteristics that
merit analysis (indeed, that have to be analyzed for the
notion of communication to make sense) 9
. Bergmann seeks to
achieve a certain realignment of communication theory that
takes into account its disparate elements (31)
.
In this
sense Bergmann would seem to be rather straightforwardly
following the direction of Gluckman (albeit in a different
field -- Bergmann is a social psychologist) . However, while
Gluckman's essay recognizes that notions of social
organization must change to accommodate the content and
function of gossip, Bergmann thinks that gossip has to be
analyzed according to preexisting norms within the field of
communication; gossip must fit existing methodology. He
90ne might wonder how Bergmann can consider gossip a form
of communication like any other, given the value judgment
implicit in the title of his work.
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sees as his exciting breakthrough elevating gossip to the
rationally analyzable terrain of social science - showing
how the irrational can be considered rationally (and all of
its irrationality revealed)
. I see his breakthrough as not
a breakthrough at all, but rather a stagnation -- Bergmann
confines gossip (and communication) to the ever- rat ional
terrain of science, which fails to assess either (or, of
course, science itself) as a complicated, not clearly
rational or irrational phenomenon.
Bergmann 's attempt stands in clear contrast to
Gluckman
' s essay (which I will discuss in more detail in
section 3); for where Bergmann' s book is overloaded with
observations on methodology and a narrow confinement of work
to appropriately preordained bounds of social science,
Gluckman 1 s short essay is a freewheeling, creative analysis
of previous social science that is colored by Gluckman ' s own
observations, and Gluckman' s own experience. Gluckman 's
frank subjectivity, which lends authenticity to his remarks,
suggests not only that Gluckman is alert to more (and more
variant) details in his anthropological work, but ultimately
that Gluckman has a basic interest in writing about gossip
that Bergmann cannot honestly share. To phrase all of this
as cattily as possible, if the tone of Bergmann 's book is an
appropriate indicator, than apparently he himself has never
recognized any indulgence on his part in a spot of gossip;
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or if he has, this book is either curious penance for his
transgression or an attempt at covering his tracks.
Bergmann's inability to adjust communication theory to
reflect its subsumption of complicated social occurrences
such as gossip is reflected in his moralizing attitude
towards gossip, which he makes plain throughout the book.
To begin, Bergmann has a conceptual quarrel with Gluckman;
he doesn't like Gluckman
' s article because "instead of
acknowledging gossip's social disrepute as an empirical
feature and explaining it, [Gluckman] treats it as a
scientific statement about gossip that needs to be
disproved" (144) . Bergmann finds this disregard of such a
"fact" about gossip irresponsible and distorting; he has
harsher words for Gluckman later, chastising Gluckman for
"overlook [ing] the fact that gossip, since it repeats the
private affairs of others, is, and in principle has to be . a
morally disreputable practice" (145, emphasis mine) . It is
clear, when we juxtapose these two statements, that for
Bergmann the social disreputability of gossip isn't simply
an 'empirical' feature of gossip that can't be disputed,
only explained; but that gossip's moral disreputability is
an essential characteristic of gossip that can only color
and inform treatments of it 10 . The neutral language of the
10The strict reliance upon dictionary definitions a
statement like this belies -- for gossip is commonly defined
in dictionaries as "sensational," "tattling," "idle"
supports my earlier comment that the more closely writers
cleave to dictionary definitions, the more restrictive
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earlier statements is misleading -- one can think of many
"empirical features" of a subject under study (for example,
the hypothesis that only gay men contract AIDS)
,
the
explanation of which would be rather less critically
important to even pretending a knowledge of the subject than
Bergmann's opinion of gossip's disreputabil ity seems to
indicate about "empirical features"; in particular, given
that empirical features" are often revealed to be somewhat
less than empirically true of their supposed objects, as was
the case in the early 1980s when the phenomenon of "GRID" as
a gay male disease was replaced with the (still partially
contentious) theory of AIDS as a viral disease to which
anyone is susceptible, this language is too strong.
Bergmann's slippery use of language here gives away an
ulterior agenda. Notice how the "social" disreputability of
the first passage evolves into the much stronger, more
evocative "moral" disreputability of the second passage.
More pointedly, Bergmann's attempt to foist upon Gluckman an
unthinking admiration of gossip is simplistic -- Gluckman
makes it quite clear, at several points in his article, that
he is well aware of gossip's socially insecure status (308,
314, 315). Morality aside, Gluckman ' s argument rests on the
contention that, while gossip may have one status overtly,
in actuality, its function is quite different. Why Bergmann
chooses to ignore this collection of complicated remarks in
analyes of gossip they produce.
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Gluckman's (brief) article goes unexplained. But, as the
rest of Bergmann's book amply demonstrates, multi-layered
readings of events and texts seem anathema to Bergmann's
analytic style 11
.
Of course, Bergmann makes a good show of endorsing a
mul t iperspec t ival approach. His definitional starting
,
as he repeatedly reminds us, is to take gossip "at
its own terms." But what exactly is considering gossip on
its own terms? For Bergmann, such a consideration seems
chiefly to consist of one thing -- taking seriously everyday
conceptions of gossip. This sounds good to start with --
for how productive is a social science that entirely
functions to ignore or dispute the practices of the society
it claims to annotate? Bergmann deals lengthily and
seriously with such everyday conceptions of gossip as its
status of social disrepute, and its status as the occupation
of women, the elderly and the idle. He also spends a fair
amount of time considering past social theories of gossip:
as a means of social control, a mechanism for preserving
social groups, and as a technique of information management.
“Bergmann's ultimately trivializing and dismissive
attitude towards gossip becomes clear when he describes the
nature of gossip (starting in his "Gossip Triad" chapter)
.
It ' s clear that he always thinks that there is a kind of
invasive nature to gossip, and that it's a kind of cold-
blooded, laissez-faire operation where the participants are
constantly dealing with each other for private benefits and
public disadvantage (43, 58, 66, 67, 68, 85, 126, 136-138).
Indeed, the only good effect gossip can have, Bergmann
paradoxically claims, results from its illegitimate moral and
social status (153)
.
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His basic criticism of those theories is his criticism of
those who created the theories; they don't consider
seriously (i.e. as also a thing to be studied) the everyday
conceptions of gossip (16-17)
.
Clearly, taking what gossipers themselves think about
gossip seriously is a critical issue, and one that is often
neglected in social science studies. Bergmann correctly
points out that not doing this is part of what perpetuates
the absolute split between theory on gossip and gossip
itself -- you don't need the former to do the latter, and
the latter isn't really a critical part of the former (3-4).
His task, then, is to improve science on gossip by bringing
the two together; by examining intuitions about gossip
carefully to understand why they are formed (and hence why
we think what we do about gossip)
. Bergmann' s professed
task is something that may seem so admirable as to be self-
justifying -- writing authentically useful science.
Unfortunately, while Bergmann admits that there are
differences in intuitions about gossip, he doesn't allow
that there might similarly be a pluralism in conceptions of
gossip (or more importantly, that the pluralism in
intuitions of gossip might extend to different kinds of
notions of gossip; i.e., not simply different particular
intuitions about gossip but more general disagreements about
what it means to gossip, or conceptions of gossip that do
not all cohere to one basic theme -- gossip is bad) . In
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other words, Bergmann avoids what would seem to be a crux of
a book as methodology-obsessed as this -- actually defining
gossip, so that instances of it can be reocgnized by
scientific means. More particularly, he avoids
articulating his own everyday attitudes and conceptions of
gossip. Such an absence might simply be seen as an attempt
to be a neutral scientific observer (!) ; but I think that
even if this is the apparent motive, the real effect is far
broader, and skews his work far more extensively 12
.
To take these issues one by one: Bergmann argues that
since we all have preconceived ideas about what gossip is,
we don't have to begin investigations of gossip with
definitions, because "empirically proven determinations"
(39) of what gossip is will appear in the course of the data
collection. And Bergmann' s point here is not only that
12 In particular, when we consider how Bergmann ' s text
rather transparently displays his unusually rigidly moralistic
and condescending attitudes towards gossip -- it is, in turn,
"a toy for adults" (2), "a completely broken relation with
moral rules and values" (146)
,
a kind of hypocritical mania in
which its practitioners preach moral order but by gossiping
act chaotically (134-135), marked by coarse or obscene
language (101)
,
"morally contaminated" (99, emphasis in text)
,
akin to "radioactive" substances in that it can "pollute
anyone who reaches out for it unprotected" (91), storytelling
"without specific measures of care and neutralization" (73),
and ultimately, an unimportant part of our lives (6) -- the
likelihood that Bergmann ' s assumptions do in fact seriously
distort his data collection and analysis should seem
inarguable. Ultimately, then, Bergmann ' s admonitions to "take
gossip on its own terms" must be highly suspect, for by these
slips of language in the text Bergmann reveals himself to be
writing from an outsider, non-gossiping perspective (who
therefore would have a difficult time figuring out what
gossip's "own terms" might be)
.
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empirical determinations will appear, but that they will
actually replace and improve upon preconceived notions
(science will triumph over prejudice!)
What Bergmann is saying here is that how we define
gossip is irrelevant; that the only thing that matters is
the result we get when we apply our science to our
observations, at which point a rigorous, sound definition of
gossip will become absolutely clear 13
. This is a pleasant
and seductive point, but unfortunately Bergmann' s actual
work doesn't give it any legitimacy.
Bergmann 's technique by which he proposes to determine
gossip's definition, manifestation and function empirically
begins with his criticism of the standard social scientific
tool of the variable grid -- the result of analyzing a
complicated social formation according to several factors or
variables, a graph of a social group. Because variable
grids are finite, Bergmann argues -- one can only analyze a
certain number of variables in any social analysis (when we
examine the UMASS student population to predict student
success we'll take into account family income, gender,
racial background, religious history, town of origin,
graduation rate, and t ime- to-degree
,
while ignoring family
educational background, extra-curricular activities, majors
13This achievement, of course, would stand in sharp
contradistinction to much of the history of science, such as
Galileo's discovery of the orbits of the solar system; see
Feyerabend (1975) 121-125.
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[number of majors a student has throughout his or her time
at UMASS]
,
class size, academic advisor) -- the shape of
any variable grid will in part determine the result.
Because only data that fits into the variable grid will be
noticed [or noticeable]
,
Bergmann argues (16-17)
,
some
observations about the subject will naturally escape the
observer's notice.
This is why it is important to talk about
preconceptions so as to understand how the preconceptions
determine the final product 14
. Bergmann makes this point
with regards to ethnographies, to demonstrate how
ethnographies are lacking in the ways in which they consider
gossip. But Bergmann 1 s work itself seems lacking in exactly
this respect. To make this plain, simply consider: how do
you know where and in what fashion to apply your science to
gossip, if you already don't have a pretty clear idea what
is (and more importantly, isn't) gossip? When we look at
the transcriptions of the gossip-conversations Bergmann
analyzes, his preconceptions become clear (gossip is always
personal, its topics are traditional personal vices like
drinking, infidelity, bankruptcy [46-47, 84-85, 87-88, 95-
96, 102-103, 113-114, 124-125, 127, 131]). He starts out by
noting only a few everyday conceptions that are clearly
important to him (that gossipers are socially disreputable,
that gossipers are women and the idle)
,
and lo and behold,
14This point, of course, is drawn from Geertz.
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his data (transcriptions) empirically reproduce those
facts. By the conclusion of the book, he's still trying to
talk about why gossip is socially disreputable (i.e., he's
yet to examine whether or not gossip actually is socially
disreputable)
,
and he's never really focused on gossip in
corporations, gossip by men, rich gossips, gossip in
governments or about governments, gossip by scientists,
gossip by priests, non-personal gossip, non-negative gossip,
etc. (though he mentions a few of those possibilities in
theory, his case analysis is always about people living in
housing projects, primarily women, carping about the
personal habits of others)
. So the replacing of intuitive
preconceptions by hard data that he's talking about is empty
-- the only data Bergmann sees is the data that confirms his
preconceptions, the data that his own variable grid
magically produces.
Because of this, Bergmann 's argument that actually
defining gossip at the beginning is irrelevant rings false.
Bergmann sets up the belief that hard science will in fact
be hard (immovable, neutral, nonf alsif iable)
,
so that
prejudices are ultimately irrelevant because the data will
have their way. In other words, he sets us up for a
conceptual movement (we start at the literal and conceptual
beginning, with crude belief -- we jump to the end, with
scientifically verified determinations)
,
when none really
occurs. We do not need to define gossip because we only
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hear conversation that fits neatly stereotypical dictionary
definitions of the word. As Bergmann would have it, we
still wouldn't believe anything different about gossip than
we d already thought, we'd just believe it with more force.
In one sense, of course, Bergmann presages his
conceptual non-movement when he talks more directly of
definitions 15 of gossip. When Bergmann talks about
preconceptions of gossip, he's only talking about a very
reduced field of what gossip is, and what preconceptions
about it are. As his dictionary definition of gossip makes
clear (he follows up that early dismissal of the need to
define gossip by tossing off a dictionary definition as
adequate enough for our purposes)
,
Bergmann only thinks of
gossip as "bits of news about others" (39) 16 . He adds a
few clarifications of that definition throughout his book,
but it's clear that for Bergmann, gossip is talking about
someone who isn't present, and talking about that person's
15Throughout this chapter and the next, many of my
criticisms of many of the secondary sources I will cite here
will revolve around their unreflective adoption of what I
consider to be the uselessly judgmental, innacurately narrow
dictionary definition of gossip: as negative, evaluative
conversation about some absent person's non-public behavior.
I would like to include as a general reminder over this entire
discussion of definitions that in Chapter Three I propose and
defend an alternative definition of gossip, which broadens its
scope without reducing the notion to complete nonsense.
16
"Others", of course, refers to people only -- the
possibility of gossip about institutions or buildings is
automatically ruled out (so when we speculate about the
reasons as to why Michael Hooker gives UMASS a grade of C+ we
can be gossiping about Hooker only, and have nothing to say
about UMASS?)
.
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private life. Of course, if the terrain of gossip is
reduced like that, it's more believable that Bergmann would
come to the conclusions that he does -- that gossip is
something to be controlled, that only women and the idle
gossip, that gossip can only be socially useful (e.g. reveal
social rankings) because of its continued dim moral position
(153) . In other words, Bergmann 1 s focus determines his
conclusion. This is a point he never comes close to
noticing (even though he makes precisely this point about
Gluckman when he condemns Gluckman as a functionalist [145-
146] ) .
The reductiveness of Bergmann’ s definition also makes
itself manifest when Bergmann gives his account of how
gossip happens. He reproduces a narrative conception of
gossip -- someone tells a story, someone else appreciatively
listens and comments (97)
;
in short, a completely one-sided,
individualist, non-meaningfully- interact ive relationship.
Even when Bergmann pretends that narration isn't the model
of gossip (he says that there is a metanarrative and
interpretation going on at the same time as the storytelling
[98]), the roles are clearly divided -- the producer
provides the metanarrative and sets the tone for the
interpretation, the recipient merely listens and fills in
gaps. This narrative approach cannot help but to restrict
the domain of gossip-activity to the content of the stories.
While perhaps one story may lead to another related one, and
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hence an entire gossip-conversation may be larger than the
sum of its individual stories (i.e., an entire conversation
could be a summation of a particular person's character, or
a conflict between many people in a town or academic
department or whatever)
,
Bergmann only considers the
conversation in terms of the individual stories, and what
the stories were "about". Utilizing such narrowly realist
literary techniques precludes the possibility of
tiultiplicity of meaning to gossip, or indeterminacy of
interpretation, or of agency to multiple actors. Bergmann
simply can't hear multiple tales in a conversation, or
multiple tellers in one apparent tale.
Bergmann 's choice of communication theory methodology
sets him up for such reduced conceptions of gossip. It's
clear, from the amount of space and analysis he gives to the
subject of methodology and science, that Bergmann is very
concerned that his book and study have legitimacy - it's
important for Bergmann that his readers think that his
method is the best possible method for studying gossip (as
contrasted to, say, Gluckman's more carefree method). The
reason why is a topic for later discussion. Right now I'll
discuss the ways in which Bergmann holds his own method
(gossip is a genre of communication) in highest esteem, and
the ways in which I think his method doesn't deserve such
esteem
.
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Bergmann sees the theory of genres of communication as
a happy medium between the competing interests in gossip
study. For Bergmann, the trouble with studying gossip (as
with studying communication as a whole) is that of social
science -- trying to fit human patterns of behavior into
more rigid, scientific patterns (variable grids)
. His use
of Gregory Bateson's metaphor of a dance (26-28) well
expresses his faith in the communicative genre method as a
productive compromise. Bergmann begins his book
articulating rather neatly the conflict between the
universal and particular in theory (the conflict between
theory and subject, each of which bears no relation to the
other)
;
and the conflict between science and the social (the
grid that loses its subject, 3-4)
.
Communicative genres are
a compromise between rigid science and indiscriminate
particular observation because they contain both within
their frames.
Bergmann uses the metaphor of a dance to articulate the
nature of this compromise (26-28)
.
Genres of communication
are structured, have a basic ordering (just as a dance has
steps to be learned, is selected based on the music's style
and tempo)
,
but at the same time have freedom of
interpretation (music doesn't always determine that just one
dance must be danced -- every dance has its own variations)
.
His metaphor of a dance frames my dissatisfaction perfectly.
Bergmann really likes to think of communicative genres as
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dances
--he likes to think that we can sort of figure out
what's appropriate and inappropriate to say all the time if
we just listen to the hum and watch (follow) our
interlocutors (do what they do, just backwards and on
heels)
. Of course, he's aware of "spontaneous" dances, but
even these are turned into a genre, even these are limited.
Bergmann's impossible desire to have it both ways
(unpredictable and yet categorizable ! individualized while
perfectly transparent!) amounts to perennially adding a few
more dances to the list. Ultimately, then, gossip becomes
another genre 17
.
There are general reasons why gossip doesn't seem to
work as a genre of communication. In the first place, in
Gluckman
' s article, when he discusses professional gossip,
he astutely demonstrates that there are many times when the
boundary between technical, professional remarks and
personal gossip is impossible to draw (either during the
conversation or afterwards upon reflection, 309) . While
Bergmann's metaphor of a dance is perhaps more rigid than he
means it (because it seems that only in the case where
someone wasn't doing a dance properly
.
moving the right way
to the right music, would we say that it was difficult to
say whether they were tangoing or waltzing or just shuffling
17 In short, Bergmann's attitude towards dance perfectly
replicates his attitude towards gossip; he presumes that it is
transparently previously clear whenever someone is or isn't
dancing, ignoring the obvious confusion present in our
observations of what "dance" is, as in any social phenomenon.
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around)
,
it is still the case that Bergmann is assuming a
uniformity and univocality to gossip -- that all of its
manifestations must be markedly the same in terms of form,
tone, content, (or at least divisible into broad
categories)
. And indeed, when Bergmann gets into the
detail of how gossip happens further along in the book (80 -
100)
,
we see that he in fact is making exactly those
assumptions. By his narrative construction, there is an
invitation to gossip, then the gossip happens via a story, a
story-teller, an appreciative listener, and finally
evaluation and condemnation of the subject by the gossipers.
As the selection of Bergmann' s conversations, his evaluation
of intuitions, and his theory of gossip demonstrates,
Bergmann can only see gossip happening in one particular
way. And it is only if one can ascribe this kind of
homogeneity to gossip that using genres of communication to
confine and discuss gossip makes sense. And this notion of
gossip, it seems to me, surpasses simple homogeneity, and
approaches simple, useless tautology.
To his credit, Bergmann does make some attempt to give
some play to his notion of gossip. He sums up his self-
defense by saying that we can't overcategorize gossip (and
18While Bergmann himself stoutly denies such a possibility
(genres are not "'merely' heuristically relevant conceptual
construction of the scientists' but empirically effective
orientational and productive models of everyday communication"
[28] ) , his actual use of the notion of genres, as fixing the
details of how gossip happens rather than simply "orienting"
our observations, belies this notion.
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that the concept of communicative genres is not such an
overcategorization), because ultimately we theorists aren't
in control of the categories (the actors control the
categories and their contents [29]). But if that's true,
why then does he start with the (over ) categorization
; why
not just present the goods and let the categories and their
actors 'empirically determine' themselves? As becomes
apparent later, when he describes the moments of a gossip-
conversation (80-81), Bergmann's notion of "actor agency" is
sharply limited -- he will recognize variance only in the
small details of the predetermined subject (in the gossip-
conversation, he recognizes that different participants can
start or finish a gossip-conversation, but its fundamental
path remains static)
. Bergmann's commitment to the tenets
of the scientific method seem very much provisional,
tactical, for decorative purposes only19
.
Several conclusions Bergmann reaches in this study are
oddly shaped by his methodology. One interpretative task
is to explain the everyday conception of gossip, according
to which only women gossip. Bergmann employs some truly
wacky etymology to explain that women have been labelled as
gossips for a long time. In brief, the theory is that the
original German word for gossip, "klatz", was originally an
19 In short, Bergmann's apparent "play" shows only the
retention of his model -- "adjustments" are made for odd
cases, otherwise gossip is a straightforward and noncomplex
social issue.
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interjection that was the sound of the crack of a whip or a
slap; and that this word carried with it the connotations of
a wet stain (62-63). Bergmann's creative conclusion from
this is that "klatz" invokes up a scene of washerwomen doing
their chores, and gossiping during the process. "The
washing place is symbolic birth place of (female) gossip,"
Bergmann concludes ( 63 ) . Bergmann is pleased with his
linguistic reconstruction of the word, because he suggests
that this gives some substantive evidence for why it is
women have been labelled the gossiping sex, rather than the
label simply being "empty" or "analytically obtuse" (63) .
His contention is clearly that once we know why and how
women got this defamatory label, we can freely reject it
(61) . But Bergmann actually moves in a different direction.
More trivially, in the presentation of the etymology
itself, Bergmann misses an obvious point 20 . He presents
klatsching historically (71-74)
,
developing as a female
response to the overwhelmingly male coffeehouses of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. While Bergmann is
quick to ascribe dramatically serious purposes to the coffee
houses (" function [ing] primarily as places of business
...centers of communication in early bourgeois economic and
20Of course, Bergmann misses several obvious points here,
not the least being that his etymological explanation doesn't
account for why women are castigated as gossips in non-German
languages (notably English)
,
where the roots of gossip are
both not clearly gendered as distinct from the roots of the
German klatsch. His explanation cannot be accurate.
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cultural history ... serv [ing] the editors of the London moral
weeklies as editorial locations and... business addresses
. . . exercis [ing] no small influence on literature" [72] )
their female counterparts get dismissive, and quick
treatment as centers of gossip talk only. Indeed, Bergmann
chiefly characterizes them as "the butt of men's jokes"
(ibid)
. Now, while it is certainly true that serious
business did (and does) get conducted in coffeehouses and
bars, it is nothing short of disingenuous not even to
su99es t that non- " serious " activities like gossiping also
occurred, to say nothing of the possibility that business
sometimes 4s gossiping. Bergmann 's description suggests
that coffeehouses weren't so much sites of socializing as
early business guilds, or oral newspapers. Indeed, as
Mickey Hellyer's dissertation makes clear (see Chapter Two),
even august personages like Benjamin Franklin, engaged in
serious tavern business like adult education, were wont to
do little else with their "purposive" bar time than gossip.
Bergmann 's initial, moralizing prejudices against gossip,
then, produce this incomplete reading of gossip, and
reproduce the assumption (if displacing it to an earlier
historical moment) that indeed, only women really do gossip.
More broadly, the etymology gets applied when Bergmann
makes it clear that the reason why women (and old people,
and working-class people) get saddled with the pejorative of
"gossips" is that gossiping is (was) done by the working
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classes, by the (female) domestic servants, about the upper
classes (their masters)
. The whole scenario is remindful of
his treatment of celebrity gossip (we do it out of a mixture
of envy, adoration, resentment [51] ) -- his examples and
description make that clear. This is a condescending,
reductive treatment of gossip -- it's done for shallow
reasons, it's done from resentment, lower-class people do it
about upper-class people, and certainly never the other way
around
. Again, it suggests a reductive univocality about
gossip, and a pretty negative univocality at that. We
gossip to express our base lower natures, and clearly only
certain of us (the poor, women, the unemployed, the elderly)
need to express those lower natures — rich, active people
(rich active men) lead too interesting lives to be able or
interested to waste time nattering.
Of course, it could be that Bergmann is simply raising
this specter as a vision of the past — in other words, this
is the myth about gossip (these are the presuppositions that
arise out of those old, outdated intuitions we all have
about gossip)
,
to which he will now contrast the clearer
reality (everybody gossips, regardless of class position,
employment, gender, activity level, etc.). As I said
before, this is an ineffective tactic in the first place,
because its historical siting of gossip as a female, lower-
21 Indeed, at one point Bergmann quite explicitly says that
gossip between "superiors and subordinates, namely, between
persons of unequal rank, is generally rare" (68)
.
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class activity still carries with it stigma (since class
boundaries exist, and many women still do in fact launder
clothes)
. But more unfortunately, if he ultimately wishes
to dispel this cliche as a cliche (as something with no
claims to accuracy) he certainly doesn't do it in this book,
because he doesn't give us one reason (theoretical or
empirical) to believe why anyone other than women, the
unemployed, old folks, and working-class folk gossip. He
doesn't show us or talk to us about upper-class gossip
(whether or not they do it and what characterizes their
gossip). Aside from the fact that he's also clearly
suggesting that gossip can be typified in a really broad way
(you gossip and thus you reveal your social, class or gender
position)
,
remember again the cliched gossip transcriptions
Bergmann presents us with, women in project apartments
sifting through neighbors' carnal and venal sins. In other
words, Bergmann doesn't show us rich or occupationally
successful people, or many male people, engaged either in
these (or other) kinds of behaviors, discussing these (or
other) kinds of behaviors. So his evidence presupposes the
conclusion he never has to make explicit -- that women, the
idle, the elderly really do gossip more than other folks.
Indeed, Bergmann closes the chapter with the limp
statement that women are simply characterized as gossiping
more because structurally they fall into the positions seen
as gossip-producers more than men (67) -- here he's talking
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about the kinds of jobs women often hold (i.e., domestics,
launderers, secretaries, child care)
. But even this
conclusion simply reinforces the outdated intuition,
regardless if via a different justification. So, as this
first conclusion of Bergmann
' s makes clear, his interest in
conceptual movement (let the facts present themselves!) is
minimal -- both his methodology and his prose serve only to
reinforce churlish privately muttered but perhaps more
widely held stereotypes
.
After having contended that only certain kinds of folks
gossip, now Bergmann moves on to conclude that only certain
kinds of situations lend themselves to gossip. Bergmann
introduces the continuum between active and inactive gossip
(71-80) -- active gossip is klat schincr
. where gossip is the
activity, and inactive gossip is diversionary gossip, where
you're gossiping to pass the time on the way to something
else [class, work, appointments]). Of course, given his
attitude and tone towards gossip earlier in this book, it's
surprising that he didn't align terms to type oppositely.
The fact that inactive gossip is also characterized as
"diversionary" should alone make this point clear --
Bergmann really doesn't think diversionary gossip has a
point other than the diversion itself, filling up "empty"
time (75) . And the entire continuum is overshadowed by
Bergmann ' s assumption of the social disreputability of
gossip (and how that is a thing not to be questioned) .
Gossip at work, which Bergmann considers as different from
diversionary gossip but really isn't (the only difference is
that it's intentionally diversionary gossip -- you could be
doing other things but you're choosing not to), is discussed
as the most surreptitious kind of gossip -- Bergmann
suggests an entire complicated set of behaviors by which
work gossipers gossip so as to appear to be just about to,
just finished with, or in the middle of work22
. So both
hslvGs of the continuum are tainted by the notion that
gossiping is something not to be done, to be castigated.
Bergmann
' s only attempt at being slightly less than rigid is
when he says that sometimes particular conversations can be
active or inactive (76), but this qualifier hardly does much
to alter the context of his analysis.
Again, I think it is a plausible thesis that Bergmann'
s
overarching presupposition of the social and moral
disreputability of gossip produces this restrictive
analysis. Bergmann lists elaborate sets of behaviors as the
only protection workers have against lavish punishments for
their sloth (e.g., gossiping while standing, holding files,
etc. [77-78] )
.
But I think the issue to consider here is
why are workers punished? Is it because (as Bergmann
220f course, a reasonable alternative hypothesis is
presented by Gluckman (1963)
,
that the working gossipers quite
well might be working by gossiping (obvious examples: Walter
Winchell, Hedda Hopper), but such a simple thesis is
inconceivable to Bergmann, who not only ignores such a
possibility, but replaces it with a more elaborate, social-
sciencey argument
.
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suggests) they are doing something socially disreputable?
He analogizes gossip to drunkenness as a means of
demonstrating precisely this point (77-78) ; he argues that
drunkenness is only acceptable at work under certain
conditions (winning lottery, birth of a child)
,
because
otherwise it's seen as social disreputabil ity
.
As before with the dance metaphor, I think he picked
exactly the analogy that refutes his point. Bosses don't
care if you're drunk at work because it's socially
disreputable (notice that Bergmann never gives us a reason
for why it is that bosses only care about drunkenness
sometimes because of social disreputability) -- they care
because it makes you less productive (you're less profitable
for them) . If you can hide your drunkenness, if you can get
your work done, they don't care about drinking. I'm sure
anyone reading this piece can think of many functional
drunks, who are able to get through most workdays with
steady drinking or excessive lunchtime drinking. Those
unable to recall functional drunks should recall the John
Tower confirmation episode, or the aborted Thomas Eagleton
Vice-Presidential nomination 23 . The point here is not that
simply Tower and Eagleton eventually lost their political
plums because of fear of public disapprobation, but that [as
testimony and public record around each episode makes clear]
23Cf . White, chapter 8, for a full account of this
episode
.
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their respective indulgences were transparently obvious to
their coworkers, constituents, for years before the
respective contretemps. Indeed, the retracted political
prizes were initially offered precisely because of each
politico's spectacular success at functioning despite what
according to Bergmann would be a debilitating weakness.
Even the gestures towards disguising or minimizing the
drinking (e.g. only drinking at lunch at restaurants away
from the worksite, or drinking in a private location at
work) don't make the drunkenness any less apparent -- astute
observers can read the signals of regular secretive
behavior. Most functional drunks are in no threat of losing
their position, precisely because they can still do the work
they are expected to do. The same corollary follows with
gossip -- employers don't care about gossip if it means you
can still get your work done and it doesn't interfere with
your performance in other ways (i.e., if it doesn't foment
your anger at your job). Lots of 'socially disreputable'
things are easily tolerated in workplaces (lying, cheating,
manipulation, certain kinds of drug use) -- because they
don't hinder productivity (and in some cases [trading in
stocks is the obvious recent example] clearly help it, and
are [perhaps only tacitly] encouraged) . Productivity, and
so clearly not social disreputability
,
is at least as
constraining, if not more so. Owners, bosses, and managers
are not in the business of making business decisions rest on
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moral judgements -- unless, of course, those moral
judgements happen to coincide with increased business or
better public relations. In other words, to return to the
Tower/Eagleton examples, had Congress confirmed Tower or the
Democratic party supported the Eagleton nomination, certain
business fallout -- unseating of incumbents, calls for
reductions in Department of Defense budgets -- would have
been probable. Clearly, if morality were the real issue,
with such widespread knowledge of each's habits prior to the
icts
,
neither Tower nor Eagleton should have been put
forth in the first place; and indeed, their political
careers should have been aborted at much earlier points in
time. Of course, Bergmann ignores this fact in lieu of
making grand moral statements like: "gossip is viewed as
sociable inactivity and is therefore incompatible with work"
( 77 ) .
I suspect that part of the reason Bergmann makes a case
for gossip being socially disreputable is because he is
still fascinated with the phenomenon of gossip on a
voyeuristic level 24 . Bergmann wants to think of gossip as
a clandestine, subversive activity that depends on
secretive, private networks of trusted compatriots trading
24More evidence supporting the thesis that Bergmann is
either a voyeuristic gossip-phobe or an ashamed, secretive
gossip seeking to repress his vicious past.
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I think a
secrets no one would dare express in public 25
,
moment of reflection on the nature of gossip easily
demonstrates that it is far from having such a clandestine
character currently. Bergmann makes his covert attitudes
overt when he distinguishes between gossip and rumor -- the
mam distinction for Bergmann is that rumor doesn't depend
on preexisting networks of trusted interlocutors (anyone can
spread or receive a rumor)
, whereas gossip does (70) . But
this notion, again, is outdated. Gossiping doesn't require
significantly greater levels of trust and intimacy than
rumor. Granted, in an Enlightenment world, where physical
appearances and statements were considered to be eminently
confirmable or falsifiable, and where there was a truth to
be known, making verboten connections and thinking in an
unseemly way did require trust and intimacy (why else was
gossiping evidence for the practice of witchcraft? [Bergmann
16] ) . In that world, gossip is a frontal attack on
rationality and logic. But in a century where the theories
with most common purchase revolve around perspective
(relativism, pragmatism, existentialism, postmodernism)
,
there are no stakes (sic!) in gossiping. You don't
25Hence his fascination with the cof feeklatsch itself;
which he describes as unique because, unlike other social
settings, "gossip occurs here within the context of -- we
could also say under the cover of -- socially accepted
sociability" (74) . In other words, klatsching is interesting
to Bergmann (not simply because it's a world he clearly
couldn't enter but) because its practitioners courageously
defy the sure-to-be-applied label of moral disapprobation;
klatsching is gossip uncloseted.
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(Everyone but the
challenge anything epistemologically,
professional philosophers knows that you can't believe
everything you hear or read.) That's why now you can gossip
with relative strangers, and in relative comfort. Indeed,
the clear collapse of the public-private distinction in
journalism
,
which was certainly apparent as Bergmann
wrote his monograph, is fair testimony to the only
increasing legitimacy of gossip.
Bergmann views his own work as a drastic improvement on
earlier scientific works on gossip 27
, because he is the
only scientific researcher willing to consider gossip "on
its own terms" (a claim he frequently repeats)
. However, my
general conclusion about Bergmann
' s book is that when an
approach to gossip as careful, self-conscious and extensive
as Bergmann
' s nonetheless still ignores many basic aspects
of gossip and rumor, and when the methodological departure
from its prior studies such a work promises not only fails
to emerge, but indeed, reproduces stale old chestnuts for
conclusions, then perhaps it is time for gossipists to look
for new approaches to analyzing gossip. Perhaps the problem
is not, as Bergmann repeatedly reminds us, that only some
26A few examples of this are Signorile (1993) ; the
Harper '
s
forum (1986); cable channel El's "Gossip Show,"
broadcast daily; and the thriving of gossip magazines and
newspapers in this country and in Europe (Meiser [1995] )
.
27Some of those he speaks disparagingly about that are
relevant here include not only Gluckman but Haviland (1977)
;
Shibutani (1966); Goffman (1963); Lumley (1925); Philadelphia
Institute for the Study of Human Relations (1958).
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scientists are considering gossip on its own terms, but
rather that social science as we think of it actually
prohibits a consideration of gossip on its own terms.
It is important to document the ways in which less
tightly academic analyses of gossip perpetuate the same
straitened analysis. While Deborah Tannen
' s You Just Don't
Understand (1990) is (unlike Bergmann) not centrally
focussed on gossip, the approach she uses to consider gossip
as one of the many indicators of gender differences in
language is revealing. Tannen makes many of the same
definitional assumptions Bergmann does when theorizing about
gossip. For Tannen, gossip is simply (and again) reporting
on an absent third party's personal life; and it is
something only (or primarily) women do (96-97)
.
Tannen,
then, is also writing from a univocality of perspective on
gossip (only recognizing a very few things to be gossip or
particular people as gossips)
; her univocality differs from
Bergmann in its gender-specificity.
For those unfamiliar with Tannen
' s book, she argues
that American women and men are raised differently -- that
as boys and girls we learn different means and values of
communication, and that this split continues through
adulthood -- men and women simply don't speak the same
language. My quarrel here is not with the book's overall
argument (though I think that argument more generally
restates the criticisms I make in this section) . More
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particularly, Tannen
' s assumption of gossip as something
gals do that boys just can't understand strikes me as
naively overgeneralizing.
Tannen believes that gossip is something girls learn
very young. While boys are off roughhousing and playing
games, girls sit in each others' rooms and just talk; that
is an acceptable play activity for girls that boys must
repudiate (80)
.
Like Bergmann, Tannen is making an
assumption about the simplicity and univocality of human
behavior here -- she is assuming that when girls talk in
rooms, that they are only talking (and that they are only
talking about the content of their talk)
,
and she similarly
assumes that when boys play games, they are only playing
games and not communicating (indeed gossiping) on some other
level)
. When boys (and later men) do talk, Tannen avers, it
is about topics like sports and politics, and ' report -talk
'
,
or talk to impress, inform, or persuade (85)
.
Tannen (like
Bergmann) ignores the argument that talk about sports and
politics, that talk about non-personal issues, can be gossip
(can be personal, among other things); and correlatively
,
that apparently "personal" gossip can also be about
impersonal topics, or have layers of meaning that extend
beyond the individuals in question. For Tannen,
conversation is either good (expressive, intimate, revealing
= feminine) or bad (non-expressive
,
impersonal, combative =
masculine) . Her locution makes it clear (83, 84, 91) that
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women are naturally more expressive than men, that they are
expressive because they talk clearly and directly about
themselves and their personal lives, and that this is the
ideal both sexes should strive for in their conversation.
Tannen grounds her sociolinguist ic program in a series
of dichotomies about conversation that are based on her
reduced notion of what gossip is and who does it. For
Tannen, gossip is either good ( talking-about
,
intimate) or
bad ( talking-against [96] )
.
Any particular item of gossip
can be either one or the other, but never both at once.
Intimate gossip is valued over non-intimate gossip on many
levels. Not only is intimate gossip better than morally
disreputable talking-against, it is also clearly valued over
political gossip (which isn't really gossip in any
interesting way for Tannen [101] ) . Men only gossip about
politics with each other, and cannot gossip about personal
lives. Tannen maintains this split between public and
private, intimate and impersonal, even in the face of
counterexample. When she acknowledges that public and
private get blended, that news and government reports are
becoming gossipier, she argues that this is only about style
("off the cuff," "informal"), not substance (105). Remarks
are "made to seem" gossipy; the implication here is clearly
that news can never really be gossip, because it's not about
the right subjects (it's not personal, it's about "big"
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issues -- objective, universal topics that affect all of us
directly)
.
While much of Tannen
' s chapter on gossip is simply
advice for men and women on different strategies to come to
conversational detente with each other (in essence, she's
suggesting that men need to learn how to gossip more, and
that women need to learn to do 'report-talk' more [121]),
her concept is subsumptive. I like Tannen
' s advocacy of
gossip here, but it's done for the wrong reasons. Women
need strategically to learn about assertiveness, but men
need to adopt feminine values of intimacy and
connectiveness, and gossip (the right kind of gossip) is the
tool with which to do this
. Since gossip is simply a
component of her argument, and not the argument itself, it
is impossible to tell how (or why) she maintains the
assumptions towards gossip that she does. Suffice it to say
that she, again like Bergmann, restricts her notion of
gossip (it is either good or bad, it must be about certain
topics only, it can only be between individuals and have
relevance in interpersonal relations, only women do it)
,
ultimately to restrict the applicability or interest of her
analysis; while gossip can be "appropriated" by men,
inherently it remains a tool for women, for essentially
private purposes.
Even when writers on gossip and rumor expand the realm
of their analysis from the strictly personal to structurally
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political, their analyses do not correlat ively expand in
insight or sophistication. Terry Ann Knopf, in her Rumors
.
Race and Riots (1975)
,
very much writes about rumors as
political entities, exceedingly charged political
manifestations that can help signal the onset of race riots,
or civil disorder (153). But more broadly, whereas Tannen
is enough of a social constructivist to argue that at least
some facets of gossip are malleable (e.g.
,
men can learn how
to gossip too)
,
Knopf depicts rumor as an even more
immutable social occurrence
.
Knopf's project is very narrowly defined; she's trying
to determine why it is that racial riots are so frequently
precipitated or accompanied by rumors; in particular, she's
concentrating on race riots occurring in the United States
in this century only (19) . Knopf rejects the previous
theories of rumor occurrence, as either too individualistic
(13), or so generally socially determining that they fail to
explain the uniqueness of rumor formation -- in particular,
rumors about civil disorders (86-90)
.
The model Knopf
eventually constructs combines structural factors, local
causes, and some psychological theory, to explain why and
how race rumors can occur (107-109)
.
The complexity of Knopf ' s model stands at odds with the
narrowness of her treatment of rumor. To her credit, Knopf
acknowledges the limitations of rumor study. While she
accepts that standard definition of rumor (a proposition
58
without sufficient evidential proof [ 1 ] ) , she acknowledges
that it's difficult to study rumors in part because only
those rumors that are false tend to be documented or
remembered as rumors; rumors that turn out to be true are
documented simply as fact (62)
.
But unfortunately,
throughout Knopf
' s study the stain of rumors as necessarily
false and counterproductive social ills remains 28
. Knopf,
by very legitimately trying to de-emphasize the all-
determining power of rumors she sees in the contemporary
social science literature (she energetically argues against
the naively empirical belief that by refuting the rumor you
solve the social problem29 ) , by my reading goes too far in
this task -- rumors simply become one of a host of blips on
our social screen, to be read accordingly.
To explain in more detail, Knopf's model presents two
kinds of features that pave the way for racial disorders:
28Because this argument has been so exhaustively
demonstrated in my discussion of Bergmann, I will not
elaborate on it here. Suffice it to say that Knopf's language
throughout her book (rumors are associated with lynching
because both rely on assumptions of belief rather than strict
standards of proof [19] ; rumors are defined as the proof stage
for [generally false and hostile] beliefs [158-159; rumors
increase polarization while strengthening solidarity "in a
negative sort of way" [164] ) , combined with her lack
particular analysis of the concept of rumor, justifies
reading of her as presupposing a negative
counterproductive image of rumor.
of
a
and
29Knopf names the Philadelphia Institute study and
Shibutani as two of her examples . I disagree with her placing
of Shibutani in this camp, but otherwise accept her
characterization of this tendency within those who study the
social phenomenon of rumor (and indeed, gossip)
.
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larger, structural characteristics (e.g. demographic
changes, ideology changes, urbanization, industrialization
[146] ) , and immediate circumstances (local incidents that
can touch off conflagrations [150]). In this model, rumor
acts as kind of a shuttle -- it can simply act itself as an
immediate circumstance (a particular rumor about a
particular local incident), or it can represent or make
particular general ideological convictions (Knopf observes
patterns to rumors people spin around racial incidents,
having to do with continually held stereotypes [119-130,
134-142]). Additionally, Knopf is critiquing the literature
on rumor, which defines it either as a strictly individual
or social problem -- the roots of rumors, particularly race
rumors, Knopf argues, are manifold. Ultimately, Knopf
remarks, " [rumors] are an extension as well as expression of
[community] conflicts" (243) . But the problem this
argumentation raises is that if one phenomenon called
"rumor" arises in all sorts of kinds of situations, has
different kinds of origins, and functions in opposing ways,
then the explanation of and description of that phenomenon
must account for those myriad characteristics. To simply
point to a wide variety of explanations, theories,
phenomena, and say "look, there's rumor," while appealing
only to the most general of definitions, brings us no closer
to an understanding of what rumor is, and why and how it
functions in the complicated, seemingly contradictory ways
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it does
.
In other words, Knopf sheds no light on the issue
of why rumors in particular are one of the many signals of
racial unrest -- indeed, an almost inevitable one.
Witness Knopf's language: " [rumors are] one of a
number of determinants which enhance the prospects for a
collective outburst" (153), rumors are often simply
crystallization of already-held hostile beliefs, or the
last straws" before violence (151, 153, 154)
,
"rumor closes
the gap between a hostile belief and its embodiment as a
'fact'" (159). While it's true that at least technically,
these lines refer to rumor as an active phenomenon (no
passive verb voice here)
,
the fact remains that using
analogues like "crystallization" and "last straws" suggests
that rumors are significant for Knopf less because of what
they actually do (in other words, how they change or make
manifest violence that was simply imminent previously)
,
than
for what they represent. More particularly, this usage of
"crystallization" connotes a kind of inevitability or
overdetermination to rumors -- they cannot be controlled or
prevented. Rumors are one (perhaps the last) sign of
imminent political crisis (a riot); where a rumor occurs, a
riot is a serious possible consequence. Rumors are less a
phenomenon to be understood, than one simply to be marked,
noted, and countered.
It is because rumors are such a passive phenomenon that
the policy recommendations with which Knopf ends her study
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seem to have so little to do with rumor itself; the
recommendations are all about avoiding the consequence of
rumor: riots. Knopf's lack of real analysis of the concept
of rumor means that ultimately, she doesn't have a lot to
say about it in lieu of what she determines as the "real"
determinants of riots. Knopf sees race riots in the first
place as endable only through real, material, structural
changes in society (e.g. a more egalitarian distribution of
wealth, housing, educational opportunities); barring that,
her self -described provisional solutions all have to do with
broadening accountability of public offices to the
community, and increasing communication between officials
and the public on a day-to-day, non-crisis basis.
While her recommendations in general seem responsible
and reasonable, one irony presents itself. Knopf concludes
her book by addressing the brief phenomenon of "Centers for
Rumor Control" (CRCs, public crisis hotlines for people to
report in rumors and check on their verification/
disconf irmation) . While CRCs enjoyed a brief vogue after
World War II and longlasting good press (307-308), Knopf
subjects them to some strong criticism, arguing that the
problems rumor signify are too big for CRCs to be a real
solution (311-312) 30 . "They [CRCs] not only treat rumors
30 It's worth noting here that CRCs, when used by smaller
groups for their members only (for example, the Crips and the
Bloods gangs in Los Angeles), have met with success. My
thanks to Bob Ackermann for pointing this out.
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as an isolated, problem, they treat it as the problem, with
rumor control as the solution," Knopf claims (308) . Of
course, in her rush to prove that rumors are not only not
the problem but play only the smallest of roles in the
problem, Knopf amply demonstrates that rumors really aren't
her topic at all. In other words, exactly why she makes fun
of CRCs is because of the accompanying naive empiricism with
which they began. Just get the right facts out to folks, so
the thinking proceeds, and they can't help but recognize The
Truth, and cease and desist any and all unlawful behavior.
But of course, Knopf responds, rumors just don't work like
that, and more broadly, people don't work like that. If you
don't trust the police (or management, or your department
head, or your parents, or your friends) to begin with, why
will you suddenly believe them when they tell you some one
fact contrary to what you've been believing for a while?
You won't, and so of course the disorder won't stop, she
says. But most of Knopf's policy recommendations are simply
more sophisticated versions of exactly the same kind of
empiricist naivete (newspapers should rely less on wire
services [300-303]
; police should be trained to become more
rumor-conscious, and screen police applicants for "emotional
fitness" [259-262]; public officials should more actively
verify and communicate with the public about rumors they
hear [276-278] ) .
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To be sure, Knopf herself is aware of this point, hence
the band-aid remark. But it seems to me that part of the
reason Knopf is able at the end of her extensive study to
offer only (albeit bigger) band-aids to the gaping wound of
race relations in this country is exactly because she has
failed to grasp the complexity of the concept of rumor.
Riots and rumors can in some sense be seen as similar
concepts. Both are genuinely ambiguous, unpredictable
social constructs. The very ambiguity of Knopf's model of
riot aetiology (the vast number of "possible" structural
forces she names, the ambiguity of "situational"
circumstances) attests to this, as does her difficulty with
explaining the variance to rumor. Knopf claims, quite
correctly, that rumors have failed to be controlled by such
inherently rational and predictable means as CRCs -- new
rumors constantly crop up that are "untrackable " by the CRC
radar (e.g. in the '60s Communist conspiracy rumors died
down, to be replaced by race rumors)
. Riots are (by
definition) a similarly unpredictable social phenomenon, so
it is hard to see how recommendations that require game-
theoretic rationality on the part of their participants
would succeed (well, the police have this great new public
relations program where they attend town meetings once a
month, so they can't also be brutal) . At best, it seems
that riots would simply morph into differently manifested
phenomena -- as the literature on the LA riots of 1992
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suggests. Reducing social concepts to the sum of their
rational, precipitating factors (rumors = ambiguity of news
+ inadequate information, riots = structural inequities +
local incidents) denies the inherent contrariness of social
life; similarly, eliminating rumors from an analysis of
riots (save for as a passive, but negative, marker) so as to
ensure a rational, predictable answer ensures that the
answer such analysis provides will not succeed.
Unfortunately, contemporary events underline this point.
Even where the topic is not nearly as grim as riots,
yet still not stereotypically gossipy (a view of gossip that
does not revolve around individual actions)
,
the tack of
dismissing the accuracy of rumor so as to enhance the
potency of centralized policy solutions remains attractive
to far too many academics. Marie Zaner, in her 1991
dissertation, sets herself the pragmatic task of designing a
model for communicative strategy to help companies implement
organization-wide changes (layoffs, reorganizations, name
changes, etc.) without drastic negative side benefits (which
she sees as, among other things, unionization of the
employees) . While she begins the dissertation with one
assumption of how communication strategies have to change
(on a broad-based level, changing how the message is
initially presented, to whom, and its content)
,
her
secondary research early on demonstrates that rumors are a
key reason administrative changes often go over poorly (52-
65
53). She positions herself as a supporter of informal
channels -- companies need to make use of the grapevine to
communicate their information with less risk and greater
speed, ability for evaluation on both sides (72-73, 75-76)
But enthusiasm aside, Zaner still has a fundamental
mistrust of the effect of rumors on stable businesses, a
mistrust her research suggests is misplaced. First, she
cites several studies that demonstrate that rumor accuracy
is much higher than we might otherwise think (ranging from
50-90% accuracy! [75] )
;
this fact becomes particularly
revealing when we examine her 15 case studies of companies
instituting organization-wide change carefully. In seven of
the 15 cases, a major problem for the companies was that
they released inconsistent information to their employees
regarding the change, so the employees would lose trust in
the company, become more hostile, etc. (In four of the
other case studies, the company simply released very little
information, resulting in similar situations.) Anyway,
what's thrilling about this is that the "authoritative"
information is only about as accurate as the lower end of
the rumor accuracy level . Rumors are almost always right
!
(Or certainly, no less wrong than the "right stuff.")
This becomes ironic to me when Zaner endorses another
writer's advice that "once rumors have begun, the best
advice is to provide facts to those most affected by its
spread. By doing this management has removed the ambiguity
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because the facts are transmitted via a reliable original
source" (133-134). But of course, there's not much of a
solid ground in this study for believing that management
information is necessarily going to be all that much more
reliable than rumor information. In several of the cases
(four), accurate rumors about the proposed changes provoked
management into announcing the change sooner than they'd
intended to, oftentimes months before the change was
scheduled to go into effect -- this is partly what resulted
in company chaos so many times (and while the rumors
occasionally may have been exaggerated in those cases, the
essential character of them wasn't far off the mark)
. For
example, in one case, when the news was finally announced,
"the general feeling among the employees was 'It's about
time'
"
(211) . Only in one case study does Zaner actually
mention than some of the rumors circulating were bizarre
(219)
,
but at the same time, this case was yet another case
study where management had provided inconsistent information
("No layoffs!" - layoffs - "No more layoffs!" - more layoffs
-
"No more layoffs!" - still more [200]), in a situation
where information was desperately needed (a total of more
than one-quarter of company employees were laid off over two
years)
.
Zaner is assuming the sustained reliability of
authoritative information, a reliability belied by the
evidence at hand.
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By the conclusion, Zaner apparently recognizes at least
some validity to rumor. Her model changes drastically from
the beginning of the research to its conclusion -- and the
one major change in the model is the new emphasis given
rumors. Zaner
' s proposed model depends on Grice's (1975)
maxim of four parts to communication strategy: message,
source, channel, timing. In the original model, the source
is the most central part of the model (she most closely
links it to the nature of the change and the organizational
dynamics, 255); but in the revised model, timing becomes the
most central part of the model (282)
;
and timing is
important because rapid transmission of management
information defuses the power of rumor. More particularly,
in the original model, "rumors" are the second and third
sub-categories to the (lower prioritized) timing category;
in the revised model, rumors are the first subcategory of
the first-prioritized timing category. Zaner is explicit
that rumor pervasiveness is the reason behind her changes to
the model (273 ) .
Yet even in such a straightforward analysis of the
importance of rumors in official change, Zaner must still
present criticisms of the existence of them at all. Even
after Zaner has argued for the efficacy of rumors for
administrators (the grapevine is there to be used, employees
can be manipulated successfully through rumors) , she must
still remind us of the moral taint rumors carry.
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Often the grapevine made the changes worse thanthey ultimately became. Employees seemed to feelthat any information was better than no
information. The more interest employees had in
the change and the less information they receivedfrom management, the more rumors developed. (235)
Any information, of course, implies information of
(probably) dubious accuracy and reliability. Remember,
we're operating from within a framework that still takes
source of information and credibility very seriously (and
means both terms in the most straightforward, typical ways)
This casual slam ignores the fact that information from
hiGfhly credible sources (management) was often, in these
very case studies, of no value at all, and only served to
mislead employees even more (in fact, contradicting many of
the accurate rumors employees were trading) 31
. In short,
then, despite her moments of appreciation of the power of
rumor, Zaner clearly thinks that rumors are an inevitable
31Zaner is by no means the first scholar to make this
point explicitly; Tamotsu Shibutani ' s well -regarded Improvised
News: A Sociological Study of Rumor (1966), begins by
pointing out that "false intelligence is sometimes worse than
ignorance" (2) . While Shibutani ' s manifest purpose is to bring
rumors up for examination, to show where they are empirically
right as well as wrong, and while he refers to incorrect
information being disseminated from various authorities as
fact (and as inciting rumor)
,
it is interesting to note that
the language of violence he invokes to criticize inaccuracy in
information (see part 2 of this chapter) applies only to the
inaccuracy of rumor- information, and not to the
"authoritative" data.
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commodity inherently dangerous to business; smart managers
should strive to quarantine them successfully 32
.
What we have seen up until now is a series of more
applied analyses of gossip and rumor, each assuming the
inevitability and the undesirability of gossip and rumor.
The more general rumor authority most rumor authors cite,
Gordon Allport and Leo Postman's The Psychology of Rumor
(1947)
,
while not having such an activist agenda as to
propose models or recommendations to control the spread of
rumor, presents the same old argument that there is a dire
need to control rumors and gossip, to preserve community
sanity. Even though Allport and Postman initially define
rumor pretty innocuously: "A large part of ordinary social
conversation consists of rumor-mongering
. In our daily
chitchat with friends we both take in and give out whole
lungfuls of gossip -- sometimes idle, sometimes not"
( vii ) 33 , their real opinions soon become clear. Rumors
alternately "sap morale ... menace national safety ... spread []
needless alarm... rais [e] extravagant hopes," and "sprea[d]
the virus of hostility and hate" (vii-viii) . Indeed, when
Allport and Postman define rumor in more exact terms, they
32For a comically excessive demonstration of this line of
thought, see Philadelphia Institute for Social Relations
(1958) . This study of the effect of a false rumor on a
disaster- stricken community actually purports to trace out the
play-by-play path of the rumor (13), so as to instruct readers
to control more effectively similar "outbreaks."
33Notice that this is another example of the casual
intermixing of gossip and rumor.
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are only able to do so in terms of a lack: a rumor is a
"specific (or topical) proposition for belief, passed along
from person to person, usually by word of mouth, without
secure standards of evidence being present" (ix)
.
In other
words, we recognize a rumor chiefly by what it's not,
justified true belief. More precisely, their analysis of
the path of rumor transmission is an analysis of how the
requisite distortion occurs (they trace a path through
recall, forgetting, imagination, and rationalization of
participants, viii)
,
clearly not even considering the
possibility that rumors could be accurate, or have validity.
Of course, part of the reason Allport and Postman
conceive of rumors as necessarily false and necessarily
present is because of their highly psychologized account of
how and why we spread rumors. We spread and believe rumors
because they relieve, justify or explain emotional urges, as
well as providing closure and meaning in an inherently
chaotic environment (37) . Because of this complicated web
of individual emotions dictating our rumor transmission,
Allport and Postman regretfully conclude that even when
there is a "kernel" of truth to a particular rumor, it is
probably inextricably embedded within the detail and
distortion that are added to satisfy the particular
individual's psychic interests (147-149, 43). At the end,
Allport and Postman come clean and admit that rumor isn't
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really about designating or presenting new information, but
"evaluating" or "appreciating" old information. Indeed,
they continue,
[ijnsofar as rumors pretend to be informative-
designative, they are always, in part at least,
erroneous. Since this pretense is always present,
they are invariably a deceptive mode of discourse
[167]
Such false and manipulative information can be controlled to
some extent, Allport and Postman admit — when people are
more educated to the real nature of rumors, they are less
likely to be susceptible to them (36)
.
But the fact remains
for Allport and Postman that no matter what our activist
intentions, the specter of rumor remains to haunt us --
ultimately, it makes public both private, individual wants
and desires and larger, collective fears and dreams.
Ultimately, what Allport and Postman make explicit --
encouraging us to study rumors in their "appraising,
legendary, mythic, poetic" capacities (169) -- is exactly
what their followers (Bergmann, Knopf, Tannen, Zaner) have
done. These students of rumor and gossip are ultimately
interested only in the legendary and mythic aspects of
conversational formations. Gossip and rumor are interesting
more for the cachet with which they are held than for the
divergent forms they take, and the myriad effects they bring
about. No matter what the ostensive content or circle of
gossip and rumor -- intimate friends, neighbors, corporate
employees, nervous citizens -- gossip and rumor can function
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only to highlight inevitable flaws we have (we speak
separate languages, we are not serious enough, we ignore
reality, we are unselective in our information collection)
.
Such are the elements of social meteorology. For this group
of barometricians, rumors and gossip are (ig) noble lies for
the populace, nothing less, and certainly nothing more.
1 . 2 Spin Doctors
Unlike the social meteorologists, who only see gossip
and rumor as always already present, those academics I think
of as gossip and rumor "spin doctors" share some commitment
to social constructivism; to varying degrees, each attests
to the fact that our words can construct real truths for us,
that even "less" empirically reliable words like those of
gossip and rumor can be part of that truth-making, and that
hence gossip and rumor are more complicated features of the
social scene than we might have previously thought. Of
course, while this sounds initially appealing, the
depressing reality is that spin doctors really do still have
sacred cows, just more covertly. The members of this group
clearly write with two truths in mind -- Truth, which is
actually empirically correct, and the truth of gossip and
rumor, which may sometimes coincidentally turn out to be
Truth, but in general is simply an interpretation of,
exaggeration of, projection of, or otherwise distortion of
The Real Thing. Social constructivism turns out to be a
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convenient peg on which spin doctors can hang a triadic
notion of truth -- truth, outright falsehood, and the messy
stuff in between. But unfortunately, the two initial
concepts remain purified; the in between messiness of gossip
has no meaningful status or content for these
constructivists. Untidy gossip and rumor are simply empty
space
.
John Beard Haviland, in his Gossip, Reputation, and
Knowledge—in—Zinacantan (1977), anchors this discussion; his
arguments about gossip titrating already-existent social
rules paradigmat ically demonstrate the spin doctor's
competing allegiances to social constructivism and an
absolute notion of truth. Of course, at first glance
Haviland apparently seeks a far less value-dependent social
function than the other social scientists we have examined.
When he blandly repeats the standard dictionary definition
(personal talk about an absent third party [28] )
,
it is not
to set himself up for a Bergmannesque lecture on its evils
but so as to appreciate its varied uses. Haviland explores
his assumption that gossip is a venue for apprehending and
appreciating (and occasionally critiquing) social rules. By
Haviland' s view, there are different homogeneous groups
applying standards to personal behavior and habits; gossip
is simply an interpretive trope (a passive vehicle of
reflection) for individuals to use to consider other
individuals. While this allows for some social
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constructivist power for gossip, Haviland's individualist
bias towards gossip diminishes his ability to read the
gossip moments he collects, to consider and analyze the
background and intents of his various informants, and
probably, to hear certain kinds of conversation as gossip.
Hence Haviland is only able to see gossip as a factor in
information manipulation, not creation. And initially,
Haviland's individualist bias explains why his attitudes
towards gossip (what it is and why people do it) -- while
attenuated strike a moralistic tone similar to
Bergmann
' s
.
This failing begins to appear when Haviland repeats
that definitional saw about gossip as sordid personal
chitchat. While Haviland doesn't explicitly say what kinds
of actions aren't worthy of gossip (he only loosely
categorizes gossip as "news, report, slander, libel,
ridicule, insult, defamation, and malicious and innocent
gossip" [28] )
,
it is clear that the one thing that gossip
never addresses is political decisions, community issues.
The instances (gossip-moments) Haviland cites (23, 9) are
all about issues like excessive drinking, adultery,
marriage, divorce, etc. Leaving aside for one moment the
notion that a conversation can have many layers of
interpretation and content, Haviland early on states baldly
that instead of gossip exposing issues that affect the
Zinacanteco communities (like new taxes, harvesting or
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voting issues)
,
he observes gossip as "masking" the
conflicts: "the gossip, that is, has less to do with power
and political ends than with the personalities and
propensities of the disputants" (9) . In short, even when
gossip may occur in a civic or political setting (here
Haviland is referring explicitly to gossip-conversations
that happen in court cases, in town halls)
,
it is really
on^ly about personality. So when the ostensive content of
gossip is personal (i.e., Haviland observes a conversation
about someone's drinking too much, say), there is no latent
gossip; but if the gossip potentially concerns political
issues, there must be a latent personal content so that the
gossip (and the implications of gossip) can be kept safely
on the trivial plane of interpersonal relations 34
. It is
difficult to reconcile the one-sidedness of Haviland'
s
willingness or disinterest in seeing multiple narratives,
34 In case readers are beginning to think that I as a
gossipist am obsessed only with politics, and in fact
bifurcate my gossip to the reverse of Bergmann, Haviland et
al
.
(to wit, that only political gossip is important/
interesting and that personal gossip is dull)
,
let me make it
quite clear that I follow no such dichotomy in my own
characterization of gossip. To be sure, I do not believe that
gossip can be divided (often) as strictly personal or
political, rather that gossip conversations (like most
conversations) are clearly about many subjects at once. The
only reason I am writing so heavily on political gossip in
this chapter is to correct what I see as the mistakes earlier
gossipists make in abundance. When I use words like "sordid"
in this chapter with apparently judgmental tone, hopefully the
reader will understand that the tone is an attempt to indicate
how I read these social scientists' tone when they write about
gossip, rather than as a reflection of my personal opinions
about personal gossip.
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with his initially proclaimed interest in the power of
gossip
.
At one point, concluding a chapter, Haviland mentions
gossip that concerns town issues (65); but this is a quick
mention, with no quotations from transcripts or lengthy
analysis. Rather, Haviland 's point in mentioning that
gossip around town issues occurs is to shore up his notion
that gossip reinforces factions in towns. When this
assertion is considered in light of his earlier argument
about political gossip being transparently about personal
issues (and indeed, in light of the rest of the book and its
overwhelming supply of sordid anecdotes about Zinacantecos
) ,
his meek acknowledgement of civic gossip carries little
weight. For Haviland only a very few conversations merit
hearing, and only according to a very limited stock of
interpretations
.
Now, the careful reader could dispute this as a
reductive reading. After all, Gluckman's claim in the
original 1963 article is simply that the boundaries between
gossip and non-gossip are hard to draw, and that there are
many kinds of subjects to gossip (sometimes all at once)
.
Couldn't I, in my reading of Haviland (and Bergmann before
him)
,
be unjust in inferring simply from the ostensive
content of the cited gossip-conversations a univocal
approach to gossip -- in other words, isn't it possible that
Haviland and Bergmann are both hip enough to recognize that
77
when we gossip about someone getting drunk and being silly
we may also be gossiping about who should be chair of city
council or how much property tax should increase, etc.?
Couldn't they be that sophisticated?
In a word, no. It is not simply the fact that they
both only listen to, record, and remark upon gossip-
conversations about ostensively personal behavior; both also
very have static notions of what gossip is about, and are
unwilling to grant freedom to gossip to move beyond content
restrictions. When Haviland lists the topics of gossip
(74), they are all (with the possible exception of one,
jail) about explicitly personal aspects of life, and the
topics (listed by frequency of appearance in gossip) are
also clearly static -- there is one topic per gossip-moment.
Haviland can justify this assumption because part of his
notion of gossip is evaluative storytelling (cf. 10, 48-49,
51, 53) -- gossip is telling a story, only with more group
participation and group ranking and rating at the end.
Incidentally, Haviland' s gossip groups are "moral
communities" (8), locution which suggests stasis in not only
the content of the story of gossip but the interpretation
and evaluation that follows.
Like Bergmann before him, Haviland seems to take his
role as a social scientist very seriously -- his analysis of
gossip reflects his training on many levels. In addition to
his close adherence to the ' commonsense
'
gossip definition,
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Haviland also argues that we can only consider as gossip
what Zinacantecos would consider gossip; and that that set
of conversations must also fit what we would think of as
gossip, and to which we would react as we do to gossip ( 28 )
While at first this sounds impressively thick-descriptive
(Geertz s term for social science that thoroughly reflects
the social and epistemic norms of the society it purports to
depict)
,
Haviland 's claim reflects how deeply, and how
limitingly, his social science instincts run. According to
this notion of what we can call gossip, gossip has to be
translatable and transparent; in short, everyone and anyone
must be able to recognize a conversation as gossip. This
transparency may be a necessity for success in some social
science world, but it is a path to failure for gossip (and
ultimately, I would argue [as I think would Geertz]
,
for
social science that aspires to greater completeness and
complexity). Haviland' s apparent objectivity here is an
attempt to please everyone, and has the result the cliche
predicts. Universality in gossip --an abstract notion of
what gossip is and what it does -- simply cannot make sense
(gossips wouldn't accept it); this is Gluckman's exact
point 35 . Gossip is fluid, has fluid functions, has fluid
effects. Coming up with a category of gossip (this can
count, this can't count, gossip must do this and can't do
35My cynical first reaction to Haviland' s remark (who are
'we'? Do 'we' have a univocal opinion about gossip? Do the
Zinacantecos?) is a short version of this criticism.
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this) beforehand means that you approach your conversations
in a predetermined way -- that you can only hear certain
things, that you will miss certain conversations, certain
nuances, certain asides. Those "certain" conversations that
Haviland thinks "we" will regard as gossip are clearly only
the most idle, the most trivial, the most stereotypically
gossipy; e.g., those conversations that most narrowly cleave
to that chestnut of a dictionary definition of gossip.
At one point, Haviland observes (following Gluckman)
that he simply cannot understand much of the conversations
he hears because he isn't aware of the local gossip. But
what Haviland misses, in his attempts to be locally
acceptable about gossip, is exactly this notion that you
restrict your field of what you can hear and the connections
you can draw dramatically. How better to explain the fact
that the only conversations Haviland (and Bergmann) think
worthy of transcription and repetition are those involving
the transgressions of the seven-deadly- sin variety?
Haviland isolates the stereotypical gossip-moments only to
quarantine them, so that gossip can have reference and
resonance in reflexive ways only. But as I demonstrated
before with the analysis of Bergmann, just because there is
an everyday conception or has been one, doesn't mean we must
maintain it uncritically and in perpetuity.
When Haviland moves beyond the dictionary definition of
gossip, and attempts to draw conclusions based on his
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research, the result is a rather meager extension of the
most modest of Gluckman
' s theses. Haviland uses the cargo
system in Zinacanteco culture as evidence for how gossip
expresses tacit, consensually held community standards of
morality. The cargo system is simply the structure of
community religious ceremonies to celebrate the corn
harvest, which is the basis for the Zinacanteco economy.
There is an elaborate hierarchy of roles one can assume (if
one is a man) in the cargo ritual, and one 'works' one's way
up through the cargo ladder. Cargo participation is
restricted (there are only about 30 roles to play)
,
and
relative position is supposed to reflect, according to
Haviland, not merely one's social status, but one's moral
purity -- how hard one works, how pious one is. The cargo
system, in short, transparently indicates Zinacanteco
beliefs, values and practices. " [T] he idiom of cargo
success is, in most conversation, synonymous with virtue,
diligence, and worthiness," Haviland writes (104). He
continues
:
Gossip about cargoholders
,
fortunate and
unfortunate, leads directly to the interrelated
notions of wealth, prestige, luck, seniority, and
success. [ibid]
For Haviland, when Zinacantecos gossip about their primary
social link, it is only to use it as a yardstick for
virtues
.
This conviction about the transparency of the cargo
system and its gossip gets interestingly complicated when
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Haviland explains its warps and woofs; when Haviland
accounts for cargoers who don't fit into the Horatio Alger
picture, and the gossip around them. Haviland is aware that
lots of Zmacanteco gossip centers around cargo decisions,
and that much of that gossip in turn centers on decisions
that many Zinacantecos don't accept. But Haviland
characterizes that gossip as exceptional.
When gossips encounter a cargo career structuredin an unusual way they try to reconcile the facts
with the peculiarities, disabilities, or bad luck
of the individual. They explain, that is, why
what happened was not exceptional, not surprisina
[ 100 ]
In other words, gossipers only enforce a preexisting social
code, be it explicit or implicit, and their gossip serves to
fill i n gaps so as to endorse the legitimacy of status quo
decision-making (or the existence of the social code, and
the appropriateness of the rules that are perhaps sometimes
less than rigidly enforced)
. This analysis ignores the fact
that gossip is often what determines status quo decision-
making, and that fact that gossip also (and contradictorily
to each of these earlier social functions) acts as criticism
of status quo decisions; gossip highlights bureaucratic or
personal incompetence as often as it complicatedly
legitimates it 36 . The competing and irreconcilable nature
of these social functions of gossip suggests that function
in gossip may operate on a deeper level -- that the reason
36Zaner's evidence of gossip efficacy bolsters this point.
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why we can do so many different social things with gossip is
because it's not transparently an endorsement of social
order
.
Haviland ignores these less- than-Pollyanna implications
of gossip as critical of the social order37
,
and he does so
because he grounds his concept of gossip in too strictured
an understanding of social rules and how they operate. His
individualism is a result of his maintaining a categorical
notion of truth -- gossip can't have a broad impact.
Haviland 's analysis of the failure of the cargo system is
peculiar: "gossip reminds us that people fail, that careers
go wrong, that following the rules is not the rule" ( 108 )
His locution is suggestive -- it is not the rules themselves
that are wrong or don't work, it is the individual.
Following" the rules is the erratic occurrence; the rules
themselves are no cause for gossip or concern. Gossip
tracks and evaluates the individual, on an idiosyncratic
basis it stays away from the touchier, more dangerous
stuff like what rules we (apparently or actually) live by
37And importantly, he ignores conversations themselves
that are less than Pollyanna about the social order. He
quotes transcriptions (102, 103) of conversations about cargo
where the conversations suggest an ironic attitude towards the
cargo system -- a shared belief that while supposedly the
cargo system may represent virtue, diligence, etc., in reality
it is (like other political systems) also an opportunity for
the purchase of power and influence, with cynicism and
selfishness being the operating factors. While Haviland heeds
the words of the conversations he transcribes, he misses the
laughter
.
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and if they make sense. Gossip cannot be a means for
evaluating the big stuff, only the small stuff.
For Haviland, social rules are not completely fixed or
rigid; he thinks there are many different kinds of rules,
and that the point of defining rules is to understand and
recognize their violation (158) . Ultimately, Haviland
thinks there needs to be a flexibility to rules and our
interpretive guides of rules (of which gossip functions as
such a primary guide [167-68] )
.
To demonstrate this,
Haviland describes how impossible it would be for a social
scientist (or anyone) to explain what rules are in effect,
when and why for a situation as simple as a yellow light at
a busy traffic intersection (178-80)
.
But, as he makes
absolutely clear in his chapter on the cargo system, it is
an individualist, crudely relativist flexibility that
Haviland seeks. Ultimately, the looseness he wishes the
social sciences would adopt is this narrative looseness with
which he characterizes gossip -- the freedom to constantly
make particular, on an individual level, why someone does
something and how (or how not) actions reflect their
supposedly determining social rules. Haviland
' s conclusion
is that our social grammar needs more complexity -- and
while the completion of such a complicated descriptions
would be impossible (imagine a complete description of why
eight cars and three pedestrians did whatever they did at
some traffic light), gossip nonetheless stands as a marker
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of the kind of complexity we should be seeking in our social
explanations of human behavior (180)
. The difficulty here
is that Haviland's conclusion about social rules and
gossip's role is implicit from his beginning assumptions.
Of course gossip's productive domain can only extend so far
as to explain individual moves and individuals' stories (and
their lives are for Haviland always stories, and stories
only)
,
never contributing to any kind of broader critique or
understanding of who people are and why they do what they
do
.
This starting and closing assumption of the
restrictiveness and triviality of gossip is most patently
clear when Haviland finally refers to Gluckman explicitly.
As he closes his book, Haviland sharply observes that
Gluckman
' s position that you don't know a society until you
know its gossip is a "fatuous and self-congratulatory
position that would deny most social science" (171-172).
This harsh critique of course ignores his own self-
consciousness at finally learning Zinacanteco gossip; and
how his status in Zinacanteco society changed dramatically
after he learned it (12-14) . Haviland is desperate to
justify social science that doesn't include gossip, so
desperate that he ignores his own experiences, and indeed,
the import of his own conclusions about gossip. He later
notes that "the naive ethnographer, unlike the old-hand
gossip, has trouble distinguishing the exceptional from the
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ordinary" (175). By this reading, instead of the gossipy
social scientist being fatuous and arrogant (and hence
overemphasizing her own work), wouldn't the non-gossipy
ethnographer be practicing the bad social science? This
juxtaposition of remarks recalls Bergmann 1 s fundamental
trouble with definitions -- since Haviland as well fails to
make clear what his opening assumptions and biases about
gossip are, he avoids the tricky issue of clarifying why it
is he approaches gossip the way he does. Basically,
Haviland attacks Gluckman for lending credence and
significance to gossip, the subject Haviland apparently
thinks interesting enough to merit an entire book.
Haviland 's dismissive attitude towards gossip is
surprising, given his interest in being seen as a
knowledgeable gossip. He quite painstakingly lays out his
means of capturing and analyzing gossip. Haviland collects
various knowledgeable people from the different hamlets and
tapes lengthy collective interviews he calls "Who's Who"
sessions; in these he asks about various people or
incidents, and his informants spell out histories 38
. The
technique itself I have no serious quarrel with (because, as
Haviland' s transcriptions make clear, once stories start
38Bergmann, amusingly, is appalled by this technique (he
finds it artificial -- thinks that clearly, what Haviland is
collecting isn't really gossip because it's too content-driven
and ignores the interactive nature of gossip [37] )
,
and of
course replaces it with his own much more exacting technique
that produces exactly the same result.
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they are interactively told), and because it's clear that
Haviland simply acted (albeit more formally) as many of us
do when we lead our lives -- he asked for gossip. However,
where I do quarrel with Haviland 's Who's Who methodology is
the representativeness of his informants. Haviland, without
elaboration, makes a quick claim that his Who's Who
participants are a 'representative' sample (13). There are
several reasons to be suspicious of this claim. First, it
is not clear that Haviland' s informants are other than all
male. Haviland 's understanding of Zinacanteco gossip is
that it occurs primarily through the men; and that the women
act as "vehicles" only of gossip -- they transport it, they
don't create it 39 ( 26 ) . While Haviland acknowledges that
children too can be carriers of gossip (40)
,
it is similarly
in this passive, vehicular notion of gossip that children
are characterized as gossips -- and there is certainly no
suggestion from reading the transcripts that children are
included in the Who's Who groupings. The overwhelming
majority of Haviland' s transcripts of gossip-conversations
seem to be between men; he frequently refers to circles of
men engaged in gossip (1,8-9,21,27,31,35,43-44), and at one
point he refers to the panels as being composed only of men
(13-14), talking (primarily) about men in the village.
39 In other words, women can't do the heavy thinking
necessary to interpret social rules, but they can usefully
spread men's wisdom. Notice that this is the location where
Haviland ' s social constructivism gets most precisely
compromised
.
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Now, before I appear to be a cranky Pagliaesque
feminist (I complain when women are castigated as gossips, I
complain when women are excluded from gossip)
,
let me make
myself absolutely clear. I don't think only men or only
women gossip, or only rich people or poor people, or only
Zinacantecos or Anglos or Latinos or Asians, or only
existential philosophers or ethicists, or only any one or
other particular group. My point (obvious though it should
be, and clearly following Gluckman) is that everyone does
it . Any attempt to constrict and restrict gossip to or from
particular social sub-groups must be wrong. While in a
sense Haviland's restriction is modestly less irritating
than Bergmann
' s or Tannen
' s (Haviland at least makes it
clear that men do gossip — a lot -- and often about sordid
personal topics, analysis that somehow must have escaped
Bergmann 1 s and Tannen
' s notice) because it is less of an
obvious cliche, it nonetheless distorts the domain of
gossip
.
This is not the only distorting methodology I find in
Haviland's book. Presumably, his notion of representation
should contain some class representation -- he should have
talked to Zinacantecos from all economic levels.
Particularly when cargo gossip is considered, given the
inaccessibility of cargo positions, it would be important to
have richer and poorer Zinacantecos (identified as such),
particularly given the amount of cargo gossip that occurs in
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this book. But here again, Haviland is silent on the
background of his informants. The individual transcriptions
aren't helpful either. There are only two mentions of cargo
participation from informants -- one an elementary
participant and one a higher-up participant. From over 50
conversations, this doesn't tell us much. It is important
to know whether or not those Haviland quotes as being
pleased or annoyed with the cargo system are those who have
succeeded at cargo, or tried and failed, or simply been
excluded. In fact, it is impossible to get a very
complicated analysis from Haviland 's conversations without
getting a sense of who's doing the talking; as Haviland
himself earlier says, intent, motive and agenda are
important parts of gossip. So why then does he leave
intent, motive and agenda out of his Who's Who
transcriptions -- does he assume (ludicrously) that when his
informants enter the room they automatically adopt neutral
roles?
Given the looseness of his methodology here, his
analysis -- choosing to use his transcriptions as a basis
for making cultural generalizations about the values that
are important to all Zinacantecos -- rings particularly
insincere. He makes this agenda clear at various points
(76, 77, 86-87); it is an agenda that smacks of a
primitivist bias. Haviland rather sniff ily refers to
"American student gossip" as "highly psychologized" (58), as
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gossip focusing solely on determining motives for behavior
on an individual level. But while individualist biases may
be f rustrat ingly relativist (as Haviland should know)
,
it is
equally frustrating to have gossip act as a great leveller,
simply transmitting cultural codes and beliefs through human
mouths. This primitivist bias becomes clear when Haviland
very cautiously acknowledges that " [he] cannot avoid the
feeling that some Zinacantecos take cargos or involve
themselves with ritual simply because they enjoy it" ( 119 )
This conclusion is one that easily applies to other
cultures' social, religious or political systems -- imagine
a resident of this country having difficulty with the notion
that some Americans involve themselves with holiday rituals
(Christmas, Hanukkah, Kwaanzaa)
,
with their accompanying
special feasts, songs, gifts -- for pleasure, not simply for
the religious and cultural reasons ostensibly behind the
rituals. The cargo ritual is similarly marked by feasting,
playacting, parades, and tokens, yet Haviland seems
unwilling to consider seriously less-than-pure motives for
partaking in a system that is, like so many cultural
artifacts, complicatedly effective and ineffective,
functional and superfluous. I suspect that this bias
towards overgeneralizing the motives and actions of the
Zinacantecos partly determines why Haviland' s analysis of
gossip is so constraining of the effect of gossip. Haviland
the spin doctor can only see gossip as an individual,
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interpretive device to apply and analyze particular social
rules, because his view of Zinacanteco society is itself
ultimately too simple.
Ultimately, then, gossip for the spin doctor is at best
a tool for opinion, not fact. This assumption is central in
Karen Jane Brison's work, Gossip, Innuendo, and Sorcery:
Village Polit ics Among the Kwanaa . .
.
(1988), as well.
Brison's dissertation (since published as a book [1992])
confronts the "problem" that the Kwanga have many long
public meetings, typically devoted mainly to addressing
(unsuccessfully) issues that originate in village gossip
(16) . The Kwanga hold two kinds of meetings: regular
village meetings each Monday to distribute community labor
(only one half-hour is spent on the division of tasks,
several hours spent on gossip issues [2-3] )
,
and funeral
discussions, held after a death in the community, to
determine the cause (12) . The preconceptions clearly
guiding Brison's study are that since these meetings don't
result in overt change of villager behaviors, laws,
reputations, and that since the issues at the meetings are
often trivial (11-12), there must be a significant social
explanation for their occurrence.
The theory she proposes, after eighteen months of
observation of and interaction with the Kwanga, is that the
particularly egalitarian form of Kwanga society necessitates
ineffectual meetings (42-43)
.
In a society without a
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particular hierarchy, Brison contends, the meetings are
necessary to establish both social norms, and social
rankings 40 (37) . More to the point, egalitarian societies
contain within them the seeds for more fact ionalizing
,
while
simultaneously being more dependent upon consensus (since
there aren't recognized leaders or parties [42-43]).
Seemingly ineffectual talk can actually be critical social
maintenance work, resolving or helping to resolve problems
(41) . Finally, being a good talker (being able to talk
frequently, and eloquently)
,
is the highest mark of social
status for these villagers (of the three kinds of 'big men 1
in the Kwanga, orators are the most respected [46] )
.
While all of these comments delineate a society
strikingly supportive of gossip as a constructive rather
than destructive social force, Brison nonetheless observes
Kwanga holding the same old myths about gossip as
necessarily distorted and counterproductive. She observes
in several of these meetings (the purpose of which seems to
be only to make public and evaluate accusations circulated
through private gossip [65]
)
that people seem to distrust
others' public statements (66); and indeed, that they regard
gossip as disuniting of the community (ibid) . In addition,
the Kwanga, in their village court system (Papua New Guinea
has been independent from the rule of Australia since 1975)
,
hold rumor and gossip spreading to be a crime for which one
40Which, of course, would hardly seem "ineffectual".
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can be charged, tried and punished (88, 158, 276). Finally,
Prison notes that at several of these meetings participants
discuss not only rumors but rumor -- complaining about the
veiled way in which accusations of culpability in a death
are made, for example (140)
The problem with all this conceptualizing is that the
end result is a kind of levelling and simplifying of the
Kwanga perspective. In other words, the conclusion I see
Brison making over and over again is that the Kwanga are
only straightforwardly afraid and mistrustful of gossip --
that they see gossip and rumor as disruptive of what is
otherwise a peaceful community order. But what emerges from
the anecdotes Brison herself presents is a more complicated
reading of the Kwanga.
To elaborate: Brison describes community rumors as
wild, and potentially leading to disastrous consequences
(151) . Focusing just on rumors of how someone in the
community dies, Brison describes variant, elaborate rumors
leading to "retaliation through sorcery, court, or
embroilment in long, expensive competitive exchanges" (the
Kwanga participate in a competitive harvest system around
their yam, called the tamburan cult [133] )
.
But this
reading can't be accurate; for in the several case studies
Brison herself presents throughout this study, formal and
informal penalties threatened or levied (e.g. fines through
court, threats of retaliatory violence, rejoinder
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accusations of malfeasance) are never actually carried out
(73, 89, 120) . It seems implausible that a community would
be imprisoned by a fear that never makes itself manifest.
More particularly, Brison only speaks well of the
public system of courts, laws and assessed fines, even when
it is clear that the Kwanga themselves have reservations
about those institutions. She praises the development of
the "new law" (157, 158) where gossip and rumor are
indictable offenses, and where personal slights are
adjudicated in court. More to the point, she draws an
implicit contrast between the indirect speech of rumor and
gossip and the direct speech of the courtroom; remarking
that direct, public speech results in (apparently) much less
conflict (161-163)
. Again, Brison acknowledges that the
Kwanga seem to have little faith in the efficacy of the
public meetings (64-65)
,
and that the court system itself
has a reputation for distorting facts and preserving
ambiguity (275)
.
In this praise of institutional political structure,
Brison perpetuates a neat disjunction between informal
information and adjudication sources -- gossip and rumor,
and their more formal brethren -- public meetings, courts
and the laws and penalties they impose. Brison clearly
accepts the fact that both exist simultaneously (and with
some tension) in contemporary Kwanga society, but repeatedly
portrays the latter, overt, formal judicial system as
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necessary because it balances out the inequities of the
former. Witness Brison's theory (borrowed from Donald
Brenneis [1984] ) as to why people are afraid of the negative
power of gossip:
...as long as a dispute is confined to the realms
of partisan gossip, there is the danger that itW1H spread to include other members of the
community. An official public version restoring
the good reputations of both parties removes thisdanger. [148]
"Official public version [s] " or explanations come about only
through the lengthy meetings, or the court system.
The basic tension throughout this argument is as
follows. Brison grants gossip the power to construct
reality gossip and rumor are the chief means by which
explanation and reputations are spread, gain communal force
(113) . Indeed, she even allows for a genealogical character
to gossip -- she admits that the public meetings, court
systems rarely if ever seem to get at the root of problems
within the community, or adjudicate satisfactory
explanations of deaths (73, 4-9, 52-53)
. Indeed, she avers,
"it [is] impossible to know the true cause [of death] until
a couple of years later. . .It is only after a couple of years
when tempers have cooled that people will drop hints when
gossiping with friends and relatives and the truth will
eventually emerge" (13)
.
However, Brison wants to have it
both ways -- gossip is a powerful force within the
community, acts as a force towards eventually resolving
disputes and constructing truth explanations, but only
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because of its necessarily distorting character. Gossip
constructs truth by manipulating it, impurifying it. As
such, gossip must necessarily cohabitate along with multiple
public channels for its evaluation and confirmation, even if
those channels are necessarily ineffective. Both of these
claims simply cannot be true 41
. In other words, Brison is
implicitly maintaining an absolutist conception of truth
(the only way a social constructivist account of truth with
gossip is palatable to her is if the "truth" that gossip
constructs is always already distorted)
.
Papua New Guinea is changing rapidly, Brison observes.
The harvest cult system (with its complicated system of
inter-village communications, partnerships, and
competitions, in no small part based in gossip [258]) is
fading out --no new members have been initiated into the
harvest cult since 1978 (initiated cult members are the 'big
men 1 of Kwanga society)
.
The Kwanga response to this change
(which in turn has spawned other changes -- less bartering,
more cash cropping, more hierarchy because of fewer Totem
[harvest] groups [ibid] ) has been to hold more public
meetings; conflicts which used to be resolved mainly through
cargo competition and cargo meetings -- through gossip, in
short -- are now supposed to be resolved through public
meetings, and the court system (260). Brison contends that
41 Indeed, one reviewer of Brison 's completed book noted
the same exact difficulty in her analysis: see Oceania (1994)
.
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this change happens because "people attempted to stop
tradition by stopping the system of gossip which supported
it" (ibid). But again, this contention suggests a belief
that gossip is predominantly destructive, or distorting,
that the facts in Brison's dissertation simply don't
support. And so while Brison is certainly to be admired for
acknowledging the influential status of gossip in Kwanga —
she does not shy away from declaring its social power or its
at least occasional ability to uncover facts — by
conceiving of gossip as the necessarily weak end of the
dialectic of truth and punishment in Kwanga Papua New Guinea
she ultimately perpetuates a stale notion of gossip as a
priori distorting or malicious 42
. This is what renders
Brison a classic spin doctor -- her interest in (active)
constructivism forces her to downplay her bifurcat ional
42
I think it's also relevant to draw attention here to the
primitivist stain of this kind of analysis: in short, that
gossip uniquely has a kind of distorting, malicious, and
warping capacity that "open" or "public" speech in courts does
not (which Brison herself acknowledges fails to reveal
accurate reconstruction of events) . Indeed, Brison is not
alone in making these kinds of dangerous assumptions about
gossip. Witness Robert and Ruth Munroe 1 s response to Donald
Campbell in the pages of Zygon (1976), where they casually
observe that in more sophisticated societies, "an ethical code
is a more indirect form of social control than the face-to-
face methods such as gossip, scolding, and witchcraft
accusations often employed in simpler societies" (3). In
short, one mark of "simpler" societies is their social control
only through face-to-face, non-abstract or universalizable
(and obviously, not as good) moral codes -- it is only the
sophisticated societies that can operate according to
"indirect" "abstract" rule systems (and hence have less
reliance on imprecise methods such as gossip)
.
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noton of truth; however, gossip always ultimately maintains
the inferior half of that division.
Ori Bet Or (1989), in his dissertation examining the
status and function of gossip in an Israel kibbutz, takes a
tack similar to Haviland's, using painstaking methodology to
justify unsurprising, formulaic results. Bet Or, in trying
to move the epistemological question to a different kind of
realm than "straightforward" truth or falsehood,
unfortunately simply displaces to a secondary level gossip's
ultimate status as falsehood. One quote in particular
demonstrates this attitude:
...gossip is more Impression Management than
Information Management. The gossipers are making
use of information, in order to influence and
change. Selection of the information and relating
it to certain interpretations rather than
straightforward presentation, is typical of
gossip. By being more a matter of evaluation,
criticism, judgement and impression, than of
actual information or rational analysis, gossip
cannot be related to in terms of truth or
falsehood, reasonable or unreasonable. [424]
To put it simply, Bet Or tries to have it both ways. He's
appealing to the defenders of gossip, by saying that it's
not so much that gossip is either true or false (because we
know where gossip would fall if that were the criterion)
,
but that it's beyond those simple categories -- it's off in
the murk of judgement. But his language betrays him --
gossip is not "straightforward" information transmission,
it's not "actual" information, and of course, it's not
"rational." I find myself strangely uncomforted by the
98
notion that gossip is simply too ethereal to belong to dull,
earthbound realms of reason and unreason, truth and
falsehood; because it's clear that gossip is simply a
shadow- irrationality
,
a phantasmic falsehood. Because
gossip lurks around corners, never presenting itself
directly, never confronting confirmation or disconf irmat ion
square in the face, it's in a non-realm, where it has no
actual connection with truth or falsehood, only manipulation
and "management." But the implication there I think is only
too clear managed information is adulterated information,
gossip can't be straightforward because presumably some
other kind of information is. Bet Or '
s
still clearly
holding to that dichotomy that truth and falsehood exist,
and gossip is simply even further from one category than the
other, rather than in its own realm.
Like Haviland, Bet Or thinks that gossip (as the
conclusion makes clear [239]
)
functions to make particular,
evaluable, and malleable rules, norms, proceedings,
statuses, constitutions that we already operate by. He
thinks that we already modulate the norms and categories to
suit our own personal experiences, and that gossip is simply
the means by which we check our evaluations with others, and
confirm that our own interpretations aren't too far off the
mark. And again, like Haviland, it's also clear that Bet Or
suffers from the same fundamentally dismissive attitude
towards gossip. For example, he can't help from describing
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gossip as essentially negative
--a way for someone to boost
his or her own self-image at the expense of another -- even
as he acknowledges the contradictions rife within
assumptions of gossip's fundamental negativity or positivity
(423) . It's also clear that Bet Or is well aware of
gossip's supplemental power in truth-making; he describes
the common knowledge" that no one in his particular kibbutz
actually follows the dictates in a pamphlet describing rules
and proceedings; a new kibbutz member is ridiculed for
citing the booklet (7)
.
in general, Bet Or on several
occasions recognizes both the positive capacities of gossip
(107-108, 9, 163) and the simultaneous reliance of the
community on gossip along with their fear, suspicion and
negative attitudes towards it (9). Therefore, Bet Or '
s
inflexible interpretation is at odds with the complicated
data he has collected. For example, his numbers show that
of kibbutz members 43 (N=157), 74.5% both gossip and are
gossiped about (N=117)
,
18.5% gossip but are not gossiped
about (N=29)
,
and that only 7% (N=ll) neither gossip nor are
gossiped about. In other words, gossip is a regularized
activity that most members of the group partake in, in
various locations and at different times, with all sorts of
topics and interpretations.
43Here he means actual members; there are other residents
of the kibbutz who aren't members of the kibbutz community --
salaried residents, temporary residents, etc.
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It's bizarre, then, that with the breadth of his
conclusions, and with the progressive nature of much of his
methodology (essentially, as he makes clear, he gathers his
ormat ion by eavesdropping and initiating gossip [349-
352] ; at one point he avers that you "can't study gossip
without participating" [299] )
;
Bet Or nonetheless retains
many of the most rigid and constraining aspects of gossip
study. For example, after acknowledging that defining
gossip is hard not only because of the linguistic
constraints but because of the social science paradox that
you will only confirm what you set out to discover (342)
,
Bet Or returns to the tried-and- true definition of gossip as
evaluative, negative storytelling about the absent (305-306,
347) . Bet Or also mysteriously describes gossip at one
point as "more structured, defined, delimited, amplified and
programmed [than conversation]. It is much less flexible.
Rather than being open to change, it acts against them"
(309) . This analysis seems flatly contradictory to Bet Or ' s
repeated remarks that gossip is hard to categorize and
define, and that gossip-situations are quite fluid, their
contents, intents and interpretations constantly shifting
(182-183, 385). Fundamentally, Bet Or '
s
theoretical
ambitions are held back by his methodological timidity.
Therefore, he ultimately reaches conclusions that only
reproduce Haviland's analysis of the decade before, albeit
with new data.
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The diminishing of the conception of gossip, even with
elaborately particular methodology, is nothing new. Those
anthropologists seeking to articulate theories about gossip
early in its study (by responding to Gluckman
'
s
groundbreaking 1963 article) are themselves guilty of
skewing the concept of gossip too much one way or another,
levelling gossip into conceptual flatness. One competing
theory recognizes gossip entirely by virtue of very
individual, particularized, psychological roots (Paine
[1967] ) . Another grounds gossip entirely within a crudely
political framework; gossip happens whenever someone has an
agenda to push of protecting their own good name or
attacking another's (Wilson [1974]). A third (Abrahams
[1970] ) reduces gossip to its status as nonsense performance
(291, 293-4) . These professionals all seek to consider
gossip as meaningful purely in terms of its status as
communicative tender. Reducing gossip to communication only
(it is a channel for individual twitches only, purely for
advancing political aims, or simply to perform)
,
for all of
these writers, is tantamount to reducing gossip's proximity
to truth.
Wilson is explicit about this fact -- he argues that
the Makah Indians use gossip as a tactic to deceive a
visiting anthropologist (by gossiping to her about
themselves and others, he suggests, they can mislead her
about the true nature of community ranking and self-
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knowledge [95-97]). Abrahams contrasts the "nonsense"
activity of gossip with "sensible" conversation; "sensible"
means "well-spoken" and "knowledgeable," "emphasizing] the
order and decorum afforded by knowledge" (294)
.
For these
anthropologists, it seems, gossip can only reveal its
various agendas (personal, political, performative) by
preserving a status as cunning fakery. In other words, all
the different anthropologists miss what's truly exciting
about Gluckman's work -- the vital connectedness of gossip
to all of our conversation, its indiscernability amongst
important talk.
The underlying problem I observe both in this section
and in the previous one is that social researchers on gossip
ultimately cannot resist the negative reputation of gossip,
no matter how hard they try and how much their theoretical
training prepares them (and I think it is fair to say that
the spin doctors are better prepared than the social
meteorologists)
. While it might be odd to present him out
of order here, I think it is important to document how
someone who is so initially positive towards gossip can
himself fall under the spell of its reputation -- Max
Gluckman, responding to his initial exciting article, in
1968. A passage from this response is worth quoting in
depth
:
...Doubtless there is gossip among financiers, and
they may in the course of it acquire information
of pecuniary value to them; and there definitely
is gossip among senior academics in the course of
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which they acquire information which guides themm making appointments, or in awarding research
grants. But this, I consider, is the passing of
confidential information for specific utilitarian
purposes. It cannot be classed as gossip, if wepay any regard to what the dictionary defines as
that [sic!] - idle chatter.
. . It might becomeimpossible, as a friend of mine told me, for a
^^itish colonial official to do his job under anindependent African Government when what he called
the gossip channels' were closed to him, so that
he did not know what were the relationships among
members of the Cabinet. But the chat in which
such information is set can only be placed on the
margin between true gossip -- idle talk -- and
necessary information. [33]
Of course
,
what Gluckman omits saying here is that the kind
of gossip he's now ruling out is precisely what he included
in his 1963 article; notice that when he talks about
professional gossip originally, he exemplifies it as "slight
personal knockdown
--concealed in a technical recital, or
the technical sneer which is contained in a personal gibe"
(309) . More particularly, Gluckman explains his pedagogy as
a teacher of young anthropologists, in part, as teaching
about the scandals of the field: "I believe I am not alone
among senior anthropologists in finding it more interesting
to teach students about anthropologists than about
anthropology" (314). Anthropologists gossiping about each
other as part of their work is his very first example of
professional gossip. I think this juxtaposition of passages
puts us (and Gluckman) into an uncomfortable position --
either he must hold strictly to the words of his later
article, in which case there's a clear distinction between
gossip and non-gossip (and that distinction is essentially
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between minutiae and what matters)
,
or he must side by his
earlier statement of inclusion, in which case gossip again
can be necessary information, and in which the lines between
gossip and non-gossip are all the harder to draw.
To explain: in his later article Gluckman argues that
necessity and idleness are the defining (and oppositional)
criteria that separate directed talk from gossip -- while
there s a grey area (professional gossip)
,
such talk is so
directed (he says) that it can't really be idle, hence it's
not really gossip. He's effectively writing away any
legitimacy for gossip other than his own, group-maintaining
and -defining anthropological purposes. What's depressing
about this formulation is that with it, Gluckman lumps
himself in with all of the other professionals producing
work on gossip and rumor; each of them are guilty of
reducing gossip to one kind or another, accountable by one
monolithic theory or another. Each of them must
wholeheartedly dismiss out of hand what all their
disagreeing counterparts has to say, because the theory of
gossip is a zero-sum game (if it's personal, it can't be
collective. If it's performative, then there's certainly no
agenda) . What every member of this group misses is the
possibility that gossip and rumor are simply more
complicated, more convoluted than these dismissive theories
suggest. The Max Gluckman of 1963 made fascinating strides
towards accounting for gossip in a complicated way that took
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into account all sorts of positive and negative results,
intentions and agendas. The Max Gluckman of 1968 is rushing
to appease his wounded colleagues, who are certainly never
themselves guilty of idle chitchat, only "necessary
information" (to which Bergmann can enthusiastically attest,
no doubt)
.
Sadly, rumor scientists fare no better in this arena
than the gossipists; Tamotsu Shibutani
' s Improvised News : A
Sociological Study of Rumor (1966)
,
suffers flaws of a
trivializing attitude towards gossip, disingenuously tricked
up as a pluralistic attitude towards truth. On the surface,
there is much to commend about Shibutani 1 s work: he examines
the data for 60 different rumor-locations (a rumor location
being the ambiguous set of historical circumstances around
which numerous unverified or unverifiable oral reports were
generated; the actual number of rumors Shibutani studies is
471) ; while the bulk of the rumors Shibutani is considering
are Western-hemisphere located and in the twentieth century,
the rumors occur in various countries, and stretch in time
from the plague in Central Europe (14th century) to
President Kennedy's assassination in the United States
(1963) .
Aside from the breadth of Shibutani ' s research, his
approach is also refreshingly realistic. He points out that
while rumors may have something less than the preferred
absolute standards of verifiability and reliability, that
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they must be studied simply because people adhere to them.
His outlook is sensibly pragmatic -- when we evaluate
beliefs, we do so not by the strict constraints given us by
contemporary epistemology -- in his words, "truth and
falsity are attributes of propositions; conviction and
skepticism are attributes of a man's judgement" (7)
Shibutani advocates early on for a "continuum" between truth
and rumor there are no clearcut boundaries, no crystal
moments in epistemic time when some propositions pass from
rumor to fact (8)
.
Indeed, Shibutani has sharp words of
criticism for his colleagues in social science who persist
in labelling rumor a pathological activity (exceptional,
engaged in only by the psychologically damaged) instead of a
more widely practiced activity. Such distorting vision,
Shibutani argues, leads to an over-narrow and generalizing
account of what rumors are and how they occur -- these
accounts look only at the content, the empirical facts and
distortions therein, and assume that rumors present an
'obstacle' to normal, accurate, reliable communication
(ibid)
.
Shibutani ' s counterattack relies on his conception of
rumors (and indeed, communication) as transactional
occurrences; that is, collective (not individual) processes
where a variety of roles (narrator, auditor, interpreter,
messenger, antagonist, skeptic, agitator) may be assumed by
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the participants 44
. The transactional analysis of
communication, informal communication in particular, is
nothing new; what's unusual about Shibutani
' s argument is
that he (unlike even more recent critics such as Bergmann
and Haviland) does not confine participants to particular
roles. In one conversation a person can move from being a
narrator to an interpreter, agitator, auditor, etc.
Shibutani s image of rumor-conversations is much more fluid,
much more malleable and developing, than those of his
colleagues -- indeed, it should be clear, Shibutani
'
s
analysis seems (as yet in this chapter) to be the only one
that appropriately captures the "informal" nature of such
communication
.
Shibutani uses this transactional critique to undermine
the content-oriented rumor analysis that comes before him.
One reason earlier rumorists have no conception of rumor as
related to truth is that they can only appreciate rumor as
static stories (a rumor is created, spread [maliciously]
,
distorting reality) ; rather, what actually happens according
to Shibutani ' s schematic (and amply documented by his
historical data) is that rumors develop as they are spread,
that the spreading process is actually a period of testing,
comparing, selecting. The end result is that even when a
44Transact ional analysis of communication differs from its
predecessors in that the purpose, end result is not the
expression of ideas but the establishment and maintenance of
communicative relationships between individuals.
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plethora of seemingly wild and utterly incompatible,
farfetched rumors crop up in some ambiguous set of
circumstances, the inevitability of time, natural curiosity,
and a lack of convincing 'authoritative' information result
in rumors that grow more truthful as they circulate (16-17)
Instead of rumors getting wilder (as conventional wisdom
tells us)
,
then, they get more nuanced, more particular,
more credible -- more truthful. In particular, rumor
participants' capacity to assume different roles in the
consideration of rumors ensures that rumors are compared,
evaluated and rejected or accepted rigorously (contrary to
the assumption of carelessness that almost always
accompanies analysis of informal communication)
. Shibutani
even explicitly links rumors to rational discussion at one
point -- the rumor is actually the rational tool for moving
the dialectic of information-gathering forward (71) . So
there are some reasons to be enthusiastic about this book.
Shibutani also has a handful of casual historical notes
to point out the more mainstream ways in which rumor and
gossip have come to be relied upon -- revolutionary
uprisings, the functioning of the stock market, press
reports (the ubiquitous "anonymous source" "unnamed
Administration official", etc.), doctors testing and
experimenting with new drugs (45, 58, 71-72)
.
Indeed, at
one point Shibutani goes so far as to say that "most of the
decisions one makes in the course of each day are predicated
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upon unverified report s ... such definitions are not called
'rumors, 1 the term being reserved for those accounts of
which one is suspicious; most of the information upon which
men base their lives, however, cannot meet high standards of
verification" (94)
.
We infrequently acknowledge but
invariably rely on rumors and gossip, doppelgangers of news
and truth. While, it is true, several writers on rumor and
gossip refer to our day-to-day reliance on hearsay and rumor
for decision-making (Knopf, Haviland, Coady [see Chapter
Two] are obvious examples)
; Shibutani is the only writer who
pauses long enough to make this case convincing, providing
meaningful data of decisions that are made deliberately,
that are nonetheless determined by report rather than 'hard'
fact
.
So what, after all, can be wrong with such an approach
to rumor and gossip? Shibutani has acknowledged the
historical situatedness of rumors, their fluid, mobile,
developing nature, the collective, constructive roles
participants play, and most fundamentally, he alleges a
significant relationship between rumor and truth. It would
seem that for an avowed defender of the integrity of rumor
and gossip, little else could be done to salvage the honor
of the two besmirched institutions. However, Shibutani 1 s
position as an adherent to empirical social science belies
his status as a full advocate for rumor and gossip.
Shibutani is a spin doctor because he's trying to subsume
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rumor under a category of rational, empirical knowledge.
The category itself doesn't change, it just gets bigger,
includes more things. This tactic can't possibly work, and
it shouldn't. From rumor and gossip we learn not only that
they can be truthful but that truth is constructed
differently than we might think it -- in other words, that
itself is not rational, empirical, clearly defendable.
So simply trying to push rumor (and gossip) off into one
category, where frankly no one accepts them anyway, without
giving a solid account for why it is that that category must
change to accommodate them -- in other words, that our
notion of truth must be a different kind of truth, to allow
for disparate elements like rumor and gossip -- is a futile
task
.
In other words, spending such inordinate amounts of
time solely on proving that gossip and rumor "really" are
rational accomplishes nothing so much as to underscore the
justification for rational, orderly knowledge -- to admit
that standard conceptions of knowledge and belief really are
for the most part accurate and well-grounded, they just need
tinkering with here and there. Examining both sides of the
issue -- showing that not only are gossip and rumor more
rational than we're comfortable thinking, but that
"legitimate" knowledge is in fact far less rational and
orderly than we'd like to think -- throws the whole
bifurcation of knowledge (certain fact/less certain opinion)
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into doubt. In so doing, space is created for a more
pluralistic conception of knowledge. By only doing one-half
of this job, Shibutani perpetuates that bifurcation.
Shibutani
' s well-meaning, but impossible pluralism is
mindful of nothing so much as the recent Republican allusion
to their party as "one big tent," accommodating all who are
interested. Of course, as their rhetoric makes clear, you
are only welcome to stand under the tent if you disavow
everything about you that labels you deviant in the first
place, and even then official acknowledgement will be
reguent and artificial only. Sadly, this can only be the
status of rumor and gossip if we were to buy Shibutani
'
s
schema; we could happily nod along and endorse our
multiplicitous attitude towards information and knowledge,
while quietly continuing to dismiss or disregard lots of
information as just scuttlebutt.
The mechanism Shibutani chooses to analyze how the
truth of rumor develops demonstrates this rationalistic
bias. After all is said and done, Shibutani argues, it is
by a process of "natural selection" that rumors are sifted,
compared, evaluated, and ultimately accepted as fact or
rejected as 'mere rumor’ (186). In other words, while
Shibutani is advancing a dialectical notion of truth (we
come to understand situations over time)
,
his dialectic is
closed -- final interpretations become selected and ossified
(75) . The closing of this dialectic cannot help but to
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maintain such an uneven weighting of rumor to truth.
Imagine a rumor that "becomes" true through Shibutani 1 s
natural selection. Clearly, we stop thinking of such a
rumor as a rumor; it transmogrifies into fact. So rumor
doesn't really have a truth content for Shibutani; it is a
proposition that has yet to prove itself true. The
t ru t h/ f a 1 sehood dichotomy still exists; it is only a matter
of time before particular rumors pick sides (or are picked)
Further, in the situations that remain open and
ambiguous, it is clear that Shibutani believes the correct
interpretation exists, only that it has yet to be put in
operation. While Shibutani is sophisticated in that he
believes in incrementalism --we gradually come to know
things, our beliefs and methods change as we implement them
(169-70); he still operates with assumptions that there's an
order connecting our currently variant paths of knowledge.
More to the point, as the very language of transactionalism
suggests, this order is a marketplace order, where truth,
falsehood, rumor, and gossip are so many commodities to be
traded for (individual and social) profit. Shibutani '
s
language of natural selection suggests that there is an
overdetermined momentum to the entire process of chaos-
crisis-resolution, where rumors compete on an intellectual
marketplace, for the prizes of palatable, implemented social
action (177) . Communication, then, is still task-oriented;
even though each unveiling is simultaneously a reveiling, we
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reconstruct them according to the theme of connected
enlightenment to which we all intuitively throng.
More to the point, the field of consideration (of
possible rumor-scenarios) that Shibutani is willing to grant
is initially constrained -- assumed public tenets of
rationality and pragmatism mean that necessarily some
explanations will be instantly thrown out. Witness
Shibutani
' s strong language in demonstrating this: "When
perplexed men are trying to develop a realistic orientation
toward their environment, pragmatic considerations come
first. Some individuals may become hysterical, but their
remarks are discounted by others" (93, emphasis mine)
.
Shibutani also gives himself away as fundamentally
suspicious of the irrational character of rumor-action.
When he describes the behavior of rumor-spreading, his
examples of the emotional contagion that precipitates rumor
formation are such lurid displays of mass mania as mobs,
stampedes, bank runs, even lynchings and collective
hallucinations (95)
.
He describes crowd behavior as a
collective lack of self-consciousness, critical ability, and
self control (96) . Further, Shibutani is suspicious of the
mechanism by which rumors can be evaluated: our ideas of
logic change when we're talking rumor; "images are
juxtaposed and associated rather than logically connected"
(113) . And while Shibutani offers up an excess of evidence
showing the rational and social nature of meaning
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negotiation (in other words, if a group is considering
several explanations for a situation, held by different
members, the group will almost inevitably work to reconcile
extreme explanations into a moderate, uniformly acceptable
compromise explanation [143, 145]), this transactional
analysis seems to apply only to informal, less empirically
verifiable information -- nowhere does Shibutani consider or
aver that rational knowledge-assessment may proceed in much
the same way that rumor and gossip-mongering do. 45
What this tap-dancing around the issue amounts to, in
my reading, is an analysis of rumor that still leaves it
with the taint of distortion, inaccuracy, emotionalism,
irrationality, and ultimately falsehood. This reading slips
out here and there in the text, most notably when Shibutani
discusses rumors as coincidentally true -- not because they
convey accurate information but because they produce
information or behavior that confirms the initial (and
initially false) rumor (148) . In other words, accuse
someone of cheating often enough, and eventually you'll
discover some suspicious crib notes under his chair. False
rumors are uniquely important to Shibutani because they
convey an atmosphere (118, 120); they provide data for
sociological analysis of why a crowd believed the
450n this point, see Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's
Laboratory Life (1986), for an exhaustive interpretation of
exactly how such 'rational negotiation’ takes place, in the
august milieu of contemporary science.
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necessarily absurd things they did (or behaved in the
positively irrational ways they did)
. For all his
transactional talk, then, Shibutani is still making a
fundamental content - style distinction here -- it's important
to empirically verify or refute rumors, because only true
rumors show us how truth is produced, and false rumors show
us only how controllable and directable social behavior is.
What
' s important for us to understand here is that this
dichotomy must necessarily be false
. Shibutani 1 s saying
that when we call something a rumor (something that
eventually becomes true, say that Michael Hooker is looking
for a job as a president of any university other than
UMASS)
,
then clearly that thing was never really a rumor in
the first place -- it was truth waiting to happen. But this
other rumor -- this rumor about UFOs landing in Harvard Yard
~ _ this was clearly identifiable as a rumor (e.g. false)
from the beginning. The two items are by nature different;
we can learn different things from them (one produces truth,
one produces falsehood)
. Only rumors can be false, for
Shibutani; therefore whenever we call something a rumor that
becomes true we were misusing language at the time.
Shibutani ' s connecting up of truth and rumor comes at the
cost of creating an unbridgeable chasm between rumors with
the ring of empirical truth, and false rumors that are
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merely sociological curiosities and not useful for the
information they convey. 46
Shibutani's false dichotomy produces a similarly
artificial pacing for rumor. He traces a crisis - stasis path
to explain how rumors occur and are resolved. Because
Shibutani's bias is towards rational, complete, consistent
knowledge-gathering that fundamentally is at odds with rumor
formation, Shibutani's explanation for how rumors occur is
essentially only that ambiguous historical situations
occur (in other words, situations that can't easily be
explained away by current beliefs and ideologies)
,
then the
vacuum of explanation generates excitement, and rumors just
start happening. The major difficulty with this schematic
is that it simply fails to explain how the movement from
stasis to crisis and back again really would occur47 . In
other words, Shibutani has been arguing that rumors depend
on trusting networks reliably trading information to
supplement existing institutional channels. So he's
acknowledging that rumors and rumor- traders are always
already present in normal social life. But suddenly, this
460ne has only to look at the noticeably condescending
language with which Shibutani describes belief in false
rumors, and the absurd character Shibutani ascribes to false
rumors, to justify this point (93, 96, 108, 113, 123).
47This analysis is analogically drawn from the critical
analysis Henry Theriault provides, to explain why most
identity accounts of nationalism fail to explain both the
continuing existence of nations and why counternationalist
rebellions do and do not occur, in his paper " Ant inat ional - ism
and Armenia"
.
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mechanism of authority/ subterranean communication becomes
incapacitated by historical coincidence, and communication
breaks down -- rumors become the predominant currency of
information, until peace is restored (a dominant explanation
is accepted)
. But except for the cases in which information
is clearly simply not mechanically available (e.g. natural
disasters, after which presses are inoperable, phone lines
are down, etc.), there's no justification given for why
suddenly institutional channels are much less trustworthy
than previously, or suddenly rumor channels are much more
trustworthy48
. I think it takes a different kind of
analysis of rumor and gossip to answer successfully these
questions of why and how gossip and rumor happen (or, more
to the point, to demonstrate why and how they're omnipresent
and coextensive with our 'legitimated' knowledge)
.
So as we have seen, the spin doctors, while preserving
a more sophisticated notion of truth and falsehood than the
social meteorologists (making much more of intermediating
categories such as judgment)
,
and while allowing gossip and
rumor the power at least partially to construct reality
(instead of acting as mere social indicators)
,
are
ultimately perpetuating the same stale old myths as their
more primitive counterparts. For these theorists, gossip
and rumor are still negative, destructive forces. While
48Cf . the Harper '
s
forum (1986), where gossipists argue,
with little justification, that suddenly we're gossiping more
because we've become more cynical.
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they may not carry the harsh taint of virus or poison with
them, it is only because their methods are more devious.
Gossip and rumor construct false realities, these word- and
idea-twisters and manipulators; their activity is never
wholly constructive, and usually reducible to one or another
readable agenda (be it personal or political)
. The
theoretical dance-steps are more fun to watch than
Bergmann s old one-two, but ultimately, we're dancing to the
same tune (ouch)
.
1 . 3 Gossipy Voices
Happily enough, it is clear that the disciplines within
the social sciences are clearly not anathema to the
production of good work on gossip. Three works in
anthropology, by Sarah Elizabeth Miller (1992)
,
Max Gluckman
(1963), and Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar (1979), as well
as one writer in communications, Peter DeBenedittis (1993)
,
have managed to produce creative and productive analyses of
gossip and rumor that give some play to the complications
inherent within it. Each are not like the meteorologists,
in that they are not reductive about their conceptions of
gossip; nor are they like the spin doctors, reading gossip
conversations as personal (or political) manipulations only,
with shadowy, ultimately false relations to truth. Miller,
Gluckman, DeBenedittis, Latour and Woolgar are able to
appreciate gossip and rumor that is purposive without
119
necessarily being malicious. It's appropriate to begin
with Gluckman
,
first because his 1963 article is really the
important touchstone to this entire debate, and second,
because I've been dropping some rather gossipy hints about
him for some time now.
From the opening of his article, Gluckman takes a
strong stance with gossip, and challenges his readers, on
the basis of our own experience (as he continually reminds
us)
,
to reexamine our preconceptions of gossip and give it
the weight in our lives it deserves. He writes:
I imagine that if we were to keep a record of how
we use our waking- time, gossiping would come only
after "work" -- for some of us -- in the score.
Nevertheless, popular comments about gossip tend
to treat it as something chance and haphazard and
often as something to be disapproved of
.
[308]
This is a provocative and accurate point (which way [s] do
you think he intends "for some of us"?). It is also, I
think, one that could be applied to the professional
writings about gossip. Part of the reason Gluckman takes
such a strong stance towards gossip is that his perspective
on what counts as gossip is much broader than previous and
contemporary accounts of gossip. When reading Gluckman '
s
article in the context of all the other works on gossip, one
difference immediately becomes striking: Gluckman does not
rush to define gossip, and when he does make definitional
statements about gossip, none of them are in the dictionary
category of "personal talk or stories about an absent party"
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used by almost every other writer on gossip. Gluckman never
forces himself to come right out and clearly define gossip,
which might strike some as methodologically shocking, but in
this context is remarkably refreshing. Gluckman from the
start incorporates his own intuitions and experiences into
his analysis of prior anthropological research, and the
result is a refreshingly expansive notion of gossip.
The magnitude of Gluckman' s treatment becomes clear
when he begins to discuss in what contexts gossip occurs.
Gluckman gives a quick account of professional gossip (309)
that is both compellingly clear and indicative of all the
fluidity and indeterminacy of gossip as it actually happens.
Professional gossip, notes Gluckman, "is built into
technical discussion so tightly that the outsider cannot
always detect the slight personal knockdown which is
concealed in a technical recital, or the technical sneer
which is contained in a personal gibe" (ibid)
. This brief
statement is a dramatic recasting of gossip on several
levels. First, it acknowledges that gossip happens at work,
and second, that it happens in working situations - not
simply at the water cooler, in the cafeteria, while waiting
for the bus. And third, it acknowledges that the borders
between work comments and gossip comments are not easy to
draw -- one of the reasons, Gluckman avers, that it is so
difficult to be a social scientist (or any other kind of
outsider) in this context is that it is so difficult to tell
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which comments are apropos and which are not -- which are
professional and which are gossip.
While Gluckman doesn’t address this point further, this
analysis invites speculation
--is this problem merely one
for outsiders, or do the insiders themselves also have this
problem (if indeed we were to think of it as a problem,
which I wouldn't)? In other words, could a participant in a
professional conversation be able to differentiate clearly
in retrospect between the personal gibes and the technical
evaluations? Following Gluckman' s dictate, and reflecting
on my own personal experience, I would have to say that some
distinctions are easy to draw, but that there are many
remarks which are both professional and gossipy. And more
importantly, it doesn't make sense simply to pull remarks
out of the conversational context and label them as one
thing or another, because regardless what we might call
them, these remarks have effect as to the outcome and
decisions in conversations; therefore, Gluckman 1 s quick
point suggests the importance of not rushing to draw
distinctions between gossip and non-gossip, because the two
are so interrelated in our lives. Both happen at once, and
interdependently
,
to inform our decisions and beliefs --
therefore the only result of fixating on whether or not some
one remark is gossip or not can be that we look for excuses
to discount the merit of the remark.
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However, this is far from the only creative observation
of Gluckman
' s
. As Gluckman's analysis of Elizabeth Colson's
study of the Makah Indians demonstrates, gossip is not a
phenomenon confined to one group or kind of group (women,
the unemployed, the poor, particular ethnic groups) -- in
fact, one of the effects of studying gossip is the
recognition that social classings are hardly static, and do
not necessarily determine how locals define themselves.
Gluckman describes how the small community (400) of Makah,
their lives having been redefined and reorganized on every
possible scale for the past century by this country's
government, do not maintain community unity or possess
univocal beliefs. Rather, as their gossip shows, there is
constant strife in the community, as members seek to define
themselves against each other in terms of class, social
position, religious capacities, and the practice of
witchcraft (310). In particular, Gluckman's article
establishes how these categories by which the Makah are
constantly redefining themselves are not static -- there is
no set (or even reasonably agreed-upon) community standard
for what it means to be higher or lower class. Standards
are totally individualized (essentially, every Makah Colson
talks to describes herself /himself as high class and her/his
neighbors as lower class [311]), and totally chaotic. What
this ultimately proves for Gluckman (and Colson) is not that
the standards are useless or valueless, because clearly the
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notion of social standards carries weight in Makah society
but that gossip is the meta-standard by which the social
standards are set
.
.. .Makah. values. and traditions largely persist inthe gossip and in no other way. To be a Makahyou must be able to join in the gossip, and to befully a Makah you must be able to scandalize
skillfully. [3n]
Since the categories by which Makah judge each other (buying
rights to participate in religious or civil ceremonies,
prosperity, practicing witchcraft) aren't discussed in any
clearly public sphere but only through gossip, the only
means by which Makah have access to their society and their
standards is through gossip. Gossip creates both the
standards (such as they are) and the channels by which
standards are known and debated. Gossip is the only
standard that is fixed.
Since gossip is the only accessible channel for social
definition and redefinition, it is fortunate indeed that
Gluckman opens gossip up to the widest possible audience.
Unlike some of the social scientists we examined earlier in
this chapter, Gluckman doesn't attempt to confine or
restrict the practicing of gossip to certain social
groupings only. In fact, he makes it clear that the gossip
he is most interested in is the gossip that can't be so
stratified. The gossip he focuses on is neighborly (i.e.
not confined to one gender or one social/economic class)
,
and he closes his article by specifically addressing gossip
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from one class about another -- gossip about the distant
(media stars, royalty)
. He notes that those kinds of gossip
are less interesting because there's less invested in the
gossip itself -- it's more like a conversational nicety for
people who are only transitorily acquainted (i.e., a
slightly more interesting version of talking about the
weather [315]). While I don't fully agree with his analysis
of the function of distant gossip, what's refreshing about
his analysis of gossip is that it focuses on intimate gossip
as it occurs in all different kinds of situations, and for
sll different kinds of reasons. His account of gossip
focuses more on group competitiveness and power struggles
than it does on group bonding, but it's clear for Gluckman
that both work interdependently
,
and are blurred -- in other
words, part of the ways in which groups bond is by gossiping
about other members of the group or measuring themselves
against perceived other groups.
Hence the playful conclusion of Gluckman
' s article,
that we do indeed need "schools for scandal" (313)
.
Gossip
has an important enough function, helping us to learn about
our social selves and social surroundings, says Gluckman,
that it '
s
worth articulating the basic rules of gossip and
encouraging the practice of gossip (without guilt) even for
the very young. The more we understand about the way gossip
works -- about its multiplicity of functions and methods --
the more we can recognize and be able to operate its many
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voices. Gluckman is a perceptive reader of gossip. He
points out that a single line of gossip can have many
meanings; that there can be both a manifest and latent
meaning in the gossip and that both can be right ( 314 ).
Again, he differs sharply from his professional descendants
here, in that most contemporary gossipists only recognize
the apparent meaning of gossip conversations. As we have
seen when we examined Haviland and Bergmann in particular,
inflection in gossip (body language, facial expression,
laughter or other non-verbal responses) either goes
unobserved, unrecorded, or unremarked. This suggests that
the non-verbal components of gossip have no real place or
relevance to its analysis (except perhaps, as part of the
amorphous setting of stage so that the reader can feel like
a real insider)
. But quite to the contrary, several times,
when the non-verbal gossip is recorded but not analyzed (cf.
Haviland)
,
a reading of the gossip nearly opposite to the
one produced by the gossipist is easily apparent.
But Gluckman' s call for schools of scandal, while
provocative, is also hypostatizing
. Gluckman thinks that
gossip should be understood (and taught) as a means of
communication that already exists -- that we should be able
to understand and appreciate the patterns it describes.
This is a dramatic move because it calls for a broad-based
legitimation of gossip, on the basis that we all already do
it and that it has good social effects (it has many social
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effects, some of which are holding communities together)
.
Gluckman simply wants his readers to acknowledge what
already occurs around them -- while this is a simple task,
it is one many social scientists do not face (the post-
Gluckman gossipists never make such calls themselves)
.
Of course, on the other hand, there is an aspect of
Gluckman
' s charge that is not provocative at all -- that in
fact, encourages control through gossip. Gluckman wants
gossip to be legitimate in part because he thinks it is (or
should be) a defined and definable social phenomenon --
because he thinks we should be able to learn all the rules
of gossip. While this is an understandable move from within
the social sciences (study a society and its patterns of
behavior so that you can explain them to outsiders,
translate them into other kinds of behavior)
,
the effect of
this kind of move is often to erase the very social aspect
of the patterns so described. To steal E.B. White's famous
line about humor analysis, gossip analysis is like
dissecting a frog -- you can do it, but the frog tends to
die in the process. There clearly are ways in which we can
talk and write about gossip -- there are regularities to be
observed and discussed. But when we attempt to isolate and
describe what really matters about gossip, what its real
function is, then we limit ourselves in our understanding of
gossip to our predesignated agenda.
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come
Gluckman lets his presuppositions about gossip
clean when towards the end of his article he starts to offer
a few basic rules for gossiping well ( 313 - 314 ); rules that
suggest that values of loyalty, of continuing to get good
dirt and preserving group intimacy and stasis are paramount.
While these rules and values are certainly plausible as
operators in gossip, they are hardly the categorical
imperatives Gluckman makes them out to be (suggesting that
someone wouldn't really be a participant in society if she
failed to observe these rules). As Gluckman' s article makes
clear, he is interested in gossip because it provides him
with an interesting index by which to determine group
memberships -- who is in and out, and why -- how one moves
from group to group, and how groups maintain cohesion or
disintegrate. But gossip's functions go far beyond that,
srid it is important in our various attempts to legitimate
gossip that we do not let our controlling agendas take over
the character of the phenomenon we are trying to describe.
So what are we to make of Gluckman
' s refusal to explain
gossip's social disreputability
; is it merely (as Bergmann
suggests) methodological or definitional irresponsibility on
his part? Gluckman himself suggests some of the answer to
this question. Contrary to Bergmann
' s insinuation, Gluckman
does address the fact of gossip's social disreputability as
a given -- he merely does so obliquely. When Gluckman
closes the article, he remarks that while gossip he engages
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in is interesting to him and full of possibility and
enjoyment, gossip others engage in about him fills him
"rightfully
...with righteous indignation"
( 315 ). Ignoring
his repetitive locution, what’s striking about this
statement is that Gluckman does not at all deny the
association of social and moral disreputability with gossip
(nor does he question its appropriateness; note that he says
he is "rightfully" indignant)
. Rather, Gluckman is simply
locating moral and social disreputability within a
particular sphere, and hence explaining it (exactly as
Bergmann thinks ought to be done, only the explanation's not
one Bergmann can appreciate [or perhaps understand]
)
Since, as Gluckman acknowledges in the opening of the
article, we all engage in gossip, and all engage in it
frequently and with enthusiasm, it would be rather
simplistic and disingenuous (we can conclude) for any of us
to disapprove of gossip (socially or morally) carte blanche.
Instead, Gluckman simply acknowledges what seems more
appropriately to be the empirical fact about gossip -- the
only gossip we denounce a priori is that about us, that
gossip over which we have little control, that gossip that
can in fact hold the most power over us
.
The entire measure of Gluckman
' s article is that gossip
holds power because it determines group membership and
position -- it only follows that hearing gossip about
ourselves would sting (and seem inappropriate and wrong)
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because that gossip would determine whether or not we were
included or excluded, whether or not we measured up to the
currently applicable group standards. This does not mean
that gossip has a necessary moral or social value. Indeed,
Bergmann's assumption of such a categorical moral and social
value to gossip colors his account just as much as (he
alleges) Gluckman's lack of consideration of value colors
Gluckman
' s account. But that is hardly the most salient
point about Gluckman to remember; the critical points for us
here are Gluckman's carefree style, his inclusive
consideration of gossip, along with his attention to
analytic detail, and his ear for gossip. Gluckman's self-
described status as a player in the gossip game, even with
his overgeneralizing weaknesses (for surely gossip is about
more than simply group ranking)
,
is the virtue that
ultimately makes his article stand out from the crowd, even
after over 30 years.
Where the exciting multiplicity in Gluckman is to be
found mainly in his awareness of myriad forms of gossip
(e.g., that men and women gossip, that people from all sorts
of class and employment backgrounds gossip, and about all
sort of topics), Sarah E. Miller (1992), makes a convincing
demonstration of the multiplicity of gossip- threads and
interpretations. Like Gluckman, she begins her work
determined to look for varied but related stories; indeed,
she considers making sense (not logical) of the variations -
130
why all variations are told, not an account of which one
is "right" -- one of her main projects (xxix)
. At one
point, when describing the difficulty she had getting
relative strangers to gossip with her in some intimacy, she
says :
Unless the person knew me well, turning theinterview into an informal chat
,
the stories Igleaned by asking are all stiff and empty,
catalogues of the motifs that come alive in other,
appropriate recitations.
. .1 hesitate to commit the
same violence that the interviews did, labeling a
story and then reciting the motifs common to it.
This tedious process that categorizes each story
neatly, the runaway, the illegitimate pregnancy,
the cross-caste elopement suffers from the same
ills that delivering an
ethnography in a series of categories does --
'kinship ,
'
'religion, 1 'marriage customs, 1 etc.
[ 233 - 234 ]
This is a lesson Haviland and Bergmann would do well to
learn; reducing stories to their ostensive content amounts
to stripping the stories (and their subsequent
interpretations) of all complexity, all resemblance to the
human lives they supposedly articulate.
Miller acknowledges that gossip is very serious
business in Kathmandu (it is the negotiation in the wedding
negotiations that are the background for her study -- the
formal negotiations that follow the gossip are often merely
windowdressing). Compared to our other social scientists,
Miller is doing a lot of things right in her analysis of
gossip: she's admitting first off that the "going native"
aspect of anthropology is primarily important as a
credentialling exercise ("only I know where 'there' is", she
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points out [xxii]
)
;
she acknowledges several times the
limits of what she can hear and understand, given her finite
contacts within the Nepali community (xiv, xxix)
;
indeed, a
significant strength of her study is that she acknowledges
that her informants might not have been giving her exactly
the story she wanted to hear, or the story they gave others
(2-5)
. The point in all of this, the explicit point Miller
acknowledges that sets her apart from the other social
scientists, is that gossip is not the constrained passing on
of an objective, neutral story that then becomes connected
to its auditors without ever changing its fundamental shape,
content or meaning.
Miller's goal with her dissertation is to show how
words make reality -- not simply in the naively linguistic
sense of words shaping the reality we can understand, but in
the deeper sense of words themselves actually being actions,
of speaking and conceptualizing something actually amounting
to changing prior perceptions, indeed prior situations. I
see three unique conclusions in Miller's dissertation that
are nowhere else in the social science literature covered in
this chapter: gossip forecasts reality, gossip reconstructs
new narratives to explain old, inexplicable events, and
gossip acts as a connector between communities that wouldn't
otherwise be connecting (contra nearly every other social
scientist here, who make it explicit that they think gossip
happens only within small, morally or ethnographically
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homogeneous communities)
. The notion that links these three
conclusions is that gossip, by its very triviality and
informality, provides a kind of epistemic and conversational
safe space to make remarks and construct theories that
simply couldn't be uttered in other kinds of conversations.
Before I explore my criticisms of that notion, let me
explain how I see those three claims substantiated in
Miller 1 s work
.
Gossip forecasts reality for the Nepali, first because
conversation has a much more exalted status there than it
does, for example, in this country. The Nepali word for
"word, " " kuraa , " means not only word but "thing, talk,
matter, affair" (166). Further connotations of "kuraa" all
revolve around movement, change and transfer (231) ; indeed,
kuraa is often used with the word "laagchha" -- "to effect
reality" (ibid). It’s not simply the language itself that
sets a greater epistemic store by conversation; as Miller
demonstrates, the path the negotiations take often is
determined not by the formal negotiations themselves but by
the informal visits wives (yes) pay to each other (364)
.
Through the course of teasing each other, telling each other
jokes, making delicate inquiries into others' lives, and
repeating stories about others' negotiations and weddings,
Nepali women are often able to sound out potential grooms or
brides, persuade the less enthusiastic or calm down the
over- interested, and even attend to the more practical sides
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of negotiations (getting a sense of appropriate dowries,
wedding gifts [8-12]). Sometimes simply the repetition of a
particular story or joke can do the work of narrowing future
possibilities; the speculative talk creates the reality from
the plurality (178-184). Stories are purposively told:
histories are brought in as if to describe a situation
already established, in the hopes of persuading and
effecting a beneficial future situation to fit with the
past. Thus the relation to the temporal movement of a
discursive identity is different" (158)
As this quote so abundantly demonstrates, not only can
storytelling gossip work ahead in this fashion, so can it
similarly work to reconstruct previous, unsatisfactory
events into a plausible narrative. The stories are told to
make the future "fit with the past," Miller says. Gossip
can be forecasting and reconstructive at the same time -- a
multilayered functionality that is definitely new to this
field. More particularly, Miller tells the story of a
ritual amongst the Nepali, "eating one's rice." The Nepali
believe that some marriages are predetermined; that one
spouse ate the rice of the other in a previous lifetime;
that they were bound to end up together (219) . As Miller
makes clear, this belief fulfills a very practical demand
for the Nepali; it gives them a way by which to explain
otherwise inexplicable pairings. "There is actually
something minutely illicit about this movement of fate,
"
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Miller writes; "in overriding all other considerations, it
seems to be most appropriate in scenes where other factors
are not quite right" (ibid). Even very particular rituals,
and the gossip surrounding them, can have a reconstructive
purpose. Indeed, as Miller points out, the Nepali word for
event ("bhaisaky"/ already done) is applied only to events
that are long past (224)
.
Finally, gossip can be connecting, can work amongst
heterogeneous communities. Miller phrases it simply:
[wedding negotiations] represent a kind of switchpoint
between cultures, a liaison between disparate discourses"
(422-423)
.
Wedding negotiations, and the gossip that
surrounds (creates) them, simply are the links between
otherwise disconnected people. These links quickly gain
strength; even Miller herself, a relative stranger in this
social milieu, soon found herself relating differently to
the gossip because of her particular connection to one
household: "the very kin relation that allowed people to
include me in a story also prevented me from hearing
elaborate versions from others" (xxix)
.
Exactly those
relations also helped her to have more complicated, nuanced
readings of the gossip she was hearing. Miller makes this
clear as well
:
It makes no sense to pass a story on to you if you
are not already interconnected by a network of
places and relationships: to whom would you
circulate it in your turn? How can you relate a
story that is not related to you?
[xiv]
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While those relations, those connections are sometimes hard
to document (Miller finds that occasionally she doesn't
fully understand a story she is rereading from her notes,
because so much of what she heard at the time of telling was
context or significance that she didn't think crucial and
didn't record), their technical absence in the dissertation
is far from a dismissal of their relevance. Rather, they
demonstrate all the more clearly how deeply nuanced in its
inception gossip is, and how it simply can't be reduced to
members of one tight community trading and re-trading the
same tired old sawhorses of scandal.
Gossip doesn't function this way in Nepali society in
part because of its status as a counterauthoritative
conversational tack. To explain: conversation has a
higher, metaphysically substantial status in Nepali
language, but in part this is so because gossip-conversation
is seen as making reality from a pre-existing plurality.
Gossip conversation, and not authoritative conversation
(e.g. men's talk, the wedding negotiations per se)
,
accomplishes these tasks alone. Miller points out that
gossip "suspend [s] the authoritative production of
meaning... [to glory] in possibilities, spitting them out
hard and fast, all mingled up together" (178-179) . So the
methodology that Shibutani exactly criticizes (associating
and combining rather than coldly evaluating) not only takes
place here, but effectively so; "spitting out possibilities"
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for Nepali women as often as not means having one of those
possibilities actually occur.
More pointedly, gossip creates a safe space for the
undermining of authority, not simply by gossip happening,
but by the things the freedom of gossip allows you to say.
notes that informal conversation "allows important
statements about hierarchy and subordination to be made
unscathed" (186) . Chatter allows people not only to assert
their own social position, but to challenge others'
These kind of methodological and ideological challenges
can occur, Miller attests, because of gossip's position as
trivial and idle. Miller draws a clear distinction between
"just" gossip, which is idle (19), and "real" talk, which is
the purposive pre-negotiation Nepali women carry out (under
the guise of just gossip, we must assume)
. She has the
caveat that the truly trivial is necessary, for without it
the real talk could not happen (21-22) ; indeed, she closes
her dissertation, "the innocence and triviality of talk may
constitute its power" (409)
.
This, to me, is the point
where Miller's dissertation falls short. Other than this,
she has fully accepted the notion that there can be many
layers to gossip, many meanings, many intentions, many
nuances. She has enthusiastically argued that gossip can
both foretell and retell stories; that it can create strong
relations while also undermining them. So why then, is she
still clinging to the unnecessary final belief that if
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something isn't transparently purposive, then it's just
gossip; that when all is said and done, gossip really is
just idle talk? This one last move is reminiscent of the
spin doctors, just as Gluckman's final reductiveness of the
origins of gossip amounts to social meteorology.
This thinking (that gossip can be purposive through its
very idleness) is supported for gossip's corollary of rumor
in Peter DeBeneditt is ’ generally fine Guam's Trial of the.
Century (1993)
,
a tale of a former governor of Guam, Ricky
Bordallo
,
who while running for re-election in 1987 was
indicted with corruption of office (hence losing the
election)
.
(Bordallo was eventually acquitted of more than
half of the charges, but sentenced to jury time for the
remaining charges; in a protest of his sentencing, Bordallo
fled police custody and shot himself in the head while
chained to a statue in Guam's capital.)
DeBeneditt is
,
who served as the press secretary to
Bordallo 's primary opponent, begins his study with
impressive clarity of purpose --he admits that he thinks
rumors were used unfairly against his candidate, but
acknowledges his own use of rumor, and their power to convey
or undermine misleading official information (21-22)
.
Further, he notes the accuracy and immediacy of rumors; "the
rumor mill was about six months ahead of the papers for
information concerning FBI and local investigations" (19) .
Indeed, he argues that rumors should be treated as media
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artifacts, advocating for a kind of pluralism to truth in
history: "the rumors recounted [here] are intended to fill
m the gaps between what was reported by the press, claimed
by officials, and believed by the community" (22-23)
Sifting through the amassed print and television news
accounts and editorials on the case, as well as interviewing
the local and international officials involved, DeBenedittis
draws many conclusions. Primary among them, though, is his
theory that rumors are a necessary challenge to hegemony,
and even that in some sense hegemony creates challenges to
itself such as rumor. DeBenedittis argues that for a power
bloc to form and survive (and admittedly, he argues,
hegemonic blocs are far from static, univocal or non-
evolving)
,
an internalized ideology is necessary for its
participants and perpetuators
. DeBenedittis traces the
effect of this ideology in the news accounts and interviews
about the case; to wit, that journalists, while strongly
emotional about the case and its effects upon Guam's
political reputation, regarded themselves as reporting "just
the facts" while clearly sifting through and ignoring facts
(165-166), and that several of the principals involved (most
self-evidently the the prosecuting attorney in the case
against Bordallo) similarly considered themselves to be
"just doing their jobs" while they took an unusually rapid,
emphatic course of action in Bordallo's case (e.g., it is
not unheard-of in Guam to delay preparing indictments for
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women about to give birth, people near death)
.
prosecuting attorney repeatedly dismisses rumors associated
with the Bordallo case as "silly" or "laughable" (97-109)
DeBenedittis' response to these self-images is that the
participants can only see themselves as neutral, effective
public servants, whereas their actions betray a (n
inevitable) perspective to perpetuate a structure of power
that benefits them. In this setting, where those in power
give away so little information (107-109)
,
it is only
natural, DeBenedittis argues, that rumors will occur and
spread, acting both as a counterpart to "official" theories
and justifying a cynicism in the naive faith in the purity
of the legal system that its proponents hold. The only
weakness is DeBenedittis 1 analysis occurs in his refusal to
trace out effects of rumors; DeBenedittis does not explain
exactly how the spreading of rumors undermines structures of
power, other than by their simple existence.
Those familiar with the work may be surprised at my
inclusion of Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's Laboratory
Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (1979) in this
section, as nowhere in the book do Latour and Woolgar ever
explicitly reference gossip or rumor as influence or
evidence in their social constructive theory of science
production49 . However, a closer examination of the facts
49The main exception, of course, comes not from the
authors but from their introducer, Jonas Salk, who
disconcertingly regards as high praise of the book that " [it]
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that Latour and Woolgar consider when evaluating what
constructs scientific facts reveals some extraordinarily
gossipy tactics going on in science.
An important caveat is necessary here. Latour and
Woolgar explicitly condemn gossipy sociology of science
(sociology of science that has more to do with the sociology
of scientists than of science itself [24]), that is often
little more than "scholarly muckraking" (21) 50
. They
profess themselves disinterested in breathless tales of
scandal or of the everydayness of scientific invention (as
they phrase it, "the exchange of great ideas over coffee"
[19]). These remarks of theirs might seem explicitly to
disallow any interjection of gossip into scientific analysis
as an inappropriately strong reading of the text. In
response, I would first remind readers of my attempts to
discount stereotypical definitions of gossip as useless for
our purposes here, and suggest that Latour and Woolgar 's
invocations of gossip and scandal here represent only such a
stereotypical usage of the words, and not a philosophically
interesting consideration of gossip. Further, as the detail
of Latour and Woolgar 1 s ethnographic research manifestly
demonstrates, casual conversation has a significant role to
play in the construction of scientific fact. In that sense,
is free of the kind of gossip, innuendo, and embarrassing
stories, and of the psychologizing often seen in other studies
or commentaries" (12) .
50See also page 32 for further irritated commentary.
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then, we might fairly consider Latour and Woolgar important,
though perhaps unconscious, advocates of the use and
significance of gossip in scientific construction.
Consider first how Latour and Woolgar define their own
project: their "anthropological" account considers how
"many aspects of science described by sociologists depend on
the routinely occurring minutiae of scientific activity,
the work done by a scientist located firmly at his
laboratory bench" (27)
.
Latour and Woolgar wish their
project to be in some sense classical social science —
adopting an outsider perspective so that all actions are
equally worthy of observation and recording. (I say "in
some sense" because Latour and Woolgar also write with great
emphasis about the dangers of pretending objectivity, and
ultimately describe themselves as trying both to respect the
culture of science [its internal demands, language] while
writing from the outsider's perspective [39].) Only then,
they argue, can a genuinely thick-descriptive account of how
science works proceed. Indeed, exactly their criticism of
much of social studies of science lies in the very
extraordinariness with which social factors are regarded;
for example, the ways in which social factors are taken into
account only in unusual, controversial, or suspect cases of
science. By choosing to examine a very well regarded
laboratory, and looking at a team working on a scientific
problem that is not under significant public scrutiny,
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Latour and Woolgar wish to be able to describe how
everyday" sociality contributes to the production of
science (31-32
,
37)
.
And describe they do. After giving an exhaustive
depiction of the layout of the laboratory (including more
unexpectedly descriptions of individual desks, the
refrigerator, and the roof) and the culture of research
production, Latour and Woolgar assert a 5-type system for
the adoption of scientific fact, from speculative assertions
(type 1) to taken- for-granted fact (type 5) (76-79)
.
They
then monitor one particular scientific fact (the existence
and makeup of hormone TRF [H]
)
as it travels the five steps,
both within articles and in the more informal laboratory
culture, and demonstrate the ways in which micro- and macro-
social forces contribute and shape the reception of this
fact. In the course of examining the research trail, Latour
and Woolgar discover that several research teams attempted
to isolate TRF(H), using different strategies (114-120).
The scientist who ultimately gets the bulk of the credit for
isolating the existence and structure of TRF(H), R.
Guillemin, pursues a research strategy and arrives at
conclusions substantially similar to several other
researchers and virtually identical to one other researcher
(who is popularly discredited as a researcher early on in
the seven-year process) (119-122).
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The existence of TRF(H) (its movement from speculative
hypothesis to contested scientific fact) gets jump-started
when Guillemin proposed new research and methodology
constraints for the TRF(H) project (in lay terms, the goal
was now to seek an integrated proof of the existence and
structure of TRF(H) through teams from a variety of
professional trainings and testings [endocrinological,
physiological, chemical], rather than the previous
hypotheses produced by partial testing)
,
which when acceded
to by the professional community served to eliminate
alternative strategies and researchers ( 120-12 3 ) 51 . Because
Guillemin proposed new, "rigorous" constraints to TRF(H)
research, he was simultaneously able to dismiss previous
research and theories as to the existence and structure of
TRF(H) as "hasty" (and correlatively
,
of course, establish
himself and his laboratory as the leader in the subfield)
(121). Among those publications Guillemin dismisses are
both of the alternative theories referred to above, that
substantially or virtually adumbrate Guillemin' s eventual,
celebrated theory of the structure of TRF(H) . Latour and
Woolgar do not conclude from this saga that TRF(H) is not a
scientific fact, nor that Guillemin is incorrectly or
^Individual researchers were eliminated because of the cost of the
equipment or chemicals necessary to run the great variety of tests, and
the necessity of researchers gaining additional research experience or
hiring additional researchers, a time and money investment not available
in a pressured research environment. One researcher v\ho abandoned the
TRF(H) project noted that the new constraints limited research pretty
strictly to the Uhited States labs.
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unethically attributed with credit for working on the
structure of TRF(H). Rather, their tracing out of this
metamorphosis of reputation and fact serves both to
undermine our notion of a preexisting natural, categorized
"reality" that is somehow newly seen by scientists (129),
and correlatively to disconnect ourselves from the
conclusion that scientific chases are somehow inevitably
end-directed. Several other researchers articulated the
structure of TRF(H); but only one researcher, due in part to
his reputation as the definer of the field, holds the
credit
.
More strikingly, Latour and Woolgar identify the
hundreds of informal conversational negotiations of
expertise, evaluation, reputation, and alliance that take
place in laboratories — consultations about whether or not
to read an article (is the author reputable? how do field
experts regard the conclusions?), an evaluation of a
potential professional threat (how good a reputation does a
competing research team have?), where a drafted article
should be sent for publication, ranging to more mundane
enquiries, such as where an item of scientific apparatus has
been placed (or misplaced) in the lab (157-160). What is
critical for our purposes about Latour and Woolgar 's
analysis here is the way in which they choose not to isolate
or overemphasize the uniqueness or extraordinariness of
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these conversations, and their emphasis of these
conversations' intrinsic diversity. Witness these remarks:
. . .there is no indication that such exchanges
comprise a kind of reasoning process which is
markedly different from those characteristics of
exchanges in nonscient if ic settings. Indeed, for
an observer, any presupposed difference between
the quality of 'scientific' and
' commonsense
'
exchanges soon disappears. [158, emphasis mine]
In short, "scientific" thinking is not some special, ultra-
rat ional occurrence; to put it analogically, there is no
mental gear-shift" that takes place to magically transform
a scientist from her "normal" thinking manner to her
"professional" one. Scientific conversations as a matter of
course contain social negotiations; the important caveat
Latour and Woolgar have to offer here is that this in no way
undermines or devalues the scientific conclusions they draw
(it simply socializes and localizes them) . And further on:
The wealth of evaluations makes it impossible to
conceive of thought processes or reasoning
procedures occurring in isolation from the actual
material setting where these conversations took
place. [159]
This passage can be rather straightforwardly read as an
empirical demonstration of one of Gluckman's central points
in his 1963 article: that technical gossip (pointed
evaluation of a fellow) can occur invisibly within
professional conversation, can be undetectable to the
outsider. That series of conversation topics I quickly
listed above surely offers the possibility for gossip
amongst it -- we "check in" with colleagues about their off-
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the-cuff opinions about an article, a colleague, a
competitor. Latour and Woolgar offer up evidence of these
conversations' informality; remarks include frequent jokes,
laughter, and casually extreme comments that publication-
r^i^ded scientists would be unlikely to utilize in more
formal settings, such as commenting that one colleague had
made an ass of himself" at a recent conference ( 164 )
While the topics and information may be serious, the
conveying of the information is ironic, humorous, casual,
intimate all hallmarks of the kind of gossipy
conversation Miller and Gluckman observe.
Further, Latour and Woolgar note that occasionally
scientific statement evaluation will be explicitly personal:
...Instead of assessing a statement itself,
participants [occasionally] tended to talk about
its author and to account for the statement either
in terms of authors
' social strategy or their
psychological make-up. [ 163 ]
Technical gossip, then, can be more and less explicit in the
scientific laboratory; Latour and Woolgar give us examples
along a range. The sort demonstrated in the TRF(H) saga
(Guillemin with one stroke establishing a reputation for
himself by disreputing others) is more formal; these casual
conversations Latour and Woolgar document far less so. All
sorts accomplish similar goals, just more and less
documentably . Of course, I would argue that these latter
sorts of technical evaluations are so invisible to Latour
and Woolgar that they are incapable of labelling them gossip
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are
(the sole failing I find with this book), but they
gossip nonetheless.
is of course irritating that even those authors most
sympathetic to the variety in aim and function in gossip
still hold reservations, seemingly about the word itself and
its accompanying reputation. But other than that, all the
writers m this section allow for an impressive, and useful,
amount of critical analysis of gossip and rumor that permit
them variety and interest, pleasure and purpose. In other
words, as Gluckman, Miller, and DeBenedittis attest (unlike
every other writer in this chapter) they write like real
gossips -- high praise, indeed.
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Conclusion
The social accounts of gossip and rumor that form the
backbone of this chapter (Bergmann, Haviland, Shibutani
,
Tannen, Bet Or, Allport and Postman, Knopf) are importantly
flawed -- they either ignore or distort many of the
important observations in Gluckman's article. Some analyses
of gossip trivialize the topic -- while they recognize that
gossip and rumor are interesting and worthy of study, they
take their value to lie primarily in the fact that they give
us a view of how people behave in their "off" time. This
"off" time, so it seems from my reading of these social
scientists, is demonstrably less important than "on"
time
. Social scientists like to see how people behave
when they're really being themselves (i.e., they're
relaxing, they're chatting), but only because it's important
to know the whole community, not because there's any
relation to or intermingling of on time and off time. In
short, it's important for contemporary social scientists to
have an account and explanation of gossip in society because
it's a credentialling exercise -- it's a demonstration that
they know the "real" community. However, the gossipy
52Any. skeptics need only read Haviland 's preface (ix)
,
for
a direct inscription of exactly this assumption as a "worry"
about the efficacy of gossip-centric anthropology; a worry
that "stems not from a dissatisfaction over what I have
learned about how Zinacantecos think and talk - I am glad to
have gotten as far as I have - but from the fear that much of
this book is irrelevant to the lives of Zinacantecos and the
conditions that underlie those lives."
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knowledge they have of a community doesn't get related back
to the knowledge that really matters of a community (which
still lies along traditional ethnographic lines: religious
beliefs and practices, work behavior, family constitution,
class structure, kinship, civil government, sexual
practices, dietary practices, etc.); gossip is still an
outsider m social science, and still a trivial (but now
weighty) factor in understanding a society53
. in other
words, for Gluckman gossip is important to understanding how
a society works because of what gossip does, and what
happens during gossip; but for these other gossipists,
gossip is important for formal reasons only.
Why is it important to read (or care about) what these
professionals have to say about gossip in society -- why was
it a relevant move (other than self
-credent ialling) to do
this long criticism of these folks? I have two answers to
this question that I think I pertinent right now.
The first pertains to this work. If I had to, after
reading the social scientists, restrict myself to one
criticism of all of them (difficult task)
,
I would have to
5
~Jorg Bergmann, himself one of the preeminent
trivializers of gossip while singing its praises, makes
precisely this point when he considers his gossip-friendly
social scientist colleagues. As he puts it, conversation
enters the domain of scientific research "only to be captured
there like an illegal border jumper and either put into
quarantine or 'sent back' again" (24). Gossip, and more
generally conversation, gets oversimplified and hence frozen
as a topic of scientific research, or researched so that its
inadequacy as a topic of fruitful research can be revealed.
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say that all authors have written
What I consider to be tautology he
all authors' assumptions about who
tautologous books here,
re is the omnipotence of
gossips, what gossip is
about, and what power gossip can (or cannot) have. Their
assumptions very clearly determine the methods they choose,
the definitions they use, and ultimately the conclusions
they draw. Their assumptions are in general tacit, and have
to be teased from the works by what I hope was my close
analysis of their various inclusions and exclusions from the
text
.
Now, before I sound too arrogant, let me assure you
that I think most books are pretty tautologous. The reason
someone chooses to write at length about a topic is because
s/he has something to say to motivate the writing (the ' 50 s
science-nerd fantasy that we write simply to explore
neutrally a topic is exactly and only a fantasy) -- s/he has
some initial ideas, intuitions that spur the work. So in
essence I think there are more and less interesting
tautologies - there are assumptions people have (and
analyses people carry out and conclusions people draw) that
are productive to read because they go against the
tautologies that are conventional wisdom (assuming there
really is conventional wisdom)
. I find the social science
analyses of gossip that are the subject of this chapter
uninteresting ultimately because they seek only to reproduce
conventional wisdom -- to explain why we should go on
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believing that gossip is trivial, often wrong, often nasty,
often morally dubious if not outright evil, and never
powerful. It is too easy to hold those beliefs about
gossip, and it is too uninstruct ive
. I think my work (such
as it is) on gossip is a more interesting tautology because
my initial intuitions about gossip -- that it can be
important, right, positive, morally powerful and strictly
powerful, and epistemologically relevant -- have the
capability to be instructive, because they challenge
overwhelming conventional wisdom and 'everyday conceptions'.
Less centrally, I think it is important to take
seriously how the social scientists consider gossip because
it is a microcosm of how the social scientists work, and
hence how it is we arrive at our social beliefs (or whether
or not we maintain them)
. What I have tried to suggest
throughout this chapter (hopefully not too hamhandedly) is
my general reaction to the social scientists' treatment of
gossip -- as awkward, ill-fitting, clumsy. The scientific
method is not a pristine Platonic ideal to be clumsily
attempted to apply to the clay of humanity, it is simply one
construct of a technique of arriving at human understanding.
There are many others
. Much has been written about the
impossibility of assuming rationality to be the only means
of analysis and understanding; I think it is curious that
when taking on a topic as unwieldy, as difficult to analyze,
and as fluid and uncategorized as gossip (other than by that
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darn conventional wisdom)
,
that the social scientists we
examine here choose to apply the truth of their training in
the most elementary, compulsively rational, compulsively
over-categorizing and subsumptive way possible 54
. I think
it is similarly curious that the authors think that they
have learned real, rational truths from such divisive and
dichotomizing approaches to gossip. Max Gluckman concisely
opened some possibilities for a productive, creative
analysis of gossip. I think his professional descendants
(save Sarah Miller) have failed to do either, and in doing
so demonstrate some of the outdated character of social
science in applying to truly social, and hence very truly
human, phenomena.
_
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I particularly savor the irony of the post-1963 gossip
writing (again, including Gluckman' s own) being so especially
ungainly in its analysis. Before Gluckman "outed" gossip, and
made it a "legitimate" topic for scientific analysis,
gossipwork could be more carefree, perhaps. Only after gossip
became a "real" issue did social scientists have to work more
carefully; that is, with much less creativity, and a method
much less applicable to the confusion and clamor of social
lif e .
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY LITE; WHY GOSSIP IS ALMOST ALWAYS TRIVIAL
IN THE HUMANITIES
The previous chapter reveals nothing so much as the
wide-reaching homogeneity in social science. Gossip and
rumor's impressively long-lived, broadly studied pedigree in
the social sciences is essentially a mirage -- social
scientist upon social scientist takes it upon him or herself
to establish what gossip and rumor really are, and again and
again these well
-credent ialed professionals come up with the
unsurprising fact that gossip and rumor are nothing so much
as what common wisdom says they are.-- malicious, community-
destroying distortions (if not outright lies)
,
whose only
virtue can claim to be in revealing exactly the petty ground
upon which social ranking and ordering happens (my former
friend broke this or that social taboo, and so in gossip I
will reveal this fact and denigrate him socially)
.
The review of the social science literature reveals
that not only do most of the scientists seem never
themselves actually to gossip (hence the moralizing tones
their analyses often take)
,
but that (even more
surprisingly) their work is riddled with condescension
towards those unwitting people who do indulge in gossip. At
best, gossipers are shallow (enjoying trivial conversation
for its unself -conscious pleasures); at worst, gossipers are
J. Edgar Hoovers in miniature, conducting localized witch-
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hunts appropriately to root out and punish community
deviants, for social stakes far more insignificant than
those of seventeenth-century Salem. Indeed, Henry
Kissinger's remark when he left the tempest
- in- teapot
Harvard for the headier political climate of Washington
recalls this attitude of the social scientists: "the
battles are so fierce, " he sneered, "because the stakes are
so small" (Isaacson). Social scientists' flattening out of
the meaning of gossip and rumor is interesting not only for
what it does to those two concepts (reduce them to social
indexes)
,
but because for what it correlat ively does to the
social agents in question. Gossipers become laughable
either in their triviality, or in their malevolence. In
neither case does gossip or rumor seem a worthwhile topic
for study; for what meaningful lessons are we learning from
such people, whatever could they teach us?
To use these points as springboards into the discussion
of humanists, the first obvious comparison between the
fields is their respective methodologies. The lit critters,
the philosophers, the theologians, the folklorists and the
historians don't seem to have nearly the obsession with
rigorous accounts of how they proceeded (no graphs so far) -
- but this isn't to say that they're sloppy. To illustrate,
it's clear from the bibliographies and source discussions in
the book-length works discussed here that authors
painstakingly reviewed and evaluated the respective
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literatures on gossip and rumor; writers analyzing rumor
often supply exhaustive primary source reference to document
rumor transmission and evolution. Lack of precision in
terminology and method does not equal carelessness. As we
saw in the first chapter, overwhelming expanse of method
does not guarantee originality of insight -- in fact, it can
be a clear stultifier of insight.
To reformulate this, the striking thing about the
social scientists is their compulsive need to control gossip
to use their methodology so absolutely that gossip, the
ultimate in uncontrollable phenomena, appears restrained and
transparent. Of course, the transparency of social
scientists gossip is essentially an emptiness — they can
learn nothing about gossip, they can understand nothing
about the way it occurs or why, because they commit
themselves to understanding only its orderliness, of which
there is none. So their insights are not simply surface,
they're illusory. The fun thing about the lit critters (and
other "lite" methodologists, like philosophers [!]), is that
they're not so compulsive about controlling gossip through
their methodology, so some problematic insights and fissures
in the smooth surface of textual analysis can appear. These
more problemat izing analyses of gossip and rumor are
discussed in the latter sections of this chapter;
specifically, 2.3, "Doppelganger Gossips," and 2.4,
"Archaeologists of Gossip" present analyses of gossip and
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rumor that grant epistemic legitimacy to the contents of
idle chat. This granting is permissible in large part
because the varying humanists consider a multiplicity of
perspective a non- controversial component to social reality.
Still, humanists are no less capable of constricting
gossip and rumor into socially restricted categories (to use
Bergmann's phrase, quarantining it from everyday, kosher
discourse). Historians, for example, in utilizing gossip
and rumor as analytical tools, resist the obvious
application -- suggesting its persistence and importance in
modern-day ethical and social issues. Literary theorists,
in analyzing gossip as a trope in texts, overwhelmingly
restrict gossip from having particular, determinate effects
on life and in so doing observe a kind of unspoken
distinction between gossip-time and real-time, fictional
life and real life (these humanists are discussed in the
first section of the chapter, "The Trope of Gossip and
Rumor") . Philosophers, in analyzing gossip as a subcategory
of conversation, cannot resist the temptation to lay down
strict rules of when it is and is not appropriate to chat
about one's fellows (see 2.2, "Referees of Chatter"). Let
me map out the categories of analysis, following the bounds
of the preceding chapter 1 :
1As in the first chapter, there are apparently no
humanists who can conceive of gossip or rumor being both
passive (simply a social index, uncontrollable and
unpredictable) and truthful; again the category remains empty.
I divide those humanists who regard gossip and rumor as an
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Truth Falsity
Passive see footnote 1
Gossip 2 . 1 Trope of
and Rumor
Active 2.4 Archaeologists of 2.2 Referees of
1P ChatterGossip
2.3 Doppelganger
Gossips
In sum, then, there is substantially more to celebrate,
for the catty of mind, about the humanists than there is
overt and hamhanded in their distinctions between gossip-
time and real-time, with concomitant values of idleness and
waste versus purpose and seriousness; whereas the lite
methodologists almost always acknowledge the possibility of
competing interpretations of the purpose and value of gossip
as compared to "serious" conversation. We can see this
reflected in the structure of this chapter; ultimately,
humanists can conceive of more theoretical possibilities for
gossip and rumor. In the final analysis, however, most
humanists tend to observe the same lines in the sand, and
dismiss or trivialize gossip and rumor. If they do not do
so more directly (as do this chapter's opening theorists),
active social construct and largely false into two sections
because I think it is important to distinguish between those
humanists feigning no judgmental tone, and those who write
largely to adjudicate disputes of gossip.
about the social scientists. The social scientists are more
they do so
too- scarce
,
indirectly
- by heightening the value of
rational, purposive discourse.
all-
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2.1 The Trope of Gossip and Rumor
Despite the creativity of their approaches, many
humanists fall into the same trap of their social science
colleagues: reducing gossip and rumor to entirely passive
literary devices. For these academics, studying gossip and
rumor is relevant only insofar as they demonstrate other
fundamental human truths (how intimate are humans; do humans
mean what they say; what are communal norms)
,
rather than
for what they actually do. In other words, gossip and rumor
possess status only for what they represent, not for what
they depict, change, challenge, or construct.
Foremost within this category stands Patricia Meyer
Spacks
' now-authoritative Gossip (1985). Principal among
the book's virtues, if we are to take its dust jacket blurbs
seriously, is its successful commingling of gossip with
story, showing the ways in which our conversational and
literary stories similarly tell tales of human foibles and
intimacy. Indeed, two commentators (one of them Sissela
Bok) commend Spacks for her (apparently surprising) ability
to show some kind of substance to the "triviality" of
gossip. While this praise at first might sound important (a
theorist of gossip who does not hold gossip to stern
standards of validity/invalidity
,
a scholar interested in
how gossip functions both in literature and life, a scholar
who challenges widely held cultural norms of the serious and
trivial)
,
the content of Spacks' work actually leaves much
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to be desired. In particular, Spacks
' emphasis on gossip as
storytelling ultimately not only restricts its import in
non-
1
1 terary spheres, but presents gossip for us as nothing
more than a trope, a literary version of the social
barometer the social scientists presented last chapter. In
short, Spacks 1 gossip is an entirely passive literary
phenomenon, revealing (not creating, challenging, or
interpreting) eternal and immutable human truths.
Spacks herself would not agree with this
interpretation. She begins her book by announcing her
project as "a rescue operation: to restore positive meaning
to a word that had once held it" (x)
.
"Rescuing" gossip, it
soon becomes clear, means reasserting the complicatedness of
gossip that lies behind the narrow public condemnation of
it. Indeed, she closes the book by reminding us that gossip
isn't an easy topic -- we can't trivialize it, it's not
easily judgeable (morally or intellectually)
,
and its impact
is often impossible to assess or predict. Gossip has
"essential ambiguity," she writes, "mixed and often
unconscious motives. Reassuring and connecting, troubling
and divisive, relentlessly ambiguous, gossip evades easy
ethical distinctions" (258-259)
. Gossip is interesting,
Spacks ultimately observes, because it manifests itself in
such divergent fashions, to such wide effects. Its positive
effects -- its constructions of personal intimacy,
interpretations of community norms or mores -- erupt exactly
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through gossip's small-mindedness, its pettiness, its
triviality. Indeed, the function of literature in some
sense is nothing more than gossip writ large , "reveal [ing]
the complexity of a self in its own consciousness and in the
consciousness of others, uncover [ing] discrepancies between
the two vies, dramatiz [ing] the tension of self and society"
(261) . We would do best, Spacks concludes by suggesting,
not by denouncing the moral danger inherent within gossip,
but rather by marking gossip's path and impacts through our
titclss and communities. For it is only through inevitable
gossip that we gain any possibility of a new perspective on
ourselves and each other.
While such strong statements in defense of gossip 2 may
spark exhiliration, they contrast sharply with the rest of
Spacks' work. Indeed, as Spacks makes clear as she analyzes
manifestations of gossip in (primarily English and American)
literature, not only does gossip not ultimately resist easy
forms of categorization, but in fact her book is nothing
quite so much as a series of discrete analytical
categorizations that don't seem to leave us much further
incidentally
,
Spacks also remarks in this concluding
chapter that such a popular defense of gossip was
"inconceivable" twenty years ago (259) . While it is certainly
clear that the bulk of mainstream "defenses" of gossip (if
indeed they are that) as well as academic treatments appeared
after Max Gluckman's 1963 article, it is still important to
note (as I did in Chapter 1) that defenses of gossip were not
unheard of, even before the sixties. Gluckman's article
simply brought gossip to the academic mainstream, a far
different kind of advance.
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along m understanding a conception of gossip. Gossip here
is not so much uncategorizable as categorized right out of
existence. As a first example, let us look to the issue so
important to the theorists of the last chapter -- how gossip
is defined. Indeed, as the langage in Spacks
' final chapter
makes clear, she has difficulty coming up with one sense of
how gossip appears or makes its effect known; it can have
highly divergent motivations, intentions, impacts,
communities. Given that, the reasonable reader might
wonder, what then connects the different literary
conversations Spacks is grouping together under the rubric
of gossip"? Is it gossip simply when an epistolary
novelist proclaims it so?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, what makes a conversation
gossip for Spacks is the now-standard dictionary definition:
"idle talk about persons not present" (26)
.
Of course, all
the predeterminations such a definition presents (as
discussed in Chapter 1) occur here (gossip is content-
driven, can only be about people, comes with a necessary air
of secretiveness or the clandestine [58]
)
. In addition,
Spacks immediately refines her definition by clarifying
"idle" -- "lack of announced purpose: talk in a personnel
committee about the behavior of a candidate for promotion
presumably does not qualify as gossip -- although it can get
mighty close" (ibid) . While in her applications of this
definition to analysis of literary texts, Spacks ascribes
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various effects from gossip, what is clear from the outset
is that these consequences are only accidentally connected
to or resulting from the gossip itself; inherently, gossip
is purposeless
. So purposeless is gossip, indeed, that
Spacks makes a particular point (pace Gluckman [1968] ) of
distinguishing between what are merely gossipy (but still
purposive) discussions in meetings, and real gossip, which
has no motivating purpose. Spacks grounds this lack of
purposiveness, in part, in gossip's uncontrollability; at
one point she likens gossip to rumor, dinner-table chat,
aphorism, news, and story -- all in their varying degrees of
individual intellectual control (52)
.
Gossip, like these
other conversational formations, is interesting in part
because its effects and paths are so hard to trace or
direct 4 . This initial awareness of complexity is
3The example of the personnel committee meeting
recollects Max Gluckman' s eager backpedaling in 1968
professionals don't really gossip (or there is no such thing
as "professional gossip", to wit, gossip that is part of doing
a professional's job) because they are too purposive, any talk
that has a point can't be gossip. Only the truly fruitless
talk can be gossip, which happily lets chatty academics
inclined to trade naughty rumors about their colleagues under
the guise of "serious" evaluation off the hook. Spacks,
apparently, suffers the same prejudice.
40f course, Spacks later on seems to contradict this very
point, suggesting that "gossipers generate meanings, which
they may choose to keep within their group" (103)
.
While it
is certainly not implausible to consider gossip-generated
readings of events or persons that are strictly confidential,
the mildness of "may" suggests that this occurrence is far
more individually controllable, as well as far more common,
than simple observation indicates. Indeed, the reason why
Spacks admires gossip along with rumor, news, conversation
etc. is because of their social constructions of events --as
164
promising; my contention is simply that Spacks fails to
follow through with the implications of this line of
thinking
.
It is important to note at this point that Spacks'
definition of gossip crops up in the midst of a blistering
attack on the unfair connotations attributed to the word
over the centuries. Spacks lays out a tidy etymology of the
word "gossip" from its origins in ancient English as a close
relative or friend of the family (25)
,
to its contemporary
definition, dating from the 18th century, of gossip as a
necessarily morally scurrilous activity (and ultimately, in
the 19th century, gossip takes on the status of a noun as
well as a verb [26]
)
. Such moral advocacy disguised as
lexicography, argues Spacks, misses the positive values to
gossip, and hence fails at capturing the concept (ibid)
.
Later in the book, Spacks offers an additional definition of
gossip as a "mode of relatedness" (204)
,
and chastises other
writers for considering gossip to be "human dirt" or the
"ballast" which connects us to the earth. This muck, Spacks
energetically responds, is exactly the stuff great novels
are made of; gossip is about the topics most interesting to
people. The topics and voices of gossip reassert themselves
in novels (204-205)
.
even the most rudimentary understanding of social science
informs us, the social world is hardly characterized by its
submission to individual intentions.
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However, for all this vitality in argument, Spacks
herself, in her own attempts to gain control over what
gossip means, similarly fails to grasp the variety implicit
m gossip. She begins by noting that gossip "spill [s] over,
sometimes dangerously, into the real world" (3)
.
While the
meaning of "dangerously" here is not immediately clarified
(is "dangerous" descriptive or prescriptive?)
,
the real
meaning soon becomes clear enough. Spacks' first
distinction in the book is between two modes of gossip (most
gossip, she argues, lies along a continuum with these two
modes at its antipodes)
. The first is malicious gossip,
which "plays with reputations, circulating truths and half-
truths and falsehoods about the activities, sometimes about
the motives and feelings, of others" (4)
;
the second is
"serious" gossip, "which exists only as a function of
int imacy
. . . in a context of truth... its purposes bear little
on the world beyond the talkers except inasmuch as that
world impinges on them" (5)
.
Two points are immediately
clear. Gossip's modality is identifiable to Spacks
centrally as moral: gossip is either good or bad
(adumbrations of Tannen here) . While of course the social
scientists of the previous chapter would refrain (at least
overtly) from using this morally tinged language, the
important point for our purposes is not so much that Spacks
distinguishes between gossip as good or bad morally but how
that difference manifests itself. Bad gossip is active
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gossip it is the gossip that changes reputations,
reports, perceptions about activities or people. Good
gossip is the ineffective gossip -- we really only talk
about ourselves, take the external world into our own
subjective perspective 5
. This may provide comfort for us
(Spacks continues on to talk about intimate gossip as being
particularly useful for those in a subordinated position, as
a venting technique for their frustrating lives)
,
but it
certainly has no meaningful effect on anything other than
our personal perceptions and stories
. We write our own
fictions of how we would like the world to be when we gossip
in the right way -- and the world continues on its own path,
indifferent to our chatter. So for gossip to be useful, it
must also be useless. Gossip intrudes "dangerously" on the
real world, then, when it threatens to change it, to
challenge previously unargued norms or beliefs. The
intrusion is dangerous not simply because it is false
(malicious, overinterpreting, exaggerating, outright lying -
- all these connotations are contained within Spacks' brief
quote)
,
but because it works. Presumably those in
subordinated positions can take no lasting pleasure or
relief from challenging overgenerous reputations or
5 Indeed, when Spacks reviews the social science
literature on gossip, while she admires the completeness with
which they trace out the causes and paths of gossip (how it
happens and over what, how it ranks), she calls them all to
task for "avoid[ing] moral judgment" (34).
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rankings; their real relief comes only from complaining to
sympathetic, and equally disempowered, peers (46)
Most interesting here is the kind of gossip Spacks
places in the middle of this continuum of good and evil,
inactive and active. The most common kind of gossip Spacks
observes is (of course) not purposive, but idle in the most
straightforward sense of the word. Citing Kierkegaard and
Heidegger, Spacks refers to this kind of (literally) "idle
talk" as originating from "lack of thought ... unconsidered
desire to say something without having to ponder too deeply"
(5) . But this kind of idle talk, apparently also itself
inactive, ends up being much closer to the active end of the
*
spectrum than the other. "Of course, it too damages
reputations and hurts feelings, its consequences
uncontrollable and incalculable.
. .blunted awareness marks
such gossip; involving little real consideration of the
issues its discourse touches, it constitutes moral
avoidance" (ibid)
. At least with the first version of
malicious gossip we are given the scant comfort of knowing
its directness; malicious participants know they are doing
damage, and do so with at least some intention. Serious
idle talkers here resemble no one so much as hypocrites,
seeking out to do damage by their very thoughtlessness,
avoiding entirely the injurious implications of the issues
they raise. Spacks criticizes Heidegger only for failing to
allow for the full range of possibilities within gossip, but
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not for the intrinsic limitations within his concept of idle
chat. "I would not wish to claim that Heidegger is
necessarily wrong about the idleness of 'idle talk, 1 " she
observes (17) ; indeed, further on she adds an even more
ringing endorsement of gossip's irrelevence: "Heidegger and
Kierkegaard accurately locate the moral insufficiency of
gossip in its frivolous modes" (20)
.
While Spacks qualifies this restrictive analysis of
gossip by observing (rightly) than gossip can easily mutate
forms, or that forms may overlap (her example is malicious
talk provoking intimate alliance [6]), ultimately, "gossip
insists on its own frivolity" (ibid)
. So while gossip may
go from honestly malicious to truly intimate, or vice versa,
it can only do so, it seems, through its own irrelevance.
Gossip's multitudinous forms are rest on the central tenet
of its own status as non sequitur, as harmless play.
Spacks' most serious charge against Heidegger and
Kierkegaard is that they fail to appreciate the necessarily
dialogic character to gossip (21-22) ; however, as is clear
from the preceding, the dialogues Spacks hears have very
restricted applications. Indeed, when Spacks at one point
iterates gossip's "usual purposes," they are sadly limited:
"mak [ing] people feel important, declaring] moral and
social allegiances, fill [ing] time" (189). Dialogue is
important only for the illusions it creates (importance)
,
the (pre-existing) lines it recognizes (alliances) , or
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merely the fact of its existence (filling time), apparently,
and not for what it accomplishes (creates or constructs)
This dismissive attitude towards gossip reproduces
itself throughout the book; several times Spacks
distinguishes between good gossip, which promotes and
explores relationships and connections, and bad gossip,
which amounts to nothing more than straightforward
maneuverings for power (43, 63). The fact that human
relationships themselves form through dynamics of power
seems to escape Spacks; good gossip is devoid of power
relations, existing only on a Kantian in-itself plane of
human interaction good gossip, in short, is a egalitarian
fantasy
. Even when Spacks seems to acknowledge the
centrality of power to any conception of gossip -- "gossip,
however, constitutes not only a discourse about power but in
itself a code of power" (68) -- this observation is only
within a negative context. These observations appear while
Spacks is in the middle of excoriating People magazine,
tabloids in general and talk shows for their petty
trafficking in private lives. Presumably, then, the kind of
power gossip deals with is only effective power when
destructive; good gossip is simply commentary about power,
not invocation of it. As the rest of the book makes clear,
while gossip is grounded within discourses about power, this
is a fact we must be wary of, and not manipulate for our own
sordid ends. The best gossip is a genteel commentary on
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power relations that helps us illuminate ourselves to
ourselves (60); precisely the worst gossip is that which
seeks to publicize what really oughtn't be public, debasing
the complexity of human relations.
This chiding tone runs throughout Spacks
' considerable
discussion of People magazines and personality journalism in
general. Spacks' decision to analyze gossip magazines in
juxtaposition to eighteenth-century gossip letters, while
initially intriguing, soon reveals itself as a tactic for
distinguishing and dignifying her analysis of gossip at the
expense of much of what many people might first think of as
gossip. Spacks comments, with ill
-disguised distaste, "I
would find it in many ways more convenient for my argument
simply to ignore People and its shady relatives" (68) . One
might wonder what a scholar of gossip is doing, to so
enthusiastically express at the outset a complete lack of
interest in what after all constitutes a rather large
portion of what we could reasonably consider to be part of
her field of information. Mightn't an analysis produced
from such a reduced field of information be similarly
reductive in its conclusions, or applications? Still,
bravely she presses on, only to reveal that tabloid
journalism isn't real gossip, given its hopeless lack of
sincerity, voice, complexity, depth, or directness (66, 73,
77, 85) . At her most outraged, she analogizes People versus
the series of letters to "a one-night stand rather than an
171
The aggressiveness of thisextended relationship" (78)
language aside, what is curious about this entire analysis
is m how exactly it overturns and ignores much of what, as
she expresses clearly early on in the book, makes gossip
gossip
.
In short, we call something gossip quite often because
of its indirectness, its subversiveness -- gossip says what
we can't quite print or say publicly, or "seriously"; gossip
creates an oral space to do what are quite often very
serious investigations and explorations with lower stakes
than, say, op-ed pages of newspapers, seminar rooms, or
meetings with one's boss. But when it comes to People
. such
indirectness is apparently only something to be scorned:
the People style relies heavily on denial.
.
.
[it] hints more
than it states.
. .the unmentionable is mentioned, the
unphotographable photographed, by skillful deflect ion ... the
magazine thus avoids responsibility for its suggestions"
(67-68). While the indirection may be "skillful", this is
damning with faint praise indeed -- skillful indirection
simply means for Spacks that People ' s editors and writers
can make whatever (no doubt false or exaggerated)
allegations they care to, while protecting themselves from
litigation or public outcry. But the real payoff to such
indirection is clear; People provides its readers with the
false illusion that they really know the celebrities in
question, that their lives really are open books. The sad
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fact, for Spacks, is that not only are human lives not
comprehensible, but that People provides dubious information
in fact, and appropriateness, and accountability ( 67 )
It both imitates and debases social functions of oral
gossip," she concludes (ibid). For Spacks, gossip only
exists along a moral cliff, constantly wavering between
productive and destructive; celebrity gossip outright
hurtles over the edge.
In particular, this spurning of celebrity gossip
sharply contrasts with the quite extensive treatment Spacks
gives to literary gossip in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century novels, spinning out the manifest functions and
presentations of gossip within their frames. As her chapter
titles make clear, Spacks has some productive
interpretations to offer about the function of gossip: she
thinks it works as a voice for otherwise voiceless
communities; it acts to produce knowledge or interpretations
that otherwise cannot be said; it serves to reproduce or
enforce community standards, albeit with individualistic
interpretations; and finally, it serves to bring the remote
close to home, to make seemingly hard- to- fathom characters
or events familiar, human. The other main agenda item of
the book is a debunking of the Englightenment mythos of the
autonomous, self-sufficient, rationally guided self; indeed,
part of what makes gossip such an effective trope for Spacks
in this book is due in part to its running at such cross-
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purposes to the themes of the novels analyzed within its
pages. Indeed, Spacks makes clear at several points in the
book that there exists a rather peculiar paradox of gossip:
overtly, many of the authors treating gossip have their
characters using in in quite lamentable fashions ("it
emenates from this kind of idleness: from understocked minds
of limited energy" [176] ) , where gossip is clearly a social
and moral vice (161, 162, 164, 169)
.
This overt repudiation of gossip, of course, arrives in
the fact of gossip being quite obviously a necessary
literary technique for these very same authors (ibid)
,
and
indeed, as Spacks makes explicit, the one available tool for
agency for disempowered wives and spinsters (170) 6 .
Spacks ' willingness to construct extended analyses of
gossip's paradoxical uses and statuses in fiction is damning
testimony to her rigid inability to observe similar
complexities or paradoxes within celebrity gossip. Now, it
is certainly true that simply because gossip in one
manifestation is so complicated and paradoxical, that the
same is not necessarily true in every manifestation of
gossip. However, for a literary theorist as interested in
how literature reflects (and constructs) social reality,
Spacks apparently has a difficult time conceiving of the
6 Indeed, novelists' apparent discomfort with appearing to
openly praise or rely upon gossip as a trope is reflected by
Spacks' singular praise of William Faulkner as one of the few
novelists who can write through gossip naturalistically (240)
.
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fact that literary gossip in "classic” novels isn't simply
reflecting the paradoxical and contradictory status gossip
has in our own lives.
This brings me to one final point about Spacks
'
analysis of the People
. It's clear, from the tone of
Spacks' prose in those pages, that she thinks that celebrity
magazines simply pander to our most base tastes, and do so
disingenuously. However, what is less clear (indeed, what
goes unaddressed in Spacks' analysis)
,
is how we as readers
take in celebrity gossip magazines. One is tempted to ask,
after finishing Spacks' outraged diatribe against the
amoral ity of tabloid journalism: does she think everyone
who reads them is really stupid? Spacks suggests that we
read celebrity magazines so that we can really get to know
celebrities; to bring them to our human level (from their
presumably extraterrestrial planes of spectacularity)
. Of
course, she is hardly alone in this analysis: Jack Levin et
al . '
s
analysis of tabloid gossip columns announces one of
the main themes of celebrity columns to be that "everyday
life is worthwhile and exciting, even for the 'little'
people of the world. And the world of celebrities is not so
great after all" (Levin [1985] 517) . Of course, the flaw in
this analysis is that it presumes that the millions of
readers of celebrity gossip are simply taking in the gossip
uncritically, enthusiastically endorsing it in exactly the
same tone in which it is presented. Simply analyzing the
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themes by which tabloid journalism appears doesn't guarantee
a univocal, unthinking reader response.
More to the point, Spacks is clearly willing to spend
lengthy amounts of time discussing the "text" of classic
novels (critical of gossip as a moral vice, focusing on
locating gossips as immoral, manipulative people) versus
their subtexts" (vitally relying upon gossip to create the
complexity of their storylines and characters, empowering
women characters through their ability to freely evaluate
other people and behaviors without being constrained by
rigid social mores [228] ) . However, this complexity of
reading (which I find often very acute and impressively
thorough) somehow stops at the borders of the canon:
apparently, some texts are subtext - free ; and correlat ively
,
some readers have apparently no ability to distinguish or
decide between multiple lines of analysis. I think what's
important to note here is not that Spacks, or Levin et al
. ,
consider this point and then reject it, or study reader
response or critical literature about popular magazines (in
part, no doubt, because it doesn't exist when they write);
in short, it's not the fact of their disagreement with my
perspective that I challenge. The central point I would
make here is that it apparently never crosses anyone's mind
that readers of celebrity journalism could have brainpower
or analytic skills comparable to those holding Ph.D.s in
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communication, or English literature; complexity,
apparently, is field- (and person-) specific 7
.
No doubt I leave myself open for a reasonable response
here: isn't it feasible to imagine some readers (in fact,
don't we all know at least one or two people, people who
might include ourselves depending upon the topic?) who do
uncritically lap up celebrity gossip, gorging their brains
on random facts about Time Warner deals or Julia Roberts'
and Lyle Lovett's marital troubles, believing exactly what's
printed and thrilling to the "just folks" tones of the
articles? I certainly have no problem allowing for that
possibility: the whole purpose of granting reader agency is
to acknowledge its spectrum, which certainly must include
enthusiastic true believers of every gossip item. But
correlat ively
,
it is certainly the case that there are
plenty of scholars of communication and English literature
7And of course, sometimes even Ph . D . s fail to detect
complexity within texts. Witness Spacks ' reading of Henry
James' What Maisie Knew
, where she suggests that there is
really one one kind of voice, or subject, to gossip: "Gossip,
always personal, never dispassionate, full of emotion and
judgment, bears little resemblance to such controlled
narrative as this. Although divorce, allegations of moral and
financial turpitude, and matters of child custody comprise
conventional material for speculation, this story-teller goes
out of his way to avoid gossip's atmosphere. Yet the
insistent rejection of gossip's voice and feeling only
underlines the book's preoccupation with gossip's substance --
not just its subject matter, but the issues of knowledge,
interpretation, and morality that focus gossip as a discourse"
(216) . While Spacks is talking about a whole range of gossip-
hermeneutics, it is impossible here to miss the suggestion
that there is one typology of how gossip sounds, and what
sorts of topics it discusses. Not much in the way of subtext
here
.
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(to say nothing of philosophy) who are equally uncritical
within their fields, who simply restrict their reading to
the narrow field of their specialty, and hence have pretty
pre-programmed, unthinking responses to every article and
book they come across. If it agrees with their agenda, they
like it; if the perspective is different, they know exactly
why they don't like it 8 . But the point is that we do not
deny the possibility of thought, creativity, or genuine
disagreement within academic fields simply because some
practitioners are less thoughtful than others; conversely,
it makes us look all the more closely at dissenting
perspectives 9
. Given that, we should be willing to grant
the same possibility to tabloids and their readers 10
.
8To get catty for a minute, a recent talk by Michael
Klare at Smith College (September 21, 1995) illustrates this
point rather tidily: in discussing the evolution of U.S.
foreign policy over the last several Presidential
administrations and Congresses, Klare [an ardent progressive]
made the novel argument that the 104th Congress' foreign
policy doyens were distinct from those of previous Congresses,
because this latest group was patently insane, whereas others
were simply conservative. Klare
' s presumably non-clinicaljudgment of insanity seemed to rest entirely on an estimation
of Jesse Helms' emphatic disagreement with principles which
Klare holds dear.
9Denis Donoghue ' s review of Leo Bersani ' s Homos and
Marjorie Garber's Vice Versa in the New York Times Book Review
is just one recent example of exactly that kind of hyper-
critical treatment.
10 In particular, it seems to me that this is an argument
with at least minimal merit, given that the novels Spacks is
so fond of analyzing are themelves recent entries into the
literary canon; and more pointedly, that novels themselves
were in the not-too-distant past decried as foolish, "womanly"
wastes of time that conveyed no information worth unearthing.
If we have been flexible enough to learn to appreciate
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I have one possible, and rather gossipy,
explanation for why it is Spacks is so uncomfortable with
the notion of complexity within more "downmarket" gossip.
To put it bluntly, there is a variety of evidence within
Spacks own text that suggests a continuing fascination,
tinged with discomfort, with much of what she regards as the
substance of gossip -- sexuality. Spacks begins her
explanation of gossip's power over us by referring, fairly,
to its status as power -- to trade gossip about someone or
something is to share knowledge that isn't publicly
available. Such information, Spacks observes rightly, is
voyeuristic in nature; "gossip, even when it avoids the
sexual, bears about it a faint flavor of the erotic" (11).
Spacks' initial forthrightness about the voyeuristic
character of gossip, though, to me soon gives way to
overemphasis. For indeed, Spacks wishes to attack many of
gossip's decriers for exactly this kind of obsession with
the voyeurism of gossip; such obsession, presumably, reveals
more about those obsessed than the gossipers who may have
mildly voyeuristic practices. Spacks presents and
criticizes the seventeenth-century literary tendency to
embody talkativeness in phallic metaphors (loose tongues,
whorishness [123-125]). These literary works, Spacks
greatness in Austen, the Brontes, and Eliot, and indeed novels
in general rather than simply philosophy and history, why is
it so implausible to imagine substance in our more modern
versions of lincrua franca ?
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argues, reveal more about writerly anxiety (gossips may
possess phallic power through the tongue, but their gossip
is impotent; it has no effect [124]), and fear of individual
expression against social mores ("the world functions as
enemy of sex" [125] ) , than they do about the actual function
of gossip. That being said, of course, the sexualized
stigma of gossip of course continues to this day. But
analysis aside, Spacks uncritically reproduces the terms of
comparison so crudely displayed in the Restoration poem.
The passage is worth quoting at length:
The intimate involvement between gossip and
sexuality extends beyond metaphor. To be sure,
gossip employs the tongue in both its phallic and
its whorish aspects. Particularly as the dreaded,
fantasized voice of the world, it possesses the
dangerous generat ivity
,
the uncontrollable power,
the unsettling authority of phallic force. In the
trivialized form of sexual tattle, it reveals its
whorish side. The degree to which all gossip,
both rendered and imagined, in Restoration comedy
obsessively concentrates on sex points to another,
more ambiguous, connection between gossip and sex:
the relation of gossip to fulfillment. At once
agent and enemy of desire, gossip allows the
individual expression of hidden wishes. People
talk about sex because they care about it; they
work out for themselves, or remind themselves of,
the limits of the permissible by discussing other
people's activities; they satisfy themselves
vicariously by dwelling on what others have done.
Such satisfaction makes room for the other side of
gossip: its repressive force, its insistence on
social norms at the expense of individual
expressiveness. [135-136]
The dualism that Spacks observes here (we are obsessed both
with the fact of sex and with the taboo of our obsession) is
certainly nothing controversial; what is curious is that she
chooses to reproduce the earlier terms in such an explicit
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fashion. While we can gossip about many different kinds of
topics, the strong image in this paragraph is not so much
the careful dissection of the dualism, but the memory that
when we gossip we are both phallic and whorish. (Recall
Spacks
' line quoted earlier, about celebrity magazines being
one-night stands," for additional resonance that that is
our role as gossips.)
Indeed, should we have any doubt that by indulging in
gossip we are treading dangerously on sordid subjects,
Spacks hastens to reassure us that this is the case. She
writes that
:
Literature, unlike gossip, has didactic
pretensions; the novelist may aspire (or claim to
aspire) to make mankind wiser and better by
exemplary f ictions ... Minimal introspection would
probably reveal to most readers their own
incompatible wishes for fictional satisfaction.
We yearn for fairy-tale fantasies (sufficiently
plausible to encourage suspension of disbelief)
about flawless beauties and dashing adventurers
whose lives work out precisely as we would wish;
and we respond to the opportunity for dwelling on
life's seamy side, imaginatively fulfilling
forbidden desires. Gossip, of course, satisfies
the latter needs. [191]
Despite the fact that Spacks has spent much of this book
documenting and arguing for the closeness (if not identity)
between literature and gossip (each serves to illuminate
each other and ourselves to ourselves, each serves to make
half - fictions and truths out of our lives)
,
there ultimately
are neat lines to be drawn between gossip and fiction --
fiction really can teach us something (even though they may
only be "pretensions," fiction still has the potential to
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claim overt usefulness), whereas gossip is, after all is
said and done, still in the muck of human relations. Later,
when Spacks discusses Thackeray's Vanity Fair
, she reminds
us that it succeeds as a novel in part because it
successfully displaces onto the fictional Becky Sharpe our
own inappropriate interests in our neighbors' bedroom
activities (205-206)
.
Spacks grounds this point by reminding us that the
higher truths are not in fact learned through gossip: she
avers that in Middlemarch
, Celia and Dorothea are both right
even in their staunch disagreement about the utility of
gossip (Celia sees it pragmatically, as a resource for
information; Dorothea sees it morally, as a vice)
.
"Dorothea," she writes, "is of course 'right' at a higher
level. Dorothea's rejection of gossip stems from her
admirable determination to find her own way to the good"
(197-198). While Spacks continues on to endorse Celia's
pragmatism, pragmatic interests in human relations are not
accorded status as "admirable"; this is reserved only for
individuals who rise above community mutterings
.
This brings me to the bulk of my criticism against this
book's argument. Throughout the book, Spacks makes much of
her interest in constructing a social knowledge that stands
against, reinforces, challenges, or empowers individual
knowledge and development; she sees gossip as one of the
tools by which we can appreciate the individual and social
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worlds colliding and collaborating (8)
.
Spacks concentrates
on this point because it holds importance for the book -- it
demonstrates some of the ways in which gossip confuses the
naturalized boundaries between private and public.
Gossipers assume (create, invent) both insider and outsider
positions simultaneously, she writes, they "encourage a
certain confusion in [their] participants" (212, 214)
While this reasoning is productive, in that it suggests some
of the chaos inherent within social production of meaning
(e.g. that there is no one clear entity that is the
"social", to say nothing of the "individual"); ultimately,
Spacks undermines this whole argument by suggesting that the
knowledge and role-playing created by gossip is meaningless.
Either gossip functions simply to corrode and delegitimize
notions of the social without offering new possibilities
(225, 226)
,
or it simply universalizes community rankings
and conceptions, erasing any possibility for a more chaotic
theory (179) .
In part, it seems to me that this tactic is doomed to
failure because the sides (individual v. social) are
actually assumed to be more totalizing than they really are
in this work. When Spacks analogizes gossip to Freud's
treatment of jokes, she accepts whole-hog his casting of
jokes as individual aggression against either other
individuals or social norms (50-51)
.
Of course, while
Spacks' own analysis allows room for gossip in which the
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roles are switched (gossip is the voice of the community
attacking particular individuals)
,
the fact is that gossip
in this book is almost always of an adversarial nature, and
generally individual (s) pitted against social norms, with
the white and black hats alternating. This stasis in
casting doesn't allow for a broad range of scenarios.
Because of this limitation in casting, (and purpose,
and flavor) of gossip, the ultimate theory of gossipy
epistemology that Spacks produces falls somewhat short
. As
I said earlier, Spacks sees gossip (like literature) as
producing stories of our lives, created knowledge that can
have a knowledge -like status. But, similar to the Spin
Doctors in the previous chapter, this theory amounts to
little more than quarantining off literary gossip as a
quasi-knowledge that will still fail to be taken seriously,
because it has "different", "special" standards of defense,
in contrast to "real" (i.e. scientific, objective, really
tested) knowledge. Spacks illustrates the dubious nature of
gossip-knowledge right from the start: "all gossip also
circulates information (duly mixed, of course, with
misinformation)" (8). This lamentable beginning
("misinformation", after all, could hardly be a less damning
qualifier -- there might be some truth to gossip, but it's
sure disguised by plenty of falsehood)
,
is modestly
compromised by an account of what "storied" gossip-knowledge
is; in essence, being able to construct broadly
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interpretative accounts of events from scant evidence (10,
181-182, 230) . Gossip draws meaning from "surfaces" (53)
Of course, when we are given no reason to doubt the veracity
of scientific evidence, and rationally arrived-at
conclusions, these appeals to creating large stories from
big assumptions and thin evidence holds little sway; in
particular, Spacks reminds us that these are community
stories (256) . After the corrosive, invasive,
transactional, exploitative, and manipulative powers of
gossip have been amply demonstrated for us, an appeal that
we should be willing to let go of the only tool almost
unceasingly admired for its accuracy in all circumstances
(the almighty logos), in lieu of information that's not
really going to be very empirically true anyway, has only
the feeblest of persuasive power.
For lest we forget, gossip isn't very accurate. Spacks
hastens to remind us through literary examples that gossip
is right in a broad, metaphorical sense, but tends to fall
apart on the details. Writing again on Middlemarch
, she
observes that
:
The gossip about Ladislaw and Dorothea is always
'wrong' : the community cannot at all comprehend
either of these unusual beings. But the money-
focused gossip about Fred and Lydgate and Casaubon
and Farebrother and Brooke and Bulstrode often
touches oddly on truth. I mean by that much the
same thing I meant when I pointed out that the
stories about Lily Barth, in The House of Mirth ,
although literally false, accurate chart her moral
deterioration. Fred and Lydgate are in trouble
when the community thinks they are, though their
deepest trouble is not f inancial ... Money
,
the
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communal object of desire, provides an appropriate
metaphor for other kinds of imaginative focus
[ 200 ]
Gossip can have accuracy only in the crudest sense;
"something's got to be wrong," we mutter to each other,
noticing unusual behavior. But since our analytical skills
are so unsharpened by the titter of parlor-chat, we can only
jump to our typical, lumpenproletariat conclusions
(presumably, only social standards of decorum prevent the
chatterers of Middlemarch from seizing upon that other great
obsession, sex) . Spacks quickly follows this passage with a
reminder of exactly how crude gossip's analytical tools are:
"Middlemarch gossips do not realize the questions implicit
in their judgments; once they decide, for example, that
Lydgate has sold himself, they do not inquire about motives
or about other possible interpretations for his actions"
(201) . Gossip is no more a tool for understanding here than
it is a tool for snap judgments, quick conclusions; the
"stories" gossip tells have little in the way of depth or
meat. It seems without accident that Spacks chooses the
metaphor of surface to express the character of gossip.
This is why I find Spacks' book to be far from a
rescuing of the concept of gossip. Rather, it seems to me
that under the guise of recovering gossip for guilty-free
usage and analysis, what we have here is ultimately a gloomy
indictment of both the omnipresence and the negative,
distorting power of gossip. When we gossip, we ultimately
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fail at understanding others or ourselves; Spacks reminds us
of this fact at several points (90, 96, 206). But sadly,
gossip is an inescapable fact; Spacks reminds us that we
live in a world constructed by language more than by action
(125) . Of course, given the character and the power of the
language Spacks observes, it is no small wonder that she
uncritically quotes William De Britaine 1 s 1680 observation
that "if ... we live upon the credit and reports of others,
we live always in danger" (127-128)
. While the social
unpredictability and uncontrollability of knowledge should
hardly be news, even in 1985, it is startling nonetheless
that lack of clarity amounts to "danger, " instead of (more
blandly if also more fairly)
,
simply the way of the
world. More to the point, the real damage I see by
Spacks' book is a happy reduction of gossip's sphere to an
ever- tightening realm. Gossip is overwhelmingly personal:
we gossip about other people, in individualistic fashions
for idiosyncratic reasons (to get power, to manipulate, to
get close, to adapt /endorse/challenge social rules), and for
damningly individualistic effects. Nothing gossip does or
represents has effect beyond the klatsch . Gossip still
remains the bluntest of instruments, of interest clearly
only to those in such reduced circumstances that they don't
need more challenging (and reliable) techniques (logic, the
scientific method) . Ulitmately, gossip remains opposed and
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separate from domains of "rationality". This kind of Gossip
nobody needs to read, or hear.
Spacks has a horde of companions in making this claim;
indeed, the vast majority of commentators on gossip and
rumor as tropes in English literature make much of an
emphasis on how gossip misses the real truth of the
situation, in lieu of gross exaggeration of simplified
stories and invoking of tired stereotypes. Alexander's
(1990) analysis of Charles Dickens' use of then-hot gossip
to create some of the characters in his Bleak House bears
out this observation. After briefly recounting the incident
that inspires Dickens (a failed romance between John Forster
and Letitia Elizabeth Landon, about whom many scandalous
stories were told; Landon ended the romance because Forster
believed the stories)
,
Alexander argues that it's up to
Dickens to ascertain the real truth in this situation: that
Landon in question ended the romance not because of her
(stated) horror at her paramour's inconstancy in believing
rumors, but because she in fact had a "compulsion to punish
herself and others" (90-91) . This, according to Alexander,
is the "deeper truth" (ibid), only accessible through the
fiction of Bleak House . What's curious about this
interpretation is not so much Alexander's interest in how
Dickens chooses to reinscribe the details of his
contemporaries' lives (for surely that is a rather mundane
feature of being a novelist)
,
but her emphasis on how much
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more accurate, more truthful, the fictional accounting
becomes than its gossipy counterpart. All the gossip
produces is inaccuracy (for supposedly Landon in actuality
did not have the affairs implied in the rumors)
,
and a
trivializing of human psychological truths (Alexander refers
to the "strained sense of horror" Landon expresses
in a letter to a friend explaining her breaking off the
3-ffsir, averring that Landon cannot possibly be sincere here
[ibid] ) . This asymmetry of interpretation (fiction produces
the meaningful truth; gossip produces only sordid
manipulation of event and self
-aggrandizing) seems rather
more strained the the original horror Alexander observes.
It's as if truth is a zero-sum game; and that the truth
Dickens creates in his fiction can only come at the expense
of the truth Landon observes about herself and her friends
in letters and community conversation.
The terrain Spacks travels in Gossip -- gossip as a
trope in the work of writers like Austen, Eliot, James, the
Brontes, Chaucer -- has since been covered and re-covered by
many commentators, most of whom admire, along with Spacks,
gossip's theatricality, and the freedom by which gossip can
reproduce previously unsayable community mores. Indeed, two
commentators argue, writing about Austen's Emma , that
"gossip travels fast because in a sense it is always already
known; it is not news at all but part of a social agenda
already recognized by the community and already
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unconsciously internalized" (Finch and Bowen [1990] l)
.
But the speed and omnipresence of gossip, tacitly accepted
by so many writers, have little to do with its ability to
interpret accurately events or persons. Indeed, Jan Gordon
(1984) writes about gossip in Anne Bronte's The Tenant of
Wildfell Hall that "the first 10 chapters of the novel are
really nothing more than the attempt of gossip to come to
terms with meaning" (722) . This attempt, Gordon clarifies,
must necessarily fail, "not because of the inscrutability of
their object, but because of the nature of the discourse"
(ibid). The nature of gossip is "speculative," Gordon
writes, and its objects are necessarily impossible to
understand (e.g. gossip aims at people's private lives), and
so therefore gossip must always be tragic in nature --
engaged in futile tasks.
Given that dismal report on gossip's ability to ferret
out and interpret information, it's only natural that we
might wonder why then people engage in gossip, to say
nothing of why it is such a favored tactic among novelists,
so that characters' innermost thoughts and beliefs may be
revealed. Gordon has a ready answer for this question; she
points out that gossip spreads compulsively (virally11 ?)
,
11My use of this metaphor is neither accidental nor the
result of compulsion on my part. Indeed, just as "poison" was
by far the favorite negative metaphor by which social
scientists characterized gossip, as shown in the last chapter,
its counterpart of "disease" seems equally popular with the
humanists. Gordon, for her part, uses the metaphor in a later
article (1988) on Jane Austen, writing that "gossip, like
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exactly because the power it holds over a person is that
s/he is becoming "a character, an 'other', in someone else's
fiction" (723) . In short, to be gossiped about is to be
lied about, to be created in a non-realistic fashion at the
behest of someone else, for omnipotent purposes (for Gordon
clearly does not doubt the absolute control of the author)
Gordon underscores this point by averring that "gossip
always attempts to be what it is not by incorporating the
patterns of relatedness appropriate to the novel; i.e.
,
it
creates plots where none exist" (724) . So, contra Spacks
,
gossipers wish they could be as creative (and truthful) as
novelists)
,
but they fail at even that -- their only
specialty becomes outright lying, with the consolation that
their lies have absolute power in communities.
The lies of gossip are traced back to its roots in
collectivity. Without individual sources, or individual
accountability, Gordon argues, gossip is "financially,
theologically, and narratively unredeemable" (725)
.
This
outlaw status of gossip runs anathema to Gordon's literary
instincts -- it means that gossip always works counter to
novelistic interests of closure, plot development, climax
and denouement
. She contrasts gossip to other epistolary
novel techniques (the diary, the letter)
,
suggesting that if
only we could write completed diaries in the Bronte novel,
illness, is a system of informational storage which appears as
random and undirected -- a kind of oral plague without an
identifiable source" (20) . See footnote 8, chapter 1.
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the story could attain its previously-unachieved closure
(and transparency [728-729]). This kind of transparency
can, by simple fact of its character, never be accessible
through chattery, anonymous, false gossip. What Gordon does
not do here is to pause to consider the priority of
transparency and closure on novels. Indeed, Gordon
pronounces Bronte's aim in Tenant finally to be aggressive;
an argument that writing must be spiritual, must rise above
simple trafficking in human relations (i.e. gossip [734]
)
Otherwise, Gordon closes, we will find ourselves
increasingly in a Tower of Babel, where discourse
proliferates
,
and truth disappears (738-739)
.
Aside from
the stringently moralistic tenor of this conclusion, note
the over content of Gordon's assertion. We only access
truth, it seems, through formal investigation and
conversation -- informality and anonymity only bring out
transactional, mercurial, and exploitative impulses in us
which we can't help but spread to others. The possibility
that gossip and rumor somehow help us to formulate and
consider possibilities that could be worthwhile, if
unpleasant to many ears, simply passes beneath Gordon's
radar
.
For some literary theorists, gossip is less a trope
about knowledge (and its lack) than about intimacy (and its
lack) . Parroting the language of the social scientists,
L.J. Morrissey (1988) presents an interpretation of Robert
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Frost
'
s
"Mending Wall" that straddles the by-now predictable
paradox of gossip:
Despite the apparent message of 'brotherhood,' thepoem's achievement is clear. Frost has structured
a poem m which the message of brotherhood is
enacted from the rhetorical stance of gossip
which excludes, isolates, and distorts. He has
constructed a rheotircal 'wall 1 under the cover ofpleading against walls. [63]
Morrissey sees Frost's strategy as inviting the reader to
gossip with him about a third person (the neighbor who
rebuilds a fence between properties with Frost, repeating
only that "good fences make good neighbors"). This gossip,
Morrissey argues, encourages us to exclude, isolate and
distort the character of the neighbor, so that we can feel
superior, and then uncomfortable, about our (similar)
disinclination towards the connection a removed fence
represents. The poem, which is a meditation on the non-
necessity of fences, contains little analysis of the
neighbor's disinclination to let the fence fall, observing
only that the neighbor "will not go behind his father's
saying, /And he likes having thought of it so well" [Ellmann
396]
.
Because the neighbor is such a non-presence here,
Morrissey argues, we are encouraged to see him through the
lens of gossip -- as a laughable caricature.
It is not simply the fact that Morrissey is here
presenting a very strong reading of the text that disturbs
me, but the nature of his strong reading. Clearly,
Morrissey is uncritically reproducing a judgmental
193
definition of gossip (it is distorting, it is isolating --
it is malicious) 12
; and more to the point, this judgmental
definition to me seems to obscure the much more obvious
symbolism of the poem.
To explain: I have no quarrel with the structural
observation that Frost is inviting us to reflect with him
about his neighbor. Of course, what's clear first is that
it's not the second-order commentary itself that marks this
poem as gossipy, but the particular, moral overtones of that
commentary as distorting, excluding, and isolating -- to
gossip is somehow to miss what could be for our own
preferable, if ruder, stories of what we think we see. What
I find curious in this reading is the supposition that Frost
is being narrowly dismissive and distortive, and inviting us
to reflect upon our own readiness to join him in nasty
evaluation. It strikes me as much more straightforward that
Frost is simply reflecting on the nature of division in
humans, and that fences between properties are only a
pleasantly visual way to characterize the non-navigable
impasses that divide humans from another.
120n this point, note again the title of Morrissey's
article; Frost and the "Structure of Gossip." Like Bergmann
in the last chapter, Morrissey takes an apparently "mild,
objective" term to take on whatever stronger evaluative terms
he wishes it -- for where in the dictionary is gossip defined
as "isolating, excluding, distorting"? Instead of
"structuring" gossip as its means of proceeding (e.g., those
selfsame dictionary definitions of "idle talk about those
absent" all our other theorists enjoy so much)
,
Morrissey uses
the supposedly neutral language of structure to pack in
snobbish invective about the social unutility of gossip.
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Notice the way in which Frost is clear to articulate
the difference between his neighbor's properties and his
own: "He is all pine and I am apple orchard. /My apple trees
never get across/And eat the cones under his pines.
. .
"
(Ellmann 395)
.
In this poem Frost is provoked by the
obscurity of his neighbor (who he only seems to see at
mending time, the poem insinuates)
; this provocation is
doomed to failure: "He moves in darkness as it seems to me"
(Ellmann 396) It seems to me that rather in lieu of being
an invigorating poem about brotherhood (or an ironic
commentary about how non-brotherly some people, i.e. all of
us, are)
,
Frost is making a much more universal point here;
that not only are other people not knowable to us, but that
we even keep ourselves from making the attempts to
transgress self-imposed boundaries. For in the poem,
despite Frost's evocation of wanting to ask why walls are
necessary, what we wall in or out by erecting them, at the
end Frost refrains from any of his "mischievous" impulses
towards his neighbor; presumably continuing quietly on to
reestablish the boundary, as his neighbor repeats "good
fences make good neighbors." This is hardly the
incriminating, vindictive tongue-lashing Morrissey would
have us see it as. Indeed, it seems that if there is a
judgment to be had in the poem, it would be Frost judging
himself for his New England reticence, and not his neighbor,
who after all, is simply "dark", or unknown (and presumable
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unjudgable) to us. Given these observations, I find it
curious indeed that Morrissey insists on the particular
agency to gossip: for by Morrissey's reading, it is the
structure of gossip that somehow compels us to contort
Frost's neighbor to fit our own (sordid, petty)
presuppost ions
. Gossip is the real (only malevolent) agent
here, we simply move along, propelled by its destructive
force
.
What we are left with, when we digest these literary
theorists, is the overwhelming aftertaste of dour morality -
- to gossip is to engage in idle (if not vindictive)
judgment. While the judgments may in themselves reveal
truths about humanity (principally our venality, our need
for social reinforcement of moral codes, and our
distractability)
,
the content of the judgments do nothing to
dignify the human endeavor.
2.2. Referees of Chatter
While many humanists simply see gossip and rumor as
passive, static literary entities, to be observed and
remarked upon but little else, some of their cohorts take a
more activist approach to tackling analyses of gossip and
rumor. These referees see their projects as variously
amounting to writing rulebooks for gossip and rumor --
understanding why we do and don't gossip and spread rumors,
and when (if ever) we should spread them or abide by them.
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While the referees are primarily philosophers, working
within the domain of ethics, other humanists tackle these
"what-if" situational questions; additionally, the vast
literature on hearsay in jurisprudence pretty much amounts
to a consideration of when it is legally acceptable to
spread nasty chitchat about someone in a court of law as
evidence. Unsurprisingly, the etiquette tenor that
permeates this body of literature suggests the strategic
flaw here -- that gossip and rumor are problems to be
solved. I think it's fair to say that there are two
assumptions grounding the various prescriptions authors in
this section produce. First, gossip and rumor must be
controlled because they are inevitable human impulses;
second, they should be contained because they are at a
minimum dangerous (epistemically)
,
and probably at least
partially false. With the proper understanding (theorize
the referees)
,
we will only gossip or spread rumors in
morally acceptable ways.
The philosophers provide the most fecund material for
analysis within this group. Sissela Bok ' s Secrets (1983)
has stood as a popular standard of a rigorous philosophic
analysis of gossip. Bok sees her book as an exploration of
the concrete issues in ethics -- in other words, a more
systematic guide for when and how to follow what kinds of
moral rules. She's a Rossian in her approach to ethics --
she thinks that we have basic moral imperatives that we
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should and do follow, but that we should and do adapt them
to certain kinds of situational restraints on different
occasions. Thus, her book is less an exploration of why we
gossip and what gossip and rumor are, then under what
circumstances we gossip and when and why those circumstances
are appropriate or not . While there are some brief
definitional comments about what gossip is and the
motivations for it (91-93), the definitions don't deviate
enough from the standard analyses of gossip to deserve much
comment. What is rather more interesting is her account of
how and when we should gossip, or more accurately, when we
shouldn't. While Bok
'
s
book at first glance appears to be
interesting, in that it proposes a situational approach to
moral conundra (i.e., that the moral rules we take to be
second-nature are not all that second-nature, nor should
they be all that ruling)
,
the actual playing out of her
Rossian theory is rather rigid -- the brief chapter on
gossip is entirely focused on when we shouldn't gossip, and
the reasons why. Therefore, the effect of her chapter
simply seems to be an endorsement of the existence and the
appropriateness of those second-nature rules, rather than an
exploration of the possibility that rules ought to be
applied to situations lightly, or not at all. In short,
Bok '
s
situational analysis is none too situational in
nature. In this respect, Bok is even less adventurous than
other rules-oriented theorists like Haviland.
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After explaining what gossip is, Bok divides her book
into two sections, "Reprehensible Gossip" and "Trivializing
Gossip", itself a revealing dichotomy (this after some
admiring early comments that gossip is unfairly treated as
always negative [90]) . Bok '
s
justification for such a move,
of course, is that it is of particular moral import to
discern precisely when gossip should be avoided (since if
you're constructing a moral scale from most important to
least important, it is by her [and Ross'] standards more
important not to do the harmful thing than it is to do the
beneficial thing, or merely to do the benign thing) ; but the
absence of any even modestly sustained discussion of when it
might be legitimate to gossip leaves the obvious taint that
gossip can never be beneficial enough to merit any real
discussion (especially by a credentialled philosopher!).
Bok puts significant effort into coming up with stern
reasons why gossip can be reprehensible (if it is false, if
it is unduly invasive, or if it breaches confidence). Bok '
s
implicit conviction that gossip is generally harmful is most
clear when she cites what would seem to be a pretty benign
case of gossip (making up salacious stories about other
people to entertain a dying relative [96] )
,
and admonishes
sharply against its practice, as debasing because it
involves lying and reflects a paucity of communication
between those supposedly close.
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These harsh words are simply startling in their
excessiveness, and Bok
'
s
reliance and assumptions of common
values (of course it
'
s
second nature never to want to say
something untrue) seems simplistic. Most noticeable about
this passage, however, is Bok
'
s
overdirect and reductive
conceptions of what human relations can be
. It's clear from
this that Bok thinks that human intimacy is only reflected
through sincere, thoughtful, direct communication; that if
someone is telling deliberately untrue stories that of
course this behavior is necessarily deceptive, and malicious
the possibility that someone could be perfectly
aware that they are hearing fictional stories and enjoying
it all the same [or rather, while Bok raises that
possibility {96}, she dismisses it instantly as incapable of
holding anyone's sustained interest 13 ]). Essentially, Bok
is dictating only one course of human action and
motivation --we must try to be transparent at all times, we
must want to be transparent to others at all time, and any
evidence of opacity, intentional or not, must be personally
disturbing at the least, if not actually harmful. This is a
psychologically simplistic approach.
13Compare this to Spacks ' discussion of People magazine
and its sibling tabloids; both share the attitude that we only
read and hear gossip in the most direct, uninterpret ive
,
inactive fashion possible. Somehow, it seems, critical
faculties that theorists are willing to grant people in a
variety of situations simply fall by the wayside when we are
confronted with gossip. It is nothing short of amazing that
something decried as so clearly trivial and meanspirited is
somehow so all-powerful as simply to take minds hostage.
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Other than that, her section on reprehensible gossip is
unremarkable; however, the section on trivializing gossip is
illuminating indeed 14
. After exploring carefully the
myriad of reasons and situations that discourage gossip, Bok
then continues on to argue against the very notion of
gossiping at all, swiftly characterizing gossip by its very
nature as shallow, demeaning to both its participants and
their subjects, distorting, misleading, stereotyping, and
levelling (as she revealingly phrases it, "even the
exceptionally gifted, the dissident, and the artist are
brought down to the lowest common denominator" [100] )
.
Bok ' s elitist bias is impossible to miss here -- the
language of "lowest common denominator", when compared to
artists (creators)
,
dissidents (individualists) and the
gifted (intelligentsia) is striking in its snobbery --
gossip reduces us all to unthinking robots, united by base
urges. More to the point, precisely what is demeaning,
14And of course, we shouldn't ignore the fact that this
very pedestrian approach to gossip is in the midst of an often
enlightening book --a book that frequently seeks to discount
our justifications for keeping secrets. Bok mixes personal
secrets with professional, governmental, and military secrets
in her analysis, and the general take on secrets that she
proposes is that at the very least, the reasons behind keeping
something secret need to be accessible. Given that a thinker
who seems on some levels to be very interested in discounted
commonly held perceptions about right and wrong and desert in
the case of gossip can only rigidly underscore commonly held
perception, I am depressed by the fact that Bok apparently has
no problems with moral rigidity, as long as it is confined to
"trivial" topics like gossip. Her subterranean message in
this work seems to be that perhaps moral rigidity is
ultimately preferable, but so unpracticable in real life that
it is best maintained when it is "easiest".
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erasing, and levelling about gossip is the fact that it
recognizes commonalities between humans, and links humans we
would otherwise naturally think of as different (i.e., the
rich and the poor, the powerful and the disenfranchised, the
intelligent and the unintelligent)
. Clearly, for Bok this
cannot be a good thing. On a more basic level, Bok
noncritically quotes Heidegger's remark that gossip cannot
be positive because it is "something which anyone can rake
up" (90) . The implication here -- that true knowledge or
understanding by its nature can be accessible only to the
few elite -- is regrettably selective.
The section is brief but devastating -- it suggests
that not only is gossip a poor ethical risk to begin with
(because it is a veritable minefield of moral errors)
,
but
that even if you can manage to gossip without doing actual
damage to the person about whom you gossip, you almost
certainly debase yourself and your cohorts. While Bok
closes the chapter with a quick paragraph acknowledging the
elitism of such a view of gossip, and suggesting that this
view can't be right (that it's just as stereotyping as the
kind of gossip it is condemning)
,
the paragraph is so brief
and non-specific that it carries no weight, and seems only
the most formal of a qualifier. In sum, then, Bok '
s
attitude towards gossip seems even stricter than simply
"when in doubt, silence," her ultimate moral prescription
for gossip- situations . Her essential attitude seems to be
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that gossip is inherently a deleterious practice, and an
unavoidable one. Her task, in this pragmatic book on how to
conduct yourself, seems to be to minimize the moral damage
that must take place in this less than absolute world. The
take on Ross that seems to dictate this approach is simple:
it's too bad we can't live in a world dictated perfectly by
absolute rules, because then everything would be consistent
and good. But, given that we won't all always follow rules,
because situations and people are so messy as not to be able
to be completely circumscribable by rules, the least we can
do is to come up with second-order rules that make the
first-order rules more followable, particularly when the
stakes are as low as they are in gossip.
Bok has a compatriot in the field of popular theology;
Joseph Telushkin's Words that Hurt, Words That Heal (1996)
contains arguments against gossip so strikingly similar to
Bok '
s
that I will not detail them here; rather, I will
contain myself to a few observations about the significant
differences -between his book and Bok '
s
chapter. What is
most striking about this book is Telushkin's resistance to
argument and analysis about gossip as a social
manifestation; whereas most commentators on gossip seek to
provide at least some initial analysis of what gossip is and
how it functions, Telushkin apparently regards such work as
entirely beside the point, assuming that everyone regards
gossip similarly, as idle, sensational talk about others who
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are absent (16) . This assumption is underscored by
Telushkin
' s apparent obsession with gossip as a negative and
destructive phenomenon of speech — fully three out of ten
of his chapters on hurtful language are focused on gossip
and rumor; no other form of hurtful speech gets more than
one
.
The one-sidedness of this approach makes clear the way
in which Telushkin simply makes more explicit what is
implicit about Bok
'
s
theory: that gossip is an exceptional
kind of (normal, civil, rational) speech. Telushkin' s call
for a return to "civil" language of the past 15 (64)
contrasts sharply with his descriptions of gossip: as like
"a loaded gun" (5), "malicious", "sadistic" (43), and
ultimately, words that "incite" rather than "inform" (9).
Gossip's uniqueness, its identif iability
,
its difference
from regular, rational, civil speech is what renders it both
so powerful and so harmful
.
Telushkin is an ardent advocate of speech control; he
frames the book with an analogy of hurtful language to
alcohol addiction, and suggests that words can be as
damaging as murder (xxvii -xxviii
,
xx)
.
To minimize the harm
of words, he advises unrepentant gossips to follow the
teachings of Alcholics Anonymous, and control our speech
15A call which in itself should sound alarms in anyone
even casually acquainted with literary or world history; for
surely, documents of past civil interactions reveal nothing so
much as a constant liveliness of discourse, some of which is
exceedingly uncivil, as well as friendly.
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"one day at a time" (169-170). It's not simply the fact
that Telushkin draws much of his evidence and principles
from Talmudic writings that make his book sound like little
else than a collection of sermons; it is also the excessive,
dire tone he adopts throughout the book. Telushkin
’
s
attitude that gossiping is a serious vice that it is
difficult to resist withdraws gossip from the plane of
rational, civil discourse, and renders any defense of gossip
nothing less than self-serving hypocrisy.
And indeed, Telushkin is explicit about his belief that
gossip can be nothing more than self-serving hypocrisy
(showing that while his arguments about gossip are similar
to Bok's, the effect of his book is to carry her conclusions
to more extreme ends) . While he acknowledges the existence
of innocuous gossip, he still admonishes strictly against
its practice, noting that it cannot remain innocuous for
long with inevitably descending into malice (18) . Further,
he thinks -that we gossip only to protect and enhance our
(clearly pathetic, or why else would we need to gossip)
social reputations; we gossip only about our social equals
or betters, for it is only through bringing them down that
we elevate ourselves. There is no prestige in discussing
the "cleaning woman's or gardener's life" (36)
.
This
elitism, of course, echoes Bok's; it is inconceivable to
Telushking that we might see those in lower social stations
to us as interestingly human enough to merit gossip. In
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sum, then, Telushkin has such a restricted notion of
gossip -- what it is and what it does -- that while his
sermons are clear and compelling, they are hardly
educational; they do nothing other than reinforce the most
shallow and stereotypical notions of gossip.
Even such sympathetic readers of chatter as John Sabini
and Maury Silver, working in their refreshingly concrete and
conversationally written Moralities of Everyday Life (1982)
,
can only come up with a defense of gossip as a useful moral
tool in the most secondary sense. For Sabini and Silver,
gossip is "a training ground for both self -clarification and
public moral action" (106) . What they mean by "training
ground" is clear -- a low-stakes setting where opinions can
be clarified and potentially dicey scenarios can be explored
without offending or upsetting anyone. The reason gossip
can be free of emotional trauma is because it is clandestine
-- it involves trading secrets (96)
.
More directly, Sabini
and Silver follow the standard definition of gossip; that it
is idle, evaluative talk about someone behind their back
(98, 92 ) 16 .
16Sabini and Silver qualify their definition to allow that
our gossip may be institutional: "gossip, of course, can be
about honorary people -- universities, corporations, or
governments -- as long as they are treated as animated by
motives and subject to moral constraint. Clearly these cases
are parasitic to our talk about people" (90)
.
In short, the
centrality of Sabini and Silver's definition lies in the
evaluativeness of gossip -- what makes gossip so is its
(presumably uniquely) opinionated character, more than its
subj ect
.
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Sabini and Silver's argument, however, is not without
its sophistication: they make much of the fact that
gossip's idleness is apparent only, disguising real
purposiveness (92, 94). Indeed, far from being idle, they
iritie
,
gossip in part is recognizable as such because of
its very relevance to issues and personalities of interest
to us. Sabini and Silver add a corollary to this
observation: even old news or non-relevant personalities
can become subjects of gossip if the facts traded about them
are appropriately (e.g. relevantly) emphasized or
interpreted anew (91, 92, 95, 97).
But again, the impression that lasts long after the
prose of purposiveness has lost its novelty is one of gossip
as dealing only with the tiniest of life details: gossip
deals with less important human behavior (4); gossip is
ethics applied practically to the "mundane" (100)
;
gossip is
an important outlet for "trivial irritations" (104)
.
When
we gossip, we dramatize, evaluate, apply and adapt abstract
moral rules, Sabini and Silver write (102)
.
All of those
adjectives share among them a kind of passivity --we react
to preestablished moral rules when we illustrate or apply,
even when we evaluate or adapt. Not only do Sabini and
Silver not write about us resisting moral rules (e.g.
criticizing, debunking, rejecting)
,
notions that carry with
them the sense of more activity and engagement; but more
directly, nowhere in this chapter is there a sense that with
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gossip we genuinely create knowledge -- e.g., articulate new
moral rules, use our "outlets" to arrive at genuinely novel
interpretations or explanations of what is before us
For Sabini and Silver, gossip is an important feature
of our psychological life, but mainly because it helps us to
see our own complexity; how we can 1 t be summed up by one
tidy theory (5)
,
because we do too many things that can't be
reduced down to singular motives or reasons (98). But our
complexity amounts to nothing more than very particular
intepretations and variations on that preestablished code of
social and moral rules, for that indeed is presupposed
whenever gossip occurs (102) . This phrasing, which recalls
John Beard Haviland's Winchian theory of gossip as an
interpretation of abstract moral rules, set us up as
gossipers to take a purely theoretical interest in gossip --
we can come up with particular explanations for why it is we
gossip at different times (and why it is we should and
shouldn't), and indeed, we can come up with feasible
justifications for gossiping at certain times (like when we
need to blow off steam at someone for some "trivial" reason,
when it ' s not worth a direct confrontation) . But what this
beginning of a rulebook for gossip doesn't provide us with
is a fuller analysis of why it's worth thinking of the rules
of gossip at all -- for indeed, if gossip only traffics in
the most meaningless details of our life, why indeed should
we care about our behaviors in that fashion at all? Why
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shouldn't we simply assume that their effects will be pretty
negligible, and that hence we can feel free to act as our
whims and interests guide us? Moralities of Everyday Life
fails to address that question, ultimately because it cannot
recognize gossip as an important topic.
Of course, when the stakes are somewhat higher, as in
the gossip that foregrounds Chaucer's Manciple's Tale (in
C5n t e rbur
y
—Tales
) , still, the solution for commentators
often is to try and decode how Chaucer would have us gossip:
what are the ethics of gossiping in delicate situations (for
this one, revealing a wife's infidelity to her previously
unaware husband)? As Peter C. Herman (1991) sees it, gossip
reveals an all - too-human temptation: to act maliciously
because possessors of gossip have corrupting knowledge that
both everyone and no one wants to hear -- everyone because
it is on taboo subjects (like adultery)
,
and no one because
gossiping reveals human pettiness. Chaucer's ultimate
message in the Manciple's Tale , according to Herman, is
"illustrating the depravity of earthly politics" (325). The
Crow, loose-tongued creature who spreads the unhappy news to
his master the Manciple, is both agent and victim of this
illustration. The Crow occupies both roles not simply
because he relays the news but because he "takes malevolent
glee in revealing [the gossip] to Phebus [the Manciple] "
(323) . By his malevolence, and the brutality of his speech,
the Crow loses his justification in passing along
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/ and according to Herman, is "a murderer by
occasion" (324) -- for the consequence of this revelation is
Phebus deadly assault on his wife. While Herman clearly
holds both Phebus and his wife in contempt (the first for
murder, and the second for "treasonous" adultery)
,
his
severest criticism by far goes to the Crow, who somehow
takes on guilt for both crimes. Not only is the Crow part
of the murder, but also part of the adultery, by
" re j oic [ing] in his lord's downfall" (ibid). The Manciple's
Ta_l_e, for Herman, becomes a morality play endorsing the
virtue of silence, or pious disapproval of earthly vices.
To do otherwise is to assert complicity; and somehow, this
complicity ends up overshadowing the events themselves.
Gordon's fear in her Austen article (that shared by Spacks)
,
that interpretation somehow constitutes the world to truth's
detriment, gets fleshed out here in the most gruesome of
terms. Somehow, gossiping becomes the most reprehensible of
actions, that most responsible for other earthly vices 17 .
17 It ' s important to note here that not all commentators
on Chaucer share this gloomy view of the fate of gossip in a
community. Michaela Paasche Grudin (1991) explicitly writes
against such a quietistic interpretation of the Crow's fate,
arguing that "the solutions posed in the fables do not exhaust
the possibilities for confronting the problem [of whether to
speak or to remain silent] ...Chaucer everywhere in the tale
evokes the idea of creative or mimetic expression" (333) . In
short, simply because the Manciple's Tale presents two
unattractive options doesn't mean that this represents the
entire spectrum of possibilities for speaking-against norms.
Additionally, we might also observe that just because there
might be malice in the Crow's speech doesn't imply that to
gossip is necessarily to be malicious.
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To gossip is indulge in brutality (if its substance is
accidentally true)
,
avoidable only through abstinence
(Spacksian overtones fully intended)
. These rulebooks of
gossip, then, are less books than simple commandments: thou
shalt not
.
2 . 3 Doppelganger Gossips
Unsurprisingly, there are many humanists who wish to
ascibe some kind of epistemic legitimacy to gossip and
rumor. For many humanists, gossip is a vital construct for
assessing human and social knowledge; but its vitality is
suspect. The theorists in this section overwhelmingly
accept postmodern dictates that "real", "natural",
"objective" knowledge simply aren't accessible, because of
various reasons (subject positioning, dynamics of power,
facticity, etc.)
. However, as is clear from a close
examination of their approaches to gossip, they have yet to
let go of some abstract notion of Truth that simply hangs in
the air, imperceptible but Still There. That being so, the
knowledge gossip and rumor provides us is always a sad
second-best, a grudgingly admitted substitute which doesn't
really fill the bill. These theorists improve upon Spacks
in the sense that they seem to allow a genuine epistemic
content to the truth of gossip (whereas for tropesters the
emphasis is always on the falsehood of gossip)
,
but this
content must always be presented as adulterated, critically
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altered or exaggerated away from the (still-held) absolute
standard
.
Lorraine Code's Rhetorical Spaces: Essavs on CenrW^a
Locations (1995) attempts the mightily impressive task of
debunking contemporary epistemology's fascination with, as
she phrases it, "single and presumably self-contained
philosophical utterances pronounced by no one in particular
and as though into a neutral space" (x)
.
Code's exploration
of the spaces of talk and meaning is an attempt to explore
how nuance and texture in language and knowledge claims must
significantly alter how we think about language and
knowledge themselves (one of the results, to begin with,
being that the very idea of language and knowledge "claims"
or propositions becomes meaningless)
. She uses the mapping
metaphor quite deliberately, in its most active sense: how
do we map our knowledge claims? how do we claim epistemic
territory? For Code, thinking in terms of a concrete
metaphor such as mapping territory (moreover, a metaphor
with rich resonances of power, struggle, and ambiguity
disguised as clarity -- "lines in the sand") is necessary,
if our discussions of knowledge are to have any relevance to
the ways in which we use knowledge in real life. "The
language of rhetorical spaces," she writes, "removes the
onus of establishing credibility and gaining acknowledgement
away from the abstract, 'generalized,' disengaged, moral-
epistemic individual of the Anglo-American tradition, and
212
into the lives, social structures, and circumstances where
' concrete 1 moral and epistemic agents are engaged in
deliberations that matter to them" (xi)
. in short, Code's
work here is significantly in concordance with my project,
and I will happily map out ( ! ) our agreement now. However,
the points at which we differ (the territory over which we
would be fighting) to me indicates important gaps between
our perspectives.
Code positions herself, in her chapter on gossip within
this book, as a necessary mediation between two extremes in
analyses of gossip epistemology. She contrasts the argument
that gossip is entirely instrumental, and useful for
epistemology (her principal source here is Maryann Ayim
[1994] ) , with the more typically feminist epistemological
analysis of gossip, that it is simply women's private
language, or 'house' talk' (her example is Deborah Jones;
our analogue might be Deborah Tannen)
. The first approach,
Code argues, makes too much of gossip, rendering it so
instrumental that it becomes indistinguishable from
traditional, disinterested epistemology; the second simply
trivializes it (152) . Code writes to uncover gossip as it
actually functions in our knowledge-gathering; not as we
might wish it to, nor as we assume it to.
Her analysis of gossip's "actual" function,
delightfully, rests on an examination of gossip in a film, A
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Jury of Her Ppprs 18
. an accusation ofThe injustice of
murder of her husband leveled at the wife is only uncovered
by two women (who do not meet until the murder investigation
begins) who are able to come up with a correct
interpretation of the (on the surface damning) facts through
gossip (145)
. Code sees a tripartite analysis of knowledge
emerge through the facts of the film: first, that an
interested, engaged knowledge process (such as happens with
gossip) yields more plausible knowledge than the work of the
professional, rational investigators; second, that knowledge
emerges through a community (the community, by its own
connections, produces knowledge that is internally
consistent and sensible but will be incomprehensible to
outsiders -- investigators have a hard time accepting the
women's interpretations of the facts) rather than through
objective, disinterested individuals; and finally, that
gossip functions as effective chaos (there are no rules by
which one goes about gossiping, but its effectiveness is
undeniable [146, 152]).
“Indeed, it's worth noting that Ayim, cited in Code's
chapter, uses the Miss Marple character from Agatha Christie's
mystery novels to justify how gossip can be instrumental, and
knowledge - reveal ing . Fictional gossip seems to be a favorite
resource for those seeking to defend the epistemic worth of
gossip; perhaps because the only other documented sources of
gossip (those scintillating social science accounts appearing
in the first chapter here) have such a predisposition against
gossip's validity that the far less authoritative source of
art is a much more fecund ground for analysis.
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Code's arguments in favor of the effectiveness of
gossip are sensible: she points out that knowledge simply
can't be removed from its location in situations infused by
power dynamics (149); and indeed, that exactly that kind of
removal is what produces the curiously antiseptic,
unrealistic accounts of knowledge that pepper Anglo-American
epistemology. We must displace, she argues, "persistent
liberal assumptions that people are all, really, alike and
interchangeable" (148)
. She quickly and capably dissects
the power dynamics operating in the film (the gender
connection and class dissonance between the two principal
female "investigators," the more marked contrast between the
women and the formal, officious, and suspicious male
investigators [ibid.]). But ultimately, Code's analysis
fails to be convincing, because of her insistence upon
maintaining traditional conceptions of epistemology. This
might sound curious (for indeed, Code couches the entire
book as an argument against those very conceptions)
,
but
Code's arguments for a purposeless notion of gossip, and why
it is necessary, demonstrate why this is a fair analysis.
Code dismisses more aggressively purposive accounts of
gossip such as Ayim's; it is foolishly overgeneralizing, she
suggests, to think of gossip as if it is always, only, and
exclusively purposive and instrumental -- to do so misses
the necessarily chaotic nature of gossip. Indeed, she
suggests, to do so is to fall into the clutches of
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traditional epistemology. " [G] ossip has instrumental uses
she acknowledges, " [but] it is important to note that
characterizing it as inquiry, as instrinsically
instrumental, amounts to reclaiming it for respectable
epistemological discourse cast in a traditionally
disinterested mold. Such a reclamation obscures its power
as a located, idiosyncratic, and hence peculiarly perceptive
activity" (151) . There are several points we must pause to
analyze here. The first is the claim that gossip can't be
instrinsically purposive without also being intrinsically
disinterested; the second is that (correlatively) gossip
can't be intrinsically purposive and located, idiosyncratic,
or perceptive. The third is the unstated implication here
that we can't actually talk about inquiry without slipping
into the language of disinterest, objectivity, neutrality.
Indeed, she suggests as much when she criticizes Ayim's
attempt to claim instrumentality for gossip: "the point is
not, as I see it, to champion the worthiness of gossip by
showing that scientific communities do it too, in the
serious, fact-finding aspects of their work. Rather it is
to show that gossip, for all its randomness, produces
knowledge so valuable that it can contest the paradigm
status of scientific method as the only reliable means of
establishing truth" (150) .
Notice the wording in that quote. Code is not arguing
with the legitimacy of the argument that scientists work by
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gossip; she's contesting the relevance of talking about that
very topic. Code is arguing that we must simply defend the
fact that gossip produces knowledge, in its own
idiosyncratic way (if I might juxtapose quotations), so much
so that it challenges scientific truth as the only means
possible. But what does this mean? Quite simply, that the
paradigms of science versus gossip remain separate (but
equal!) ; that scientific truth and method remain unassailed.
Certainly, we might from time to time step down from our
scientific pedestals to indulge in a spot of gossipy fact-
finding, but we keep our borders clearly drawn (the
epistemic map can be distinct and finalized -- now we are
hypothesizing scientifically, and now we will gossip)
. This
analysis brings forth resonances both of Bergmann's portrait
of gossip "quarantined" in much of social science analysis,
and Shibutani ' s attempt to legitimate rumor as useful, and
occasional rational (in its own, special, i.e. ultimately
useless, way) . This analysis, in short, perpetuates
gossip's status as distinct from isolated, still rational,
scientific method. And, as I said while discussing
Shibutani, if given the choice between suddenly-acceptable-
in-unique-ways gossip and still -rational -and-universally-
acceptable science, it hardly boggles the mind to imagine
which choice people will make (at least overtly)
.
Code's conviction that gossip must necessarily be
unruly in part I think stems from her definition of gossip.
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gossipIn the first place, it seems clear that she thinks of
as only being about other people; she describes gossip as "a
finely- tuned instrument for establishing truths -- albeit
often corrigible, renegotiable truths -- about people"
(147) 15 . In the second place, Code characterizes gossip as
simply a mode of activity while doing other things:
[gossipers] are otherwise engaged; the gossip accompanies,
grows out of, and embellishes (cognitively) their practical
preoccupations" (146) . Indeed, she attacks Ayim
' s Miss
Marple-generated gossip as an inappropriate simulation of
gossip; the inappropriateness, Code argues, comes from its
overarching intentional and deliberate character (151) . I
think there is some legitimacy to her statement about
gossip; I do think we tend not to think about gossip when we
19 Incidentally
,
her description of gossip- truths as
corrigible and renegotiable for me represents more evidence
that she ascribes significantly less legitimacy to the truth
of gossip than to that of science. It is hard to imagine Code
defining scientific truths as corrigible and renegotiable (or
having to graft on the apologetic qualifier of "albeit
often"); although of course, as anyone who's studied even
elementary school science knows, exactly those adjectives
quite appropriately characterize science. (Even our still-
cherished mythology of science being one long linear process
into final cohesion and a revelation of all knowledge is
itself based on a belief that we are in fact always
progressing -- e.g., that scientific truth is always
renegotiating itself [if in a unidirectional fashion].)
Indeed, those adjectives are in a limited sense especially
appropriate in these days of speedily outdated, to say nothing
of simultaneously contradictory but appealing scientific
theories. But no one would think it a worthwhile point of
analysis; Code's failure to hit upon exactly these sorts of
comparisons shores up her ultimate inability to see gossip as
epistemically worthwhile in the same way as more
"conventional" forms of knowledge.
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do it, or after the fact (e.g., if someone asked you what
you did today, you might rattle off a laundry list of
activities like working, eating, cleaning, exercising, [even
laundry!]
,
while neglecting to mention that you spent 45
minutes gossiping about whether or not your division would
get more budget or labor cuts, or if the new neighbors
across the street would ever stop arguing loudly with their
windows open, or why it was that they were arguing so much)
.
But it seems to me that analyzing gossip as a mode of
behavior, or a necessarily parenthetical behavior, for Code
necessitates its status as purposeless, or only accidentally
purposive. I do not mean to overemphasize the importance of
admittedly rationalistic concepts like intentionality or
consciousness (for surely it is consciousness that
differentiates the parenthetical behaviors from the
deliberate)
,
not least because I think that we can do many
things with purposes that are in fact quite unbeknownst to
us, and therefore unconscious behaviors can often be quite
purposive (the Freudian slip is only the most obvious
example) . However, I still hold that is important not to
cordon off gossip and rumor into one mode of occurrence
only. Gossip can not only or always be accidental or less
conscious than other epistemic behaviors; to hold this is to
perpetuate Enlightenment distinctions between intention and
accident, with the inevitable result that gossip holds a
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lesser epistemic status than the "rationally-acquired"
knowledge. I do not think this is the case.
But let me return to the fallout of this modal
analysis, those first two claims Code makes about gossip
(that it can't be intrinsically purposive without also being
disinterested; that if it is intrinsically purposive it
cannot be located and idiosyncratic)
. My first reaction is
that I think Code must see this dilemma as emerging because
she is maintaining this covert distinction between the
paradigms of science and gossip, knowledge and chatter. In
short, I think that we shatter the notion of a disinterested
epistemology exactly by demonstrating that epistemology is
often and by construction interested.
It also seems to me that the assumption that intrinsic
purpose and the disinterested scientific observer posture
are automatic companions is based upon a naive and outmoded
conception of how science operates. As Laboratory Life
(1986) demonstrates, scientists do not proceed along a
neutral quest for the Truth; their motivations for increased
income, notoriety, a longer and more noteworthy resume,
besting the other research groups, and indeed hard to
categorize or rationalize motivations all factor in along
with traditional interests in finding solutions and
completing problems. This does not delegitimize the
conclusions scientists arrive at; it situates and humanizes
them
.
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Code
' s modal analysis also seems to contribute to her
conviction that gossip must be pretty purposeless, or rather
only accidentally purposive. Perhaps it is difficult to
reconcile the notion of an activity that is not deliberative
and orderly also being purposive. Because gossip is not
fully intentional, Code seems to be arguing, such
intent ionality as it possesses can't really be relevant or
essential. However, I think there are many such analogues
(admittedly less glamorous) to be drawn from our everyday
life of behavior that are clearly not deliberative or
orderly, but also purposive. The most appropriate example
is that so poorly used by Bergmann -- dancing. Now
certainly, there can be a basic purposiveness to dancing.
Quite often, people get up to dance from a sitting position,
or move away from a bar or the wall, or even another room,
so as to dance. This is clearly done with the kind of full,
transparent intent ionality Code wants to ascribe to non-
gossipy knowledge 20 . But imagine yourself dancing once you
are on the floor; in particular, imagine yourself dancing in
a club, where there are no prescribed (Bergmannian ! ) dances
20Of course, we can easily imagine a situation where even
beginning to dance would not be done with the kind of full
intentionality Code seeks. In a crowded dance club, the
"border" between the dance area and the standing-and-chatt ing-
and-drinking area is not clearly inscribed; and it's not
difficult to imagine standing at what was once "the edge" and
simply starting to dance there, not entirely deciding to do it
(perhaps starting mildly to move one arm or bob one knee to
the beat of the music, then more energetically, then joining
in fully)
.
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to be danced according to rigid musical norms (now we must
waltz, now we twist, now we tango, now we mosh, and now a
Virginia reel)
. Once you are dancing, the movements you
undertake are not clearly thought out (why now, I'm going
move from side to side for 8 beats, and then I'll start
swinging my arms back and forth; and you know, right now I
think I'll make like John Travolta in Saturday Night Fever
and do a one-girl line dance)
,
and certainly not orderly
(unless, of course, you're a rehearsing chorine, John
Travolta on film, or simply reenacting the routine from an
aerobics class) . This is even more true when two (or more)
people dance together in a club. Each partner might start
following each other's moves, but in partial, tentative ways
(or aggressive, elaborative ways)
,
and the order is neither
clear nor prescribed. More to the point, no one person has
control of the dance; each partner often does entirely their
own movements (my partner might be spinning around at a
nausea- inducing rate while I erratically circumnavigate her
vortex) . The movements will simply resonate with each
other, following the same beat (if sometimes only roughly)
.
Yet no one would say that the chaos of one person or two
people or a group of people dancing in a club has no
purpose; indeed, it's not hard to deduce multiple purposes
or intentions (often simultaneously in action) from dancing
(getting exercise, cheering up after a depressing day,
celebrating a triumph, getting to know someone, trying to
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lose an annoying person, testing someone's compatibility,
bonding with a group of friends, simply forgetting about
external reality, etc)
.
More particularly, we can also
construct multiple purposes and intentions for particular
moves of the dance (all those listed above, and more direct
ones -- chasing out a kink in a joint, moving particularly
underused muscles, just moving differently than one is
conventionally allowed to do on the street, in a classroom
or workplace, while eating) . Purposive behavior doesn't
have to be transparently deliberative, with monolithic
reasons graf table isomorphically onto behavior-moments.
In sum, then, the main difficulty I have with Code's
analysis of gossip is her reliance on a zero-sum model of
epistemology. To name gossip as instrumental, purposive, or
investigative is to renounce its merit or existence as
chaotic or accidental, or anti-rational, in Code's
perspective. And it is clear that for Code, while there
might be some plurality and play to her notion of gossip,
ultimately, gossip's chaos and unruliness stand as its
essential characteristics; any purpose we might ascribe to
particular gossip-conversations is in fact only situational,
not essential. This kind of zero-sum modeling (your
conversations can be one or another, your truth can be
either/or) seems far more pervasively modernist than the
simple instrumentality Code ascribes to feminist analyses of
gossip like Ayim's. Surely it must be possible to imagine a
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scheme of gossipy epistemology that leaves the zero-sum
model behind (such, indeed, will be my task in the third
chapter); couldn't it be so that gossip could be both
instrumental and chaotic, in short, chaotically purposive?
Couldn't our knowledge be rational and disorderly? Why
isn't our knowledge
-gathering idiosyncratic and organized?
The fact that Code cannot even conceive of or recognize
these as possibilities indicates the limitations with which
she sees gossip as valuable 21 . And again, given her
implicit praising of science (sure, it can be located, but
not as much, not as inherently, as gossip)
,
it seems to me
that it is she who casts gossip on the outskirts of a
maintained Enlightenment epistemology. Code's gossip can,
for all her provocative language in the beginning of her
book, be nothing more than a creator of knowledge in lieu of
the real thing.
Unfortunately, Code has ample company in the
philosophical field in feigning praise of gossipy, chaotic
forms of knowledge -gathering while secretly holding back the
real rewards of Truth. C.A.J. Coady is the most recent
21 Indeed, Code's final provocation comes when she sums up
her territory of gossip as "neither essentially good nor
essentially evil, essentially the province of women nor of
men, essentially private nor essentially public" (152) . What
is striking here is that she is willing to challenge so many
of the traditional dichotomies held to gossip (women's evil
private talk)
,
but cleaves so resolutely to gossip's idleness:
clearly, idleness is unavoidably essential for Code to be able
to cognize gossip. I shall challenge this presupposition
further in Chapter 3
.
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example of this analysis. Coady's highly praised book
Testimony: A, Philosophical Study (1992)
, articulates a
simple, potentially momentous philosophical argument — that
we must let go of the individualistic bias towards direct
knowledge, because most of our knowledge is indirectly
attained (13) . Coady articulates an exciting agenda for his
consideration of indirect knowledge through testimony --
rescuing its appropriate significant status in epistemic
theory. He writes that " [t] he judgements of others
constitute an important, indeed perhaps the most important,
test of whether my own judgements reflect a reality
independent of subjectivity" (12) . Not only does
interpersonal testimony not amount to substandard, purely
evaluative knowledge, he says, it is the only meaningful
escape we have from solipsism. Coady's refreshingly
skeptical attitude towards professional epistemology is
apparent here as well -- Zeno's paradox is less the problem
facing theorists of knowledge, his remark suggests, than our
own logically consistent and coherent, but hopelessly
microcosmic theories of knowledge. His task in this book,
then, becomes nothing less than to defend a recasting of
epistemology with indirect testimony as one (among many)
first priority ( ies ) , instead of a distant second cousin.
While this argument has potentially devastating consequences
for the bulk of modernist epistemology, Coady ultimately
withdraws from all the serious implications of his
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argument - and more to the point, qualifies the argument so
that testimony itself maintains a lesser-order status in
knowledge
.
Coady does an impressive job of categorizing and
critiquing the contemporary literature on testimony.
Philosophic responses to testimony range from the puritan
(testimony exists, but only to demonstrate how rare real
knowledge is; Plato, Collingwood)
,
the reductive (we are
only dependent on testimony because we check it so
rigorously, we are scientists of testimony; Mackie, Hume,
Russell, James), the fundamental (testimony is a part of the
foundation of knowledge; Thomas Reid), to the end-of-
epistemology (because epistemology fails to provide an
adequate of knowledge, we must turn to psychological
accounts of why and how we believe, at which point fallible
testimony enters the picture; Quine, Popper [22-24]). Coady
places himself nearest the obscure Scottish philosopher
Thomas Reid in this recounting of testimonials about
testimony, but nonetheless has some criticisms of Reid's
approach, as well as the rest. In general, Coady argues
that all the philosophers to one degree or another beg the
question about testimony; that they are all guilty of some
circularity. Coady does an impressive job of documenting
the extent to which even to talk about testimony, the
philosophers must accept its existence and sensibility
(e.g., we trade and understand others' testimony [79, 117,
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263-264]“. But to be able to trade testimony, Coady
argues, is to acknowledge the success of human language. To
understand human language simply is to accept testimony (for
human communications to be traded continually means that
they are believed; the act of believing is nothing more than
an internal act of testimony: "you say this"). Therefore,
the philosophers who attempt to accept the existence of
testimony and then try to problematize its epistemic value
(sure, we do it, but should we?) miss the point.
For Coady, exactly the error these philosophers make is
in trying to isolate testimony as one sort of epistemic
faculty -- an independent faculty of the mind, separable
from perception or judgment or memory (133) . Like Thomas
Reid, Coady puts perception, judgment, memory and testimony
on an equally fundamental footing. Each is a central,
originating feature of human knowledge; none can hold
priority. More to the point, Coady' s foundation is
interpenetrating -- perceptions can be indirectly
transmitted, our memories can be judgmental (146-147)
.
These two points (the communality of knowledge and the non-
hierarchical nature of individual knowledge) are intertwined
for Coady; we can only do away with the fallacy of the
Autonomous Knower if we can acknowledge the breadth of its
22More broadly, Coady does an exhaustive amount of
documentation to establish the variety of commonplaces we
accept as fact that are nothing short of testimony -- indirect
knowledge (50-51) .
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limitations, how little we operate according to autonomous
dictates (either internally or externally, with ourselves or
with others) 23
.
However, that internal /external distinction, which I
see as tacit throughout Coady
' s argument, to me indicates
the central problem I have with Coady ' s analysis. Let me
first make clear that I agree with the bulk of Coady 's
criticism of much of epistemic theory -- that it is far too
focused on an individual knower, and attempts to overisolate
how we form knowledge claims (this is a percpetional
statement only, and now I am making a judgment) . That said,
Coady 's prescription for the attitudes we should hold
towards knowledge more broadly understand is unsatisfactory.
Coady 1 s argument, in brief, is that we should suspend our
judgment about truth or falsehood towards testimonial
propositions, and not rush to include or exclude them in our
webs of belief (107, 112-113) . He thinks this because he
basically takes a pragmatist's approach towards truth --we
come to understand the truth or falsehood of our beliefs
over time, as they are tested and received by others.
Community knowledge is what matters, not individual holdings
23Coady criticizes Hume in particular for holding to an
implied concept of an autonomous knower. For Hume's theory of
habitual, inductive acceptance or denial of testimony to work,
Coady says, we would have to be capable of isolating our
testimonials and according them high, low, or no degrees of
cridibility, or denying them outright on a propositional
basis. This is simply unfeasible (85, 94)
.
We neither hear
nor evaluate reports other people give us in an atomistic
fashion
.
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-- and we only arrive at our individual beliefs through the
community
.
Coady justifies this suspension of beliefs because he
believes in exactly an individual intelligence
--a
"controlling intelligence," he calls it, which sorts and
determines validity or invalidity of beliefs (again, through
a complicated process of community interaction,
psychological habits, expectation [99-100]). The notion of
a controlling intelligence itself is nothing surprising --
we all have selection mechanisms by which we choose to hear
or ignore beliefs, avow or disabuse theories, register or
expunge facts or opinions. But exactly what's curious about
Coady 's argument is that he has clearly held tacit standards
about what our sorting mechanisms should look like; what the
right and wrong ways are to interact with evidence and
opinion. Coady ' s initially puzzling last chapter (about
expert testimony in courts) acts to illustrate his
previously unstated opinions about what evidence is really
believable or not.
To explain: Coady makes it clear that what is special
about testimony (as distinguished from other kinds of
knowledge claims) is that we believe the fact because we
believe the witness; the (disputed) fact itself is less
important to our knowledge than the means by which we gather
it (46) . He illustrates this corollary by pointing out that
from someone we consider to be a reliable witness, we will
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accept even astonising testimony; whereas from an unreliable
witness we will refuse to believe even the most banal
evidence. But the way in which we determine a witness to be
believable or not, Coady clearly holds, is itself accessible
to universal standards of logic, reason and objectivity.
Hence his unusual diatribe, with which he closes the book,
about the inadvisability of allowing expert testimony from
such "unscientific" sources as humanities professors and
psychologists, into such "unscientific" territory as "moral
problems" or "human nature" (287-303 24 )
.
The problem with
this tendency, according to Coady, is that these fields are
so unremediably tainted with ideology and advocacy that
these experts cannot hope but to be subjective, and
dictatorial in their evidence-giving. Indeed, Coady neatly
contrasts these witnesses with experts from the hard
sciences, where he points out their expertise can be clearly
demonstrated, and presumably, where their investigations are
never tainted with the stain of ideology. The hard sciences
can guard themselves, Coady argues, easily able to
differentiate amongst the good and bad practitioners, and
the better and worse experts (285) .
24By the way, there are other moments in the text where
this unusual bias creeps out. Coady argues strenuously early
on for the unreliability of testimony from children and the
mentally ill, based on their clear inabilities either to be
sincere or to distinguish fantasy from reality (35, 36) ; later
on in the final chapter, he also comments with profuse
asperity on the sad proliferation of "bogus" sciences and
their experts 1 need to be read as the same kind of experts as
their more legitimate counterparts (287)
.
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Aside from the clear fact that Coady is suffering from
a naively positivist faith in the impenetrability of hard
science by ideology (while he admits to reading Paul
Feyerabend, he only concedes to Feyerabend's claims about
the temporality of science, and not to the fallibility of
experts themselves [286] - - I guess Coady missed the passage
itt Against Method where Feyerabend documents that Galileo's
initial telescope generated widely varying reports from its
users, and Galileo's subsequent invention of consistent,
impressive results [Feyerabend 122-125]), he also is making
a clear division here between real knowledge and lesser
knowledge. Now, admittedly, both kinds of knowledge can be
transmitted through testimony, so he's not arguing against
the validity of testimony per se, but the point here is that
he's arbitrarily restricting the range of testimony and
testifiers we will accept, based on rationalistic criteria
(whose knowledge is more viably demonstrable) . To do so is
to maintain a kind of faith not only in an Autonomous Knower
(it's our job to sort the right way), but also in a
prioritization of truth over falsehood. And that
prioritization is exactly the premise against whose validity
Coady has structured his whole book. It seems to me, then,
that in attempting to do away with our individualistic,
systemic theories of knowledge, Coady has succeeded only in
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replacing them with harder- to-detect
,
but equivalent,
substitutes 26
.
Another, perhaps more philosophically acceptable way of
phrasing this objection, proceeds like this: If we are to
accept the basic premise of Coady's argument, that in
contrast to our essential presuppositions of contemporary
epistemology, the majority of what we call knowledge and
strong beliefs are not direct, autonomous, objectively
arrived-at propositions but indirectly assumed nuggets of
information, collected in a variety of ways, then clearly
there still remains an epistemic problem for philosophers.
If knowledge is so variantly collected and assumed, how is
it that we decide we know something rather than simply
believe it? In other words, the old-fashioned problem of
what exactly "knowledge" is (and when it rears its head in
lieu of faithful standby belief) reasserts itself in the
wake of Coady's analysis. Clearly, Coady's sorting
mechanism is supposed to act as the answer for how we know
something to be knowledge versus simple belief; equally
clearly, Coady's move is a reasonable one. If we accept
25 In one sense, Coady's bias towards rational, orderly
knowledge (even through testimony) is evident throughout the
book. For a work ostensibly concerned with indirect
knowledge, with oral transmission of information, it is
nothing short of shocking that Coady's book fails to deal with
gossip at all, and only mentions rumor once (and that being a
rather sniffy mention of rumor's inevitably distorting
qualities) . This attitude hardly inspires confidence in
Coady's awareness of or respect for the broad array of what
testimonial information we commonly come to grapple with every
day of our lives.
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that information is pluralistically gathered, the means by
which we gather and sort this information must clearly take
on first importance in any sort of non- autonomous theory of
knowledge
.
Before I lodge my argument clearly, I think it's
important to note that Coady ' s alternative testimonial
theorists give really shallow weight to mental sorting
mechanisms. Coady ' s end-of -epistemology adherents (it's all
bunkum anyway, so let's just examine the psychological means
by which we apprehend and believe items in lieu of grappling
with outdated modernist concepts like knowledge) offer us
little in terms of how we as individual -yet - social knowers
should approach the body of items we consider our knowledge,
let along uncertain new prospects on the range. More to the
point (here comes my argument), Coady 's own means by which
we assess and evaluate the information we hold to me seems a
bad fit to the variety of sources he's now acknowledging as
feeders into our mental hoppers. Acknowledging that
testimony provides lots of what we take for knowledge means
that we're getting a lot of our information from
conversations with other people, from reading things more
and less casually, from overhearing remarks, simply from
making the leap of interpretation (what I think in my head
about the traffic accident I just witnessed is testimonially
removed from the scene I just directly perceived) . As
should be transparently obvious, testimonial knowledge is
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directly and necessarily steeped in frameworks of power,
preconception, assumption26
. Regarding that traffic
accident: what if either car is driven by a friend of mine?
someone I despise? a car-phone wielding striver? I will
inevitably see nuances and resonances in even the most
mundane scenes that any random passerby would ignore;
similarly, they would have their own spins on this scene
that might never occur to me. Theories of knowledge that
allow for this variety of information must similarly provide
for our ability to determine judgments: when exactly do we
determine something to be knowledge?
At this point, Coady's argument stumbles. His let-it-
simmer attitude towards uncertain items, combined with his
presumptions that some kinds of knoweldge are generally more
plausible (precisely those autonomous -knower biased,
rationalistic, neutrality- idealizing theories he so
furiously debunks early on in his book) guarantees that we
are left no closer towards actually understanding knowledge
in a pluralistic fashion. It seems peculiar to me that our
sorting mechanisms should be so at odds with our intake:
that while we collect our knowledge quite socially, we
evaluate and judge it in straitlaced, individualistic
fashion. Social theories of knowledge, simply put,
260f course, pace Foucault, I think the entire enterprise
of knowledge is duly steeped -- my point here is that
testimonial information is most directly infused with these
relations, and therefore theories grounded in testimony need
most urgently to take these factors into account.
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dramatically widen the field of information we consider.
Items that before might seem outrageous or simply irrelevent
to a question at hand (I need an example here) can seriously
determine or affect how we regard beliefs in social theories
of knowledge. Therefore, it is all the more imperative that
these theories provide a means for us to evaluate and
consider the wide array of information we do in fact access,
and the means by which it is accessed. In other words, we
hear and produce testimony exactly because we are involved
in social and political relationships; testimony is by
definition a social act, embedded in these relationships.
Given that, it seems to be encumbent upon us to evaluate
testimonial information in light and in terms of those
relationships -- only this sort of evaluation will properly
"place" testimony along with its fellow knowledge sources.
Coady's overly analytic means by which we are to evaluate
testimony (as simple, propositional knowledge claims, to be
weighed by preponderance of evidence) creates a "free
market" of knowledge creation which simply ensures that the
player with the most chips wins.
An alternative to this approach, which I will explore
in my third chapter, is (more straightforwardly) the
informal approach --we accept that something called
"knowledge" exists but in fact has much less to do with
static, unassailable Truths than with social institutions:
in short, knowledge is created both along and against
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institutional power lines, knowledge simultaneously
"evolves" and resists itself. "Knowledge claims" are
assessed and reassessed, in explicitly social terms. In
other words, it matters less what I and formal logic have to
say about the feasibility of a particular knowledge claim
than how this knowledge claim is created and its effects
felt throughout populaces.
I have one coda for this argument, which may help both
as an example of the preceding analysis, and as a
contextualization of the entire proceedings. Throughout
this book, Coady's examples are highly characteristic of the
examples so favored by analytic philosophers -- extremely
low-stakes claims it's hard to imagine someone getting
excited about their truth or falsehood ("there is mail for
you today," "it rained frogs in the 16 th century" "you were
born on this day in that year27 ) ; these beliefs are hardly
27
I know, properly trained analytic philosophers could
easily construct situations where someone would be excited
about the truth or falsehood of these situations -- if I am
awaiting word on whether or not the IRS is auditing me, or if
my particular brand of religiosity holds amphibian rainstorms
as incontrovertible evidence of the existence of God and the
imminent Rapture, or if the person uttering a statement of my
birthdate is a hostile official of Selective Service averring
that yes, I will be expected to serve in the military) ; that's
not the point. Consistently using examples that university-
trained Ph.D.s would have to work themselves into lathers in
order to find relevance for in my view demonstrates a lack of
interest in applying one's analysis to epistemically relevant
challenges we face daily. For an example of this, see
Christopher Norris' book on the Gulf War, Uncritical Theory
( 1992 ) , where he points out that given the absence of reliable
information about the war from the U.S. government, many
contemporary theorists adopted a quietistic stance of
nonbelief (and hence inaction) -- we simply couldn't know
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central to our webs of beliefs (for example, Coady doesn't
deal with claims that would be more contentious if only
available indirectly, like whether or not gravity exists)
More to the point, exactly the sort of beliefs Coady doesn't
deal with are those that are centrally unsettled, and the
settling of which is highly relevant to a variety of
beliefs. To explain: at one point, Coady analyzes Donald
Davidson's claim that we can only understand prior false
beliefs because of the degree of veracity they claim (in
other words, we only understand that people once believed
that the earth is flat because we can understand a number of
other true beliefs they had) . Coady disagrees with that
argument (following Colin McGinn) because he thinks that we
only recognize false beliefs as such because of our
subsequent true (superior) beliefs. Davidson's point is
that we can only identify beliefs as such by locating them
within the pattern in which they initially occur --we may
be misreading not simply the individual belief but the
pattern itself (e.g.,the ancients might actually have had a
different notion of "earth" -- literally the surface only? -
enough relevant details to make moral or epistemic claims
about the war, those intellectuals argued. While I disagree
with much of the context of Norris' argument, and what I take
to be his over-broad applications of his argument to much of
contemporary French intellectual theory, his analysis presents
exactly the kind of pragmatic situation where how (and
whether) one determines belief can have serious consequences,
and to my mind exactly the sort of example Coady should work
with, if he wishes his analysis about testimony to have any
resonance with our lives, and how we think about directly-
versus indirectly- received knowledge.
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- than the one we inscribe upon them)
. Coady disagrees with
that because he sees our positions as readers as important -
- we only identify false beliefs as such because we've come
to show them as so.
The content of this argument seems relatively trivial
to me, but what I find interesting about it, again, is the
example used -- whether or not the earth is flat. It seems
to me that if we replace the contention at hand with a
currently unstable contention, that suddenly what was merely
arcane becomes much more relevant. Davidson's instinct --
to look at the semantic and propositional parcel by which we
come to know things -- to me seems very important when we're
dealing with knowledge claims left unsettled. When I think
of something like the debate surrounding The Bell Curve
, and
the fact that, simply by producing a book claiming to argue
for the systematic, genetic inferiority of intelligence
among African-Americans and poor Caucasian Americans, two
theorists have helped determine the direction around which
debates about merit, affirmative action, and school funding
will go for the next several years, it becomes clear to me
that context is as important as content.
Critics of The Bell Curve , of whom there have been
many, have generally focused on its implications for policy,
and its statistical claims (e.g., statistical correlation
does not amount to causation) . Left unaddressed (save by
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Stephen Jay Gould and Howard Gardner28 ) are the conceptual
claims made by the book -- whether or not such a thing as
"9" (general intelligence) exists; whether or not a term
like intelligence" (or Murray and Herrnstein's more
duplicitous "cognitive ability") is a meaningful notion.
But the point here is that Murray and Herrnstein 1 s book acts
as a placeholder -- its conception of intelligence as a
highly individualized feature that is immutable is now
relatively publicly accepted, even if the more openly
repugnant conclusions in the book have been stridently
refuted. But it seems to me that these initial conceptions
of intelligence as individualized and unchangeable are
enough to guarantee the continued, covert holdings of
exactly those more repugnant beliefs.
To relate this back to the Davidson-Coady-McGinn spat,
it seems to me that Coady's advocacy of suspension of
judgment can only work in low-stakes epistemic battles (like
the contents of the mailbox)
,
another way of diminishing the
ultimate importance of indirect testimony or hearsay.
Because Coady says that we can simply not worry about making
epistemic decisions (and that indeed, we can assign equal
value to the truth or falsehood of indirectly reported
testimony! [113]), because time will bear out the truth or
fallacy of our conceptions; it seems to me that Coady
28For their responses, as well as a variety of critical
responses, see both The Bell Curve Wars (1995) and The Bell
Curve Debate (1995)
.
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ultimately is arguing for a kind of epistemic quietism
(again, of. Christopher Norris). And again, this can only
be a feasible position if the epistemic decisions we are
making are of the regrettably individualistic kind. To
simply say I pass" on the matter of The Bell Curve (or to
leave it up to the experts!) is to suggest that it really
doesn t matter that much if we ' re right or wrong in holding
a certain conviction. And I guess that while there is a
certain kind of philosophic appeal there (in breaking away
from a dichotomized notion of truth where we must get the
right result, right away), ultimately I find this
psychologically and epistemically unfeasible (to say nothing
of its contempt ibility)
. Because our beliefs matter, to us
and to others, it is important for us to be able to be
agents in our own epistemic constructs, and not simply wait
for "history" to tell us the answer. Coady ' s passive
approach amounts to no epistemic progress at all.
At this point, then, we have two mildly different
philosophic takes on gossip and epistemology: Code's theory
that gossip is only accidentally accurate and necessarily
idle, and Coady's theory that gossip (implicitly)
contributes much to epistemology but only if we sternly,
rigorously, individualist ically, logically keep it in check.
These two positions are compatible with each other: it is
all too easy to believe that if we think that gossip is
intrinsically purposeless but theoretically interesting, we
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might allow it some raw-material bonus points (thanks for
the dirt
! )
,
but constrict ourselves to adament analyses of
any dubious information gossip provides.
Gilliam Teiman's dissertation on gossip in ladies'
magazines in the eighteenth century deals with similarly
trivial topics; and like Sarah Miller in the previous
chapter, Teiman demonstrates how the apparent triviality of
the topics under discussion in her sources belies the actual
struggle that is taking place. Teiman's argument, briefly
stated, is that the progression of ladies' magazines over
the eighteenth century (from the Female Tatler and Female
Spectator through the development of the genre of "women's
magazines") depicts the linear development of a unique
female voice, typical of at the same time as resisting the
eight eenth- century ideals of modesty, silence, purity, and
domesticity. Teiman is valiantly attempting to bridge the
gender gap of conversation; but she is only successful
insofar as the quietly erases risque, inappropriate,
'vicious' chatter from the matrix she establishes of women's
voices. Teiman does not bring woman-talk and man-talk to a
mutual meeting-place, but instead argues that women are
fully capable of adapting to a preexisting masculine model
of rational, logical, substantive, impersonal discourse.
Harmony is only possible in Teiman's model with a flattening
out of how we talk and what we say.
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The construction of Teiman's dissertation is the first
clue to the flattening aspects of the theory it contains.
Teiman just doesn't talk about men's speech, what it is,
what it sounds like, what ideals it represents or resists.
The Tat ler
,
the Spectator and the Athenian Mercury aren't
really referred to, characterized or quoted from other than
a few parenthetical remarks (52-53, 57); in fact, the only
substantive usage of material from a men's magazine (the
Tat ler ' s development of the Jenny Bickerstaff character [82-
89]), depicts how men's magazines talk about and for women,
but not how they are targeted and composed for men
themselves. The absence of context here means that we're
working on assumptions of difference between men's talk and
women's talk -- the men's magazines hover like unmentioned
and unmentionable standards against which women's magazines
are compared. Even though men's magazines contained
articles for women, and Teiman makes it clear that women
often read them (in lieu of going out, which was unseemly),
there's no consideration of the significance of this point;
and more directly, there's no contemplation of either the
asymmetry of men being allowed to talk and write for women
but not the reverse, or the possibility that women wrote for
or read the men's magazines. Talking about women's voice
for Teiman only means talking about women who write
exclusively, privately, for themselves. Teiman's linear
progression of the women's voice seems to spring up from
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nowhere; while she acknowledges that throughout the
eighteenth century increasing numbers of women were getting
educations and becoming writers, the lack of comparison
between women's magazines and men's magazines perpetuates
the impression that women were educated and put themselves
in the public eye in a vacuum -- women necessarily wrote
for, to and about themselves, while men wrote for and to
everyone. Teiman presupposes that women spoke a language
all their own.
This language, as the rest of the dissertation makes
clear, has its origins in irrationality, in intuition, and
in gossip. The dissertation depicts four women's voices.
We start with the Jenny Bickerstaff character, composed
[presumably] by a man in the Tatler
.
who develops (thanks to
instruction from her elderly relative Mr. Bickerstaff) from
being an impetuous, argumentative (but often incorrect)
young single woman to a modest, married, subservient matron.
From there we move to the first Female Tatler
,
whose voice
is a "Mrs. Crackenthorpe , " repeating gossip about those she
observes (with scrupulous standards of what she will and
won't repeat [171]), while at the same time decrying gossip,
and advocating women's place in men's after-dinner
converstaion . The first Tatler (apparently forced
temporarily to close after being sued for defamation of
someone's reputation) is succeeded by a Tatler written by
the "Society of Ladies," who combine rational arguments for
243
women's education and rights with the occasional gossip and
matrimonial discussion. Finally, we have the Female
Spectator
,
written by Eliza Heywood (a novelist of the
time)
,
who writes both for women and men, simply assuming
that the two share a conversational space of dignity and
rationality (and modesty)
.
From these periodicals, Teiman purports to advance a
multilayered reading of the development of a women's voice
in the eighteenth century. She sees the gradual inclusion
of women into the conversational space of men as not
entirely progress (17)
,
because as women are included they
are also contained - they can no longer speak about certain
subjects or in a certain manner. However, I don't see such
multiplicity in Teiman 's reading; returning to the primary
sources bears this out . Examining the Female Spectator
,
written by the most apparently standardly feminine author,
her introduction of herself reads as follows:
. . .My life, for some years, was a continued round
of what I then called pleasure, and my whole time
engrossed by a hurry of promiscuous diversions.
But whatever inconveneiences such a manner of
conduct has brought upon myself, I have this
consolation; to think that the public may reap
some benefit from it. The company I kept was not,
indeed, always so well chosen as it ought to have
been, for the sake of my own interest or
education; but then it was general, and by
consequence furnished me, not only with a
knowledge of many occurrences, which otherwise I
had been ignorant of, but also enabled me, when
the too great vivacity of my nature became
tempered with reflection, to see into the secret
springs which gave rise to the actions I had
either heard or been witness of, to judge of the
various passions of the human mind and distinguish
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those imperceptible degrees by which they become
matter of the heart, and attain the dominion over
reason. [Heywood {1929} 2]
In short, Heywood does not regret an idle or vivacious past,
for it is this that teaches her more about the complexity of
human behavior. Further, when she introduces the "method"
of her magazine, it is through gossip -- she has several
"counterparts, " each of whom take turns relaying tales heard
or observed in society. Heywood writes that she explicitly
prefers her "spy" system (4)
.
And indeed, the bulk of the
Spectators consist of many reports about others' behavior,
both for good and ill. Heywood
' s criticism, let us be
clear, is hardly restricted to women who transgress
acceptable gender norms of docility and passivity; she has
harsh criticisms for men are hypocritical with each other
(not simply for men who take advantage of women, as Teiman
would have it )
.
In sum, it seems to me that both her construction of a
linear relationship of the women's voices (i.e., matching
the temporal development of the different periodicals to the
growing conformity of women to the male ideal so that they
can be allowed to speak) , and her lack of commentary on
men's voices and men's ideals support the notion the
construction of the modest woman's voice is historically
necessary. More to the point, what I see as her creation of
an artificial division (almost an opposition) between the
first and second Female Tatlers , her inability to read the
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gossipy Mrs. Crackenthorpe as anything but an inconsistent
cipher, and her positing of the Female Spectator as a peak
of female rationality and civility speaks to Teiman's
internalization of the Enlightenment ideals of rationality,
consistency and order.
Other liteary theorists have the same reservations
about gossip and knowledge as does Teiman. Jan Gordon
(1988)
,
who we heard from earlier in this chapter (writing
about gossip in Bronte as necessarily false and distortive)
,
regards gossip in Austen as a similarly inadequate
substitute for gainful knowledge. Gordon at one point
outright denies the possibility of objective truth (27-28)
,
instead focusing on gossip as one of many ways by which
novels arrive at "experiential" truth. Initially, she
speaks admiringly of gossipers' ability to adjust themselves
and their interpretations to the reactions and ideas of
others; "gossips must listen while they speak," she writes
(13)
.
But her admiration is cautious; she begins by
pointing out that the careless reader might simply see
flexible gossip as "inconstant narrative" (ibid) . But the
flexibility Gordon so appreciates in Austenian gossip has
its price; Gordon makes a point of noting how gossips in her
novels (particularly Persuasion ) make mistakes, and have no
claim to greater reliability than more authoritative
knowledge (15)
.
Since this is hardly the assumption with
which most people proceed when talking about gossip in a
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formal sense, one wonders why this is the item of particular
emphasis, rather than the converse (that gossip is not less
reliable than the conventional knowledge the novel
reproduces)
. More to the point, Gordon's main argument is
that gossip operates in Austen to suggest that the whole
story exists and is knowable -- but is just lost (like
things lost in novels [ibid] ) . In other words, the partial
reconstructions of truth that appear via novel's special
techniques -- diaries, letters, gossip -- can never hope to
recover the Whole True Story.
Far from recovering completeness in gossip, gossip can
in fact work at cross -purposes to more traditional
novelistic techniques (again, e.g. the letter). Unlike more
"representative" forms of literary discourse, which
according to Gordon actually "represent something antecedent
to their inscription" (21)
,
apparently gossip can not only
be simple exaggeration or interpretation of event but also
outright invention. Given this, the danger unique to gossip
within novels is that of "exhaustion of textuality by a
totalizing consumption" (22). In short, everything becomes
gossip, commentary, interpretation piled upon
interpretation, at the ultimate, and lamentable, loss of
originating event (i.e. truth, substance). This schematic
maintains a bipolar differentiation of truth and falsity --
gossip's function in this formula becomes simply to
reemphasize the unbridgeable gap. In this formulation, for
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Gordon as well as for the other theorists in this section,
gossip clearly fails to have anything positive to contribute
to knowledge formation -- marking an absence of a strictly
valued positive falls severely short of full knowledge.
2.4 Archaeologists of Gossip
Within the humanities, I am most intrigued by those
choosing to use what I loosely term archaeological
approaches to gossip and rumor. By this I simply mean that
these theorists do historical excavations of gossip and
rumor at particular moments or in certain formats, so as to
demonstrate how the language of gossip and rumor reveal
subterranean veins of belief and mores that go unrecognized
in "official", aboveground treatises. While ultimately I
find these analyses limiting according to their one-way use
of archaeology (gossip is only useful for looking back: we
uncover the meaning and significance of gossip after it
happens)
,
which restricts it to being essentially an
academic tool; nonetheless these writers (like Latour and
Woolgar, Miller, DeBenedittis and Gluckman in the first
chapter) are all worthy of attention simply for their
willingness to consider gossip and rumor not only through
social constructivist lenses, but as agents of positive
change, not simply rampant social destruction.
Most assertive with this agenda is Patricia Turner's
recent book I heard it Through the Grapevine (1993) . To
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begin with, her methodology is refreshing -- while she reads
exhaustively through the fields of rumor, and has lots of
historical documentation for the periods in which the rumors
she's using occur, her approach with the contemporary rumors
is simple. She gathers all the rumors she hears about and
then focuses on those that 'work' -- those that get spread.
She investigates them simply -- talks to the people named or
implicated by the rumors, talks to those spreading the
rumors (her "informants"), and investigates the
circumstances surrounding the rumor (indeed, she amusingly
refers to her assiduous rumor-gathering self as an almost
round-the-clock field worker [6]). Her thesis is simple:
that rumors can act as tools for resistance within the
African-American community (xvi)
.
By personalizing
structural inequities (e.g. slavery, economic
discrimination, the difficulty surrounding the passage of
the Civil Rights Act) into memorable, applicable personal
narratives (white slave owners eat their black slaves,
Church's Fried Chicken contains a chemical that turns black
men sterile, John F. Kennedy Jr. was assassinated by the FBI
[32] ) , African-Americans not only comfort themselves that
their unhappiness is shared (and not arbitrary, inhuman
inequity)
,
but motivate themselves to make practical changes
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in their surroundings (economic boycotts, slave revolts,
widespread voter registration) 29
.
As the previous list makes clear, Turner's examples are
varied in subject and historical moment (she follows
Shibutani here) ; more directly, Turner also traces the
development of parallel rumors -- for instance white slave
owners spread the rumor that their slaves were cannibals
concurrently to African-Americans' communal fear that their
slave owners planned to eat them (13 -20) 30 . Turner uses
this feature (occurring frequently in her history of rumor)
to illustrate what becomes central for her when defining
rumor -- that content is not simply the issue, but more
broadly function and effect of rumor (5)
.
While Turner
essentially agrees with the dictionary definition of rumor
(unsubstantiated report about some one or thing transmitted
orally)
,
she amends it to include the fact that rumors only
spread because of reasons external to the proposition itself
-- the dictionary notion of rumor is sadly limited to its
2
9
At this point, my summation of Turner might make her
sound surprisingly like Knopf, whom I criticize for exactly
that point (I consider her thesis of rumors' crystallization
of larger political structures as passive) . As I see it,
Turner departs from Knopf's analysis strictly on her emphasis:
she repeatedly reminds us that rumor accomplishes things
within the African-American community -- foments resistance,
directs anger, motivates boycotts. Rumor for Knopf is
symptomatic only -- it represents action that happens remotely
(riots occurring elsewhere) . Rumor for Turner is action
itself -- it is a construction of knowledge that determines
future actions.
30This observation of parallel rumors developing in
politically opposed communities follows Knopf.
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material manifestations. More directly, Turner argues that
rumors help us to construct narratives of our lives that
aren't simply passive stories of complication ( pace Spacks)
,
but invigorating tales of disenfranchisement that can act to
motivate us, to spur us to action -- refusing to buy
products whose companies are subjects of rumors, even simply
spreading the rumor is sometimes a critical action (letting
other people know about organized suspicions or analyses of
malfeasance [96-97, 133, 151]).
Turner repeatedly reminds us that believers in rumor
are not, as their critics portray them, simple-minded,
under- informed, gullible sorts (Turner quotes several
academics making this claim [109, 119]). Rather, she notes,
rumor believers are often capable of sophisticated political
analysis; their rumors act to synthesize a variety of facts
they observe in their social milieus. As an example,
Turner's informants who believe or spread the rumor that
Church's, funded by the Klan, puts a chemical in their
chicken that sterilizes African-American men, note pretty
uniformly when questioned about the feasibility of that task
(how could a chemical select out only African-American men
from the chicken-eating population?) that Church's only
operate and advertise in predominantly African-American
areas ( 86 ) 31 .
31This "for blacks only" marketing strategy, which Turner
documents in many corporate rumor instances, manifests itself
explicitly in one case. Turner reminds us of R.J. Reynolds'
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More pointedly, Turner directly contrasts the
patronizing academic attitude that rumor believers are
goalless idlers, using farfetched rumors to justify their
indolent statuses in life with several portraits of genuine
subscribers to rumor -- people who are college-educated,
working, with developed plans for their futures (106, 194-
195) . Indeed, the scene Turner prepares for us throughout
her book (documenting the wide variety of themes present,
sometimes simultaneously, in different rumors -- corporate
control over African-Americans, contamination of African-
American bodies, conspiracy theories), suggests that more
than anything else, rumor functions in the African-American
community to assimilate a wide variety of facts and
structures, most of which are hostile, in a way that both
makes structural problems personal (Church's enormous
corporate profits at the expense of African-Americans
becomes a literal instead of figurative assault)
,
and that
motivates reactions. Rumors become the analytic tool by
which African Americans can read their situations --
comparing facts, individual and institutional motives, and
histories -- and assemble a narrative that covers the bases
feasibly. As Turner puts it when describing her examples of
corporate rumors, "a perception [develops] in the rumor-
telling public that the costs and risks associated with a
abortive attempt to develop a cigarette brand, "Uptown",
explicitly marketed for African Americans (101) .
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particular product outweigh its usefulness to the consumer"
(175) . Rumors become simply the crystallization of well-
founded disbelief in corporate narratives of fulfillment
through consumption. More to the point, the rumors Turner
documents are individually significantly more popular than
their correlatives in the mainstream press (e.g., Church's
denial that they are poisoning black men; Ronald Reagan's
denial that he encouraged the drug war); Turner's rumors
select out emphases or facts that mainstream accounts miss
(82-83)
.
Despite (or perhaps because of) their effectiveness at
organizing and explaining hostile circumstances, the rumors
Turner presents are vociferously denied by all of their
objects. More to the point, corporate targets of rumor
frequently redraw the rumors as misinformation campaigns
waged by their enemies (i.e., a Marlboro spokesperson chalks
up reports that Marlboro is Klan- financed to anti-tobacco
forces [99]
,
a CIA representative attributes the story that
the U.S. government developed the AIDS virus as genocidal
aggression against African-Americans to anti-U.S. propaganda
[156]
)
.
Most gruesomely, after widespread rumors of
government involvement in the Atlanta child murders, local
law enforcement and FBI officials proceeded not only to
dismiss the possibility of government influence, but to deny
the existence of serial killings themselves -- murders were
attributed to some of the children's parents, and a local
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African-American man was arrested for two of the murders
(81- 82, 126-127)
. Given that 23 children were killed in
the space of a year and a half, and that no arrests were
made in the other killings, continued cynicism towards
"official" explanations seems more than adequately
justified
.
To be sure, there is some justification for corporate
and governmental suspicion towards rumors: Turner points
out that one rumor (that a small beverage company, Brooklyn
Bottling, is funded by the Klan)
,
could feasibly have been
started by drivers for rival bottling companies, anxious to
maintain their business (129) . But the denials themselves
are still relevant for us, first, due to their extravagant
nature. Not only are the rumors empirically wrong, it seems
to be quite important to negate any legitimacy whatsoever to
the rumors (i.e., the spokespeople have no interest
whatsoever in acknowledging that while the conclusion may
not have empirical legitimacy, the context by which it is
arrived at has relevance) 32 . To substantiate this, witness
that when one executive directly asks Turner how he might
defuse the effect of the rumor, and she suggests that his
company begin marketing more moderately-priced products (to
do away with the image that large conglomerates are
32 It's also important to note here that conspiracy theory
rumors themselves are stridently dismissed as absurd, whereas
there appears to be no similarly aggressive dismissals of
conspiracy theory responses to rumors, from appropriately
expert spokespeople.
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interested only in exploiting African-Americans for their
hard-earned, scarce dollars towards expensive consumer
goods), this suggestion is instantly dismissed (214). Given
this attitude, combined with the blindness to situations
that rumor-afflicted moguls show, it isn't difficult to see
how and why rumors maintain their folk power. It is perhaps
more difficult to see why targets of rumor are so unwilling
to recognize the persistence, and the legitimacy, of rumor.
Turner closes her book by recommending that rumors and
other folkloric materials be studied along with their more
orthodox counterparts for accurate history (219) ; happily,
for several historians this is simply a given. For these
academics (James C. Scott [1990], Ranajit Guha [1983], and
Kathleen M. Blee [1991] among them)
,
rumor and gossip are
important historical resources -- they reveal beliefs and
facts that are otherwise not transmissible. Scott puts the
matter in theoretical terms: gossip and rumor are efficient
means of transmitting information anonymously and safely
(without record, without author [142] ) . Gossip then becomes
a vital resource for communities without access to standard
venues of power (public forums like newspapers, radio or
television)
,
or for groups whose views are controversial
enough that public forums will remain always closed to them
(143) . Gossip and rumor 33 are the only safe ways to
33According to Scott, only gossip is a means for
critiquing powerful people --we spread gossip about people,
and rumors about events or institutions (142)
.
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critique powerful people or institutions. Their safety,
indeed, promotes the kind of elaboration and explanation
that Turner documents more fully in the book. Because we
are free to spread our gossip and rumors without check, we
develop them to accord with already-felt but not publicly
expressible hopes and fears (145) . These features of rumors
and gossip, then, are hallmarks of political culture among
the dispossessed (151) .
Ranajit Guha ' s Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency
in Colonial India concretely foreshadows Scott's theoretical
conclusions. Guha creatively analyzes "authoritative"
histories and governmental documents of colonial India,
dissecting the language and the absences of information to
substantiate his theories about how it is that rebellion
movements can gain ground and succeed. What he finds, when
he analyzes how information is passed both with rebels and
with the colnists, is that the Indian and British
imperialists saw peasant communication as being like a
plague on their country (220-221), infected by outsiders,
uncontrollably passed throughout the population, and surely
fatal. As we have seen previously, this metaphor has deep
resonance -- plagues are out of control ("irrational", Guha
notes [222]), disastrous, perhaps inevitable ('natural') but
against the perpetuation of the natural order of things
(224) -- ultimately, a plague is like a crime against
humanity
.
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Guha calls attention to the features of peasant
rebellion that stymie historians -- how seemingly
unconnected groups, or apparently trivial events, could
trigger significant and successful rebellions (223) .
Indeed, rather than acknowledge insurgent communicative and
interpretive strategies like gossip and rumor, official
historians bend over backward to concoct extravagant
explanations for rebellion, ultimately arriving at farflung
conspiracy theories involving omnipotent, Napoleonic
"influential individuals" (2 2 6 ) 34 . To hold the line
against the disease of outside insurgency, colonial
governments banned such informal peasant communications as
gong-playing and the ritualistic circulation of a local
bread (231, 241) . But more relevantly, despite the
durability of rumors as a counter- insurrectionist medium in
India (252), while rumors are collected by the colonial
powers, they are regularly discounted as a communicative and
political medium by those writing India's histories.
Repeatedly, colonial India's historians write off rumors as
occasions of mass hysteria, irrationality that is directed
away from the truth and towards alarmist distortions (254,
258, 268)
.
The only possibility obscure to the colonial
340f course, Guha also notes that the rebels themselves
were guilty of a similar brand of self-consciousness. The
rise of prophetic rumors foreseeing mystical interventions
into the colonial structure, Guha attributes to an
unwillingness on the part of the rebels to acknowledge their
own radical urges and analyses (277)
.
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it seems, is that disempowered people could
intelligently and imperceptibly (to the colonists)
communicate with themselves, analyze a situation in a
fashion that ran counter to official ideology, and compute
rational means by which to gain power.
But as Guha concisely explains, rumor is a vitally
important medium of communication for the largely illiterate
Indian peasantry, for whom official newspaper accounts, even
if accessible, are not adequate as explanations for their
enduring poverty and diminished status (251, 254)
.
Rumormongering is not only necessary, Guha continues, it is
importantly unique as a method of communication and
analysis: it is immediate and collective, in a way that
simple transmission of news fails to be (261) . To miss this
distinction, as the "official" historians of India do (by
writing about rumor as "distorted", i.e. false, news), is to
fail to appreciate the particular circumstances by which
colonial rebels of India had to operate (259) . Indeed,
rumors are the special provenance of subalterns. Rumors
become necessary in particular when there is a dominant
ideology or explanation that needs refuting; this refutation
is most feasible through lower-risk methods like rumor and
gossip (264
)
.
Of course, the diminished risk inherent in rumors and
gossip means that they are effective tools not only for
resistance, but oppression. Kathleen Blee '
s
Women of the
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: Racism and Gender in the 1920s assiduously documents
the use of gossip and rumor as tactics of terrorism in the
early 20th-century American South and Midwest. The imagery
of the Klan itself, of course, is immediately evocative of
the reputation of gossip — anonymous (the hooded white
costume)
,
ominous (the favorite Klan tactic of the burning
cross)
,
intrusively surveillant (the well
-documented Klan
obsession with personal lives). More particularly, Blee 1 s
book is a sophisticated accounting of the peculiar status of
women within the Klan -- struggling for women's equality,
satisfying urges for political representation through the
maintenance of a subsidiary Klan, and the promotion of a
mythic image of sanctified femininity and motherhood. The
very real struggles for power between women and men in the
Klan, which Blee thoroughly explores (see especially her
section on the Elizabeth Tyler-Edward Clarke revival of the
second Klan [17-23]), contextualize Blee 1 s descriptions of
the Klanswomen's activities in support of their
organization
.
Those activities were simultaneously stereotypically
non- threatening (at women's Klan [klavern] meetings, women
would talk and play cards [129] )
,
and seriously politically
effective. Blee crystallizes this fact: "the political
power of gossip lay precisely in its apolitical character"
(14 9) . Through those channels of gossip, Klanswomen
organized votes for local, state and federal elections of
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sympathetic representatives, and indeed, boasted of winning
otherwise unwinnable elections through their circles of
gossiping women. Vivian Wheatcraft, a leader of the Indiana
KKK and a vice-chair of the Republican state committee,
boasted in 1926 after a successful re-election of a Klan-
supportive senator that she had brought about a "victory of
gossip", and that she could spread "any gossip across the
state in twelve hours" (115) 35 .
Less dramatically but equally effective, gossip was
also the main channel by which women maintained the coercive
power of the Klan. Circles of gossip ensured the success of
economic boycotts of business that were regarded as
sympathetic to African-Americans, or owned by Catholics or
Jews. While the initiative for the boycotts were
comparatively overt (lists of suspect businesses would be
read off at one klavern's meetings, for example [147]), the
information itself was disseminated through the community
widely, and informally. Operating not through the
newsletter of the Klan (which itself would be a suspect
source) but through informal conversations, women would
persuade their friends to alter their shopping allegiances
to accord with the women's Klan 1 s preset agenda (148-149).
At the time, the pattern of business failure or success was
obscure to the wider community; it is only through Blee '
s
35Unsurprisingly
,
such immoderate boasting from a woman
could not go unchallenged; fellow committeemen demanded
Wheatcraft ' s removal from her position of power (ibid.).
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interpretation that the community manipulation becomes
apparent (149)
. All of the sources interviewed by Blee
failed to see a political theme running through the series
of business failues; business failures or sudden dramatic
increases were discounted as inevitable, or owing to larger
market forces -- even as a family member's Klan status was
simultaneously acknowledged (150) . In short, people's
willingness to attribute face value to events, be they
business changes or apparently innocuous activities on the
part of the evidently disempowered, itself becomes an
important legitimizing tool for all sorts of communities.
It is a lesson hard learned by communities in and out of
power
.
Gossip and rumor in these three previous examples are
used to revise popular accounts of history -- if we look at
the gossip, these historians tell us, we find vastly
different, more feasible explanations for political change
than standard theories give us. Mickey Hellyer's (1988)
accounting of Benjamin Franklin as adult educator, while
also revisionist history, is somewhat different in focus --
his message is simply that we should notice the existence of
the gossip itself, for that is the surprise within popular
accounts of Franklin. Unfortunately, while Hellyer is
admirably successful at debunking popular accounts of
Franklin as a paragon of virtue and seriousness, he achieves
this aim only through a trivializing of gossip. Gossip's
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value as an archaeological tool comes about only through its
continued trivial status.
Hellyer begins by reminding us that the adult education
movement takes Benjamin Franklin as its founder and
paragon - Franklin exemplifies the virtues that any adult
educator should have of virtuous love of education for its
own sake, massive drive towards learning of any sort, self-
starter interested not only in self
-benefits but the good of
others, etc. (12-13)
. It is Hellyer's contention that this
notion of adult education, this notion of Benjamin Franklin,
originates in a vacuous conception of history that takes
documents at their own words and fails to examine the
socioeconomic contexts in which they appear (9). Hellyer's
Franklin is a far different character than that portrayed by
the Autobiography -- for example, instead of Franklin being
solely or chiefly responsible for a number of civic
improvements to the city of Philadelphia (starting the first
library, fire department, Penn State University, the Junto
discussion group, a hospital, advancing public safety [15-
17] ) , as the Autobiography attests, Franklin was one of
smaller and larger groups involved in these different
projects; and Franklin's role was often simply fundraising,
or some public speaking, or mere member participation (148-
152) . Hellyer's Philadelphia is also a far different
Philadelphia than what many other American historians
portray. Franklin's placing of himself in the "middling
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sort" amounts to a freezing of eighteenth-century
Philadelphia into relatively static socioeconomic classes,
which Hellyer argues was clearly not the case (17) .
Philadelphia at that point in time, Hellyer argues, was
filled with poor farmers, laborers, artisans, many of whom
were illiterate, many of whom were attempting to acquire
more profitable occupations (19, 32)
.
Hellyer notes that
Franklin was quite distinctly part of this group; and in
fact, that Franklin's love for learning and knowledge had
much more to do with Franklin's desire to acquire wealth and
status in Philadelphia than a generic seeking of knowledge
(32)
.
In particular, Hellyer notes that wealthy merchants
were idolized by Franklin as paragons of educated men,
precisely because much of what they self-evidently knew was
practical (128) .
Franklin's own practicality, while clearly in evidence
in the Autobiography , is also humorously highlighted by
Hellyer. Under several pen names, Franklin criticized
American women sharply for gossiping and scandalmongering,
among other things (146). Yet when it came to reaping the
benefits of scandal for his own profit, Franklin was
anything but timid. His ability to print his own Almanac
was a direct result of his running his competitor out of
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town based on a series of anonymous attacks to his rival's
credibility in another paper (192-193)
.
36
The bulk of Hellyer's analysis that repaints Franklin
comes when he analyzes the Junto, the "Franklin-originated"
discussion group that met from 1717-1732. Hellyer notes
that the idyllic reputation the Junto has as the original
sdiilt education group is based mainly on Franklin's
Autobiography
,
given that no formal minutes exist for the
Junto. Given the dubious accuracy the Autobiography has
already established for many of Franklin's activities, the
Junto deserves closer examination. Upon examining the
member rolls (the initial 12, expanded to more), Hellyer
discovers that the Juntoites were a series of small
businessmen, farmers and artisans, attempting to work up the
economic ladder, with no particular talent for or interest
in the arts or sciences (194-206)
. Indeed, the stories
Hellyer turns up about the Juntoites stress their joviality
and fondness for drinking more than anything else (ibid.).
The few written proceedings of the Junto that do exist
only underscore this impression. Early meetings of the
36 In brief, the rival (Samuel Keimer) printed an article
about abortion (taken from an encyclopedia) in his paper (he
was moving through the encyclopedia, one article a day) ;
Franklin and a friend wrote an enraged response as two modest,
offended females. This article, along with Franklin's
continual publication of the anonymous "Busybody Papers"
attacking Keimer, threatened his financing to the point where
he had to flee town under cover of darkness, at which point
his shop and pressworks were sold (cheaply) to Franklin (192-
193) .
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Junto, Hellyer notes, were held at the Conestoga Waggon
[sic] Tavern (237) ; and one of the procedures for initiation
into the Junto consisted of asking candidates to answer four
questions, each question and answer followed by a glass of
wine. This procedure was followed by a new rule to continue
the four queries the next night, if they all couldn't be
finished in one (236) . The other procedure that gets
significant attention from Hellyer is the list of 24 queries
meetings were opened with. Only one of the 24 (the first)
has anything to do with the general knowledge topics that
are typically supposed to be the foundations of adult
education ("history, morality, poetry, physic, travel,
mechanic or other parts of knowledge" [237] )
;
of the
remaining 23, 16 are distinctly gossipy in nature ("what new
story have you lately heard agreeable for telling in
conversation?" "what unhappy effects of intemperance have
you lately observed or heard? of imprudence? of passion? or
any other vice or folly?" "Have you lately heard any
member's character attacked, and how have you defended it?"
[237-239] ) . While Hellyer and I clearly disagree on the
extent of gossip at Junto meetings that the questions
invited (he only regards 4 of the 24 questions as gossipy in
nature [240] )
,
we agree on the general frivolity of the
Junto -- he notes that singing became a main activity of
Junto meetings, particularly near their ending (243), and
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that the penalty for missing meetings became buying a pint
of wine for each fellow Juntoite (255)
.
Hellyer points out that Franklin wrote the
Autobiography over several years; beginning it well before
the American Revolution and not finishing it until after the
Revolution (37)
.
Given that, Hellyer argues, it's plausible
(and many scholars agree with him) that Franklin wrote (and
more importantly, rewrote -- significant revisions and
deletions are in evidence in the manuscript over its 20-year
composition) the Autobiography to be used as a piece of
political propaganda - in other words, explicitly aware of
the need for new ideological and political foundations for
the new society, and creating an "American persona" that
would satisfy those needs (137) . Those scholars contend
that Franklin, in trying to promote popular support for the
U.S. cause against Britain and continuing emigration to the
States, portrays the U.S. "as a Utopia for common folks, a
virtual Mecca of opportunity and freedom" (138). What's
ultimately interesting to me about Hellyer 's dissertation is
that he doesn't seem to think that these facts about
Franklin should in any way dim the luster of his genuine
contributions towards knowledge and politics - his
activities as ambassador to France, his discovery of
electricity. Quite explicitly, he points out at several
times that he doesn't think we should regard as internally
inconsistent or morally outrageous Franklin's clearly
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dominant drive for success or his ambitious rewriting of his
past to drum up support for the fledgling Republic. For
Hellyer
,
the more complete portrait of Franklin (as the
gossipy boozer trying to get an advantage on his business
rivals, as the cranky Teutonophobe defying the Western
Pennsylvanians' claim on the state's resources, as the aging
propagandist resentful of his friends of youth's potential
to disrupt his advertising efforts on behalf of himself and
the U.S.) is simply the truer Franklin. He points out that
most people take on goals for selfish interests as well as
selfless (19)
,
and, more to the point, that we lose sight of
the ability to appropriately characterize our own age if we
always are casting ourselves in impossibly inferior
positions to ridiculously rose-colored previous ages.
Regrettably, Hellyer undercuts his own argument.
Hellyer' s argument that the warts-and-all Franklin is the
truer Franklin shows rather starkly against his own rather
rose-hued final remarks about the Franklin of the Junto.
After pointing out that Franklin lost interest in the Junto
after the initial five or six years, and that Franklin
rewrote its proceedings and minutes to try to give it more
legitimacy (253-254), Hellyer closes by noting that "the
Junto appears to have been somewhat less of a factor in the
lives of its members than previously assumed. Membership
did not necessarily bring success, for many who belonged
never achieved it. Those like Franklin, who made their
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mark, went on to gain social and economic prominence in
other areas and by other means" (271)
. in a backhanded way,
this passage attempts to restore prominence to Franklin, by
suggesting that his participation in the Junto was simple
frivolity
,
and shouldn 1 t be taken seriously as a real part
of his character. Franklin saw through the nonsubstance of
the Junto, runs Hellyer's subterranean argument, he rewrote
the Junto for posterity, and then he really settled down and
did the work for which we revere him. More subtly, what I
see as a stronger subliminal thread through Hellyer's
closing here is a fundamental restoration of primacy to
categories of earnestness, diligence and gravity to
education -- while you can learn for selfish goals, you can
only be learning if you are actually talking directly and
didactically about "history, morality, poetry, physic,
travel, mechanic" knowledge; these are the only inquiries
Hellyer finally slots in as about "adult education" (238)
.
Defenders would argue this is a true strong reading - for
doesn't Hellyer himself say that adult education can be
about anything at all, that it is the process, that it
defines itself, when he introduces the topic in his first
chapter? Doubtless this is the case --my point in raising
this issue is only that Hellyer's concluding by dismissing
the Junto as a significant impact on Franklin's life (no
doubt with the credible intentions of freeing adult
education up from its canonical restraints) , I think, does
268
the historical disservice of exactly restoring canonical
pir i 02f i t i 0 s to whst W6 should k)0 doincj. If w0 3.1T0 still to
hold Franklin in some esteem, as Hellyer explicitly argues,
then clearly part of the reason is because the Junto is
dissociated from Franklin's real accomplishments.
Conclusion
In what sense are the lessons these humanists teach us
any different from those within the previous chapter? In
many ways, they have the same message to convey -- gossip
and rumor are negative contagions that can strike otherwise
epistemically peaceful communities at will, spreading
falsehoods and damaging feuds wildly in their wake. Gossip
and rumor encourage division, obscure facts, and undermine
rationality. These sound like the same ills witnessed
before, in reading Bergmann, Haviland et al . But what is
new here? I would argue that first, the theorists in this
chapter generally represent an advance over the theories and
methods within the last chapter. Remember that
overwhelmingly, the constraint within the last chapter was
that social scientists would apply overly rigid and
reductive methods to what is inherently complicated, hard to
appreciate (or even distinguish) phenomenon. The result,
save for the few exceptions I noted, was predictable:
social science analyses of gossip overwhelmingly do little
more than confirm the prejudicial definition with which it
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is historically encumbered (it is trivial, negative chatter
about personal lives -- it wastes time)
. While it is
certainly clear that for many of the writers I document in
this chapter, gossip and rumor still have a substandard
status (they are still less than truthful, less than ideal,
less than positive means of conveying information)
; it is
important to note that the freedom of method by which
humanists work generally enables them to grant somewhat more
autonomy to gossip.
What do I mean by this? Several things. First, I
think it's worth noticing that none of the theorists writing
here are so clearly advocating morality thinly disguised as
science as does Jorg Bergmann in the previous chapter. That
in itself represents an advance of sorts -- the agendas,
whatever they may be, are simultaneously more openly
presented and less antagonistic. Secondly and more
generally, I also think that the humanists in this chapter
(even the tropesters of the first section) attribute some
kind of content to gossip -- even if they think it is merely
a passive phenomenon that represents, the representations
the theorists document carry with them some weight. Even
the most pedantic of the writers on gossip here (Spacks and
Bok) allow that gossip provides uniquely available
information, information that can be relevant to our
understanding of other people. Indeed, I think of the
methodological divide between the writers of the last
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chapter and those of this one as representable by two
opposed trajectories. Most of the social scientists I
reviewed start with their highly rational methodology,
determined to uncover the truth about gossip. Their
orderliness and methodological reductiveness reveal only the
most stereotypical facets of gossip. In somewhat of a
contrast are the humanists of this chapter, who generally
start with less orderly methods, and frequently openly cite
the randomness of gossip and rumor as being defining
features of their study (cf. Code, Turner, Spacks)
.
Consequently, their studies are generally less trivializing
of gossip, because they at least get at some feature of why
we do in fact gossip -- because it matters to us, it has
impact for us.
Humanists can discern some impact to gossip in part I
would say to their training. Notice that when the theorists
of the last chapter referred to gossip as narrative
(Haviland, Bergmann principally)
,
it was always with a very
reduced notion of what constitutes narrative -- I tell you a
story, you politely listen. Quite to the contrary, the
writers in this chapter who invoke notions of narrative to
ground their analyses of gossip almost universally have a
more collective understanding of narrative --we tell
stories together, we each contribute information, analysis,
interpretation, speculation. The story the group produces
is not only quite different from that any one of its members
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would produce, but definitely not reducible to the totality
of facts that the individuals possess. The group dynamic
itself is responsible for the production of the story. Only
Miller, Latour and Woolgar, and Gluckman (1963) from the
last chapter seem to possess any substantial notion of how
collective minds can exist and operate in fashions
significantly different from individuals.
This is not to say, of course, that our analysis of
gossip can rest with the job done by the humanists. While
it is true that they are less judgmental and trivializing in
their approaches to gossip than the social scientists, there
still appears in their work the stain of dismissal. Perhaps
the downside to the humanists' acute approach to gossip as
narrative is their ultimate inability to regard gossip and
rumor as anything else other than entertaining stories. By
this I mean that while the humanists generally are willing
to admit some kind of relevance and content to the stories
of gossip and rumor, it is so in a diminished sense -- while
our gossip may have some kind of truth value, its subjects
are never too central or very risky. We don't gossip about
what fundamentally matters to us ; our gossip is always of an
intimate nature (that is to say, personal, subjective,
derivative from Serious Truth) . I see my project in the
final chapter then, as constructing a new approach to gossip
-- demonstrating that telling stories is not just
entertaining campfire work but a very serious way we have of
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making truth. The archaeological talents writers in the
previous chapters have demonstrated (Miller, Latour and
Woolgar, Gluckman [1963], Turner, Scott, Guha, Blee,
Hellyer ) will gain resonance and relevance with a new
understanding of what gossip is : how gossip is not simply a
social artifact to be measured, an oral historical document
to be uncovered, an alternative narrative to combine with
our authorities. My hope is to show how much of our
"rational" work, our methodical behavior, our "serious"
thought is nothing more than gossip, and that gossip in its
turn is thinking at its most engaged, its most active, its
most challenging. Gossip, in short, is necessarily and
ineluctably intertwined with our mental functions -- it is
one resource among many, all of which we rely upon
simultaneously. If I can realize this project successfully,
my rather backbiting analyses of previous gossipists will be
productive
.
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CHAPTER 3
WHY GOSSIP IS ALMOST ALWAYS RIGHT; TOWARDS
A GOSSIPY EPISTEMOLOGY
Theories of gossip are always, no matter with what
intentions their composers begin, zero-sum equations. That
is to say, no matter how sincerely social scientists and
humanists tackle the concepts of gossip and rumor with the
Sfoel of eradicating particular dichotomies we use in our
lives (e.g., for social science, gossip is a way of
undermining social rankings previously thought rigid --
society becomes both more knowable and more intimate; for
humanists gossip is a means by which obscure human emotions
can be expressed, a channel for otherwise impermissible
authorial meaning)
,
they only achieve their marks of lifting
gossip's status in one or another arena by lowering it,
correlat ively
,
in another. My first two chapters lay this
move out clearly, curious though it is. Most gossip
theorists I cite enthusiastically embrace and defend the
study of gossip on their pages xx and xxii, only to
shamefacedly confess, by the time they get to their page
200s, that they really are of course only studying something
that is indicative of social dynamics or interaction, that
has little to do with knowledge.
Notice that the emphasis of where gossip departs from
knowledge possibility is different depending upon the
discipline; for the social scientists, gossip is powerful
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but ultimately irrational, an expression of individual
social hostility or anxiety, or a titration of complicated
social rules (thou shalt not...). For the humanists, gossip
can have a kind of coherence (their emphasis on narrative
means that gossip can make a lot of sense on its face,
doesn
' t have to be explained purely in terms of what it
represents)
,
but ultimately has little relevance outside a
very narrow situation or group, and often has significance
only for an individual gossiper.
This state of affairs means that ultimately, instead of
working to undermine social categories, gossip in academic
work serves to underscore them (to return to our examples,
ethnographic gossip research, rather than strictly
undermining the notion of social rank, describes it rather
as an infinitely divisible yet still all-important function;
humanist gossip writing, by placing gossip's narrative
content in stereotypically emotional gossip categories
[gossip is always about personal jealousy, anger, cattiness]
renders gossip simply another, not -that -different literary
trope) . More broadly, the net result of these analyses of
gossip is that we learn nothing about gossip that we
couldn't already have easily guessed about ourselves --
these analyses teach us nothing about gossip that isn't
formulaically true. In particular, none of these
explanations can really offer a substantial explanation for
the occurrence of gossip as a unique social phenomenon. In
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other words, if gossip really is nothing more than just
another form of social ranking, or alternatively a further
opportunity to express personal emotions, why would humans
gossip as we so enthusiastically and perennially do? Why
bother to gossip, if there are more straightforward ways of
measuring social rank, or expressing personal emotions, and
if (as so many gossipists still believe) the act carries
with it irremediable social stigma? (And of course, why
bother to write academic study after study of gossip, if it
is so apparently uninstruct ive? ) In attempting to answer
these questions, to ascertain more clearly what gossip is
and why we do it (and why gossip can be of philosophic
import)
,
I seek here to dig beneath the stereotype and to
capture more of the instructive flavor of gossip.
Let me make this critique more particular, by iterating
the various dichotomies I have observed academic writers on
gossip and rumor, from all disciplinary backgrounds,
endlessly repeating. Gossip is either entirely individual
in its motivation, or entirely social; gossip bonds, or
gossip attacks; gossip is either entirely idle or fully
purposive; controlling or uncontrollable; public or private;
inventing truth or distorting it (if it is not an outright
lie) . This entire set of dichotomies itself seems false to
me: a contrived collection of fictions designed to make us
fit gossip with a totalizing value -- either it is good or
evil. What I want to explore here are the ways in which
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gossip can genuinely be on both sides of these dichotomies;
in short, how these dichotomies ultimately must fail to
capture the character of gossip 1
.
These dichotomies fail, of course, because the truth of
the matter is that we never live within dichotomies -- they
are simply convenient constructs that allow us momentary
identification-points when the complicated character of life
threatens to overwhelm us. It seems to me that gossip is
one of the more straightforward examples of how it is we do
not in fact live by categories while simultaneously
pretending that we do . I have spent the last two chapters
debunking the illusion of categories in academic writing,
and how the strict maintenance of epistemic and social
categories capsizes academic writing on gossip; here I must
trace out some of the ways in which gossip reveals our
between-category status, and the philosophic implications
this revelation entails. To get this analysis off the
1Paul Hirst and Penny Woolley (1982) suggest mechanisms
by which similar dichotomies might be straddled in their
novel, and under-appreciated work on Social Relations and
Human Attributes . They begin by noting that they will not be
using the word "society" throughout their book, as they
consider it a misnomer: it inappropriately suggests a
totalizing, unifying character to social relations and
behaviors that cannot be described or aetiologized from any
one particular tradition (vii-viii) . Analogously, my purpose
here is to suggest how both "gossip" and "epistemology" fill
similar categories -- gossip does not have consistent
functions and markers, nor does the work of epistemology
present itself equally clearly and straightforwardly for our
divination
.
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ground, however, we must begin very truly at the beginning
with a new understanding of gossip.
278
3 . 1 Its Definition
the preceding two chapters have made overwhelmingly
clear, central to my discomfort with the extant academic
literature on gossip is its inability to define gossip in
such a way as to allow for a reasonably complicated
discussion of its presence and effects. At its worst,
gossip is def init ionally and metaphorically the
conversational equivalent of napalm: vindictive and
pointed, gossip and rumor carelessly or with deadly purpose
destroy lives, institutions, careers, marriages, families.
At its best, gossip is a harmless addiction of which we
cannot rid ourselves: necessarily idle talk, implicitly
purposeless and vacuous, but entertaining. These
definitional strands which have previously limited any
lively understanding of gossip (it is always personal talk
about the absent; it is either entirely idle or else it is
malicious and/or sordid), I believe, force the analyses
which follow them along similarly warped and distorted
paths
.
The academics who consider gossip regularly acknowledge
that gossip's etymology is rather far removed from its more
recent, notorious reputation; but both how this removal
occurred and whether or not it accurately reflects the
practice of gossip is far less regularly remarked upon. The
word "gossip" derives from old English's "god sibb" or "god-
related, " a relative or close friend of the family, someone
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who could act in a parental or guiding role, should the
parents die (there is a similar Old Norse origin)
. In
short, originally, to be a gossip was simply to be a
confidant, someone who was a trusted close companion 2
.
This usage of the word lasted at least into the fourteenth
century; Boccaccio's Decameron several times invokes the
'gossip" as simply a close family friend, who acts as a
parent or relative. While the inscription of gossip into a
word with vicious and idle did not officially occur until
the eighteenth century (Johnson's dictionary), even one or
two centuries before the dictionary definition gossip had
acquired a sufficiently questionable reputation to be
satisfactory evidence to convict someone of witchcraft. But
notice that while this transvaluation of gossip is regularly
noticed, not one academic has offered an explanation for its
occurrence 3 . More pointedly, without being able to explain
why it is that gossip rather suddenly and completely
2 It is true that even at this point "rumor" did not enjoy
quite so sterling a reputation; in the Aeniad Virgil writes of
rumor powerfully destroying both Dido and Aenias. However,
even there rumor is hardly malicious or pointed, simply
naturally destructive. My thanks to Bill Hills for alerting
me to this allusion.
3Happily, some academics are making inroads towards
explaining the transvaluation. Susie Phillips (1996) argues
that medieval male novelists and ministers use the tactics of
gossip both to undermine gossip as an immoral activity and to
fix it as primarily the work of women. Phillips supplies
evidence that medieval women used gossip explicitly to
undermine male sexual confidence. While this explanation is
not fully persuasive to me (I still wonder why it is that the
transvaluation occurred when it did) , Phillips has moved the
debate significantly forward.
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acquires a reputation of viciousness, academics still hold
rather tightly to this newer conception of gossip. As I
have exhaustively demonstrated in the previous chapters,
even those academics who claim to "rescue" gossip from the
clutches of condemnation (Spacks' phrase) themselves only
slightly more subtly condemn it on similar terms.
What I suggest here is not my own explanation for why
the transvaluation occurred when it did, but simply a
challenge to its legitimacy. Let me offer an example to
demonstrate the feasibility of alternative views in this
debate. In On the Genealogy of Morals
. Nietzsche presents
us with a simple lesson: in presocratic times, we operated
by different value tables, those of good and bad (e.g.
noble/beautiful/productive vs. lowly/ugly/useless) rather
than the contemporary, Judeo-Christian good and evil (e.g.
humble/other-serving/unselfish vs. arrogant /self -serving/
selfish) . While initially these more modern values may have
had revolutionary status, Nietzsche argues that there is no
logical reason for us still to be compelled by these values
with which we currently live; indeed, all these values serve
to do is to constrain us from acting on what might otherwise
be enormously creative and invigorating impulses. Why not
reverse the value tables, Nietzsche asks his readers; why
not believe and live by an older notion of good and bad,
instead of a newer, more limiting theory of good and evil?
Nietzsche, rather than propounding logical arguments
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criticizing modern morality, challenges his readers to come
up with an alternative morality that is superior.
Such, on a dramatically reduced scale, would be my goal
in this section. Gossip's very character, intent and effect
has been inverted and distorted by centuries of writers and
moralists. In so doing, they have taken what was surely not
once simply good and pure (for who can say that any social
manifestation is all goodness?)
,
but rather complicated, and
reduced it to sheer vindictiveness, a venial sin to be
avoided at all costs. While I have certainly attempted to
exhaustively demonstrate the comparative weakness of most
standard writing on gossip, I would similarly challenge
readers to come up with superior theories of gossip,
theories that explain more of social and intellectual
interaction. Why not return gossip to its original roots
and meanings; why not reconceive gossip in terms of what it
can do, rather than what some people consider it as failing
to do?
What, then, would an etymologically truer definition of
gossip look like? First, let us consider the origin of the
word -- simply, a person in an intimate relation to another.
That vague definition is far from the conditional, precise
definition philosophers so enjoy; however, I think that that
kind of vague definitional work might be more appropriate to
a concept that is so social in nature. One of the main
problems I have with the tidy definitions that the social
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scientists and humanists use is that they reduce gossip to a
series of conditions. If A and B and C, then gossip (or
testimony or hearsay or rumor or...). These conditions,
because they themselves are overwhelmingly static and
restrictive (e.g. an easily identifiable category of talk,
occurring between kinds or numbers of people, with
particular emphasis on the content of the talk), don't
really capture what I think is the fundamentally amorphous
quality of gossip. Max Gluckman astutely notes that it is
often difficult to discern when a conversation is and is not
gossip; the arena of gossip is difficult to circumnavigate.
Social scientists and humanists, by making the border
mechanistically easy to identify, have succeeded only in
dramatically reducing the domain of gossip. There are
really only a very few kind of conversations those gossip
researchers will even hear or think of as gossip. More
particularly, they'll miss the flavor of how gossip happens.
Conversely, I seek to expand the field of gossip.
I find Gluckman 's argument for gossip's fluid nature
far more persuasive than most gossip research because I
think it captures what I see as the three essential, and
essentially vague, tendencies or characteristics of gossip:
It is informal, comparatively intimate, and evaluative (or
speculative/investigative) conversation
.
Let me give a brief initial explanation of each
characteristic. First, by calling gossip "informal" I mean
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to suggest that gossip conversat ions aren't highly patterned
or regulated --we can't identify gossip conversations by
the conversational path they take ( contra Bergmann, who
argues for a specific conversational path to gossip; who
similarly only sees gossip as occurring when one person
tells a nasty story to one or more essentially passive
auditors)
. So "informal" first means something like not
governable, chaotic, unruly. But secondly, and more
importantly, by "informal" we might easily assume that
gossip, "real" gossip, cannot be written down -- it can only
be oral. I do not think that that is necessarily so. The
second and third characteristics will flesh out more clearly
where I draw my vague distinctions between what written
chatter is gossip and what is not, but it is certainly true
that we can converse informally with others through writing
(letters, email, "chat" rooms on the internet) . However, by
this definition, "gossip" magazines and television shows
( People , National Enquirer , The Gossip Show , Walter
Winchell's television and radio broadcasts) are not
necessarily gossip.
In what ways can gossip be intimate? Bergmann, and
many other gossipists, would place an extreme value on
intimacy -- because they attribute a high degree of social
suspicion towards gossip, they assume that only pretty close
friends would gossip with each other, and then only in
relative secret, or while doing various "disguising"
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activities (e.g. pretending to work)
. I think that this
emphasis is overexaggerated, but nonetheless, I do think
that gossip is intimate to the extent that we do not gossip
with complete strangers. We may gossip with people we do
not know very well (new coworkers, new neighbors, or new
friends can ask for and receive the "dirt" on the workplace,
neighborhood, or social circle)
,
but we do have some
established social relationship with those with whom we
choose to gossip.
Perhaps the most significant of those conditions for me
is the last: gossip is investigative, evaluative or
speculative. I use these words both as another way of
suggesting purpose (for I directly wish to challenge most
gossipists' habit of considering gossip necessarily idle
conversation)
,
and as a more particular way of discussing
purpose. It seems to me that "purpose" often gets reduced
to something like "agenda". While these two words seem on
the face of it pretty similar, I think they have different
connotations; "purpose" can be used more loosely than
"agenda". Meetings have agendas that can be written down in
numbered items and either followed or ignored; but a purpose
can be so loose (my purpose in going to school is to get an
education) that it permits an infinite number of particular
consequences (for how many different kinds of "educations"
do students, faculty, staff, administrators, and community
members get around and outside of UMASS?)
.
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This is the sense of "purpose" that I think gossipists
so often ignore. In other words, if gossipy conversations
can have purposes, in the gossipology they can typically be
nothing more than very particular, and destructive (e.g.,
destroying some one person's reputation). It seems to me,
though, that gossip, because it is necessarily intimate and
informal, can have a wider range of purposes than are ever
offered it. Further, those purposes can be both conscious
and unconscious, multiple for one conversation, personal and
impersonal. An example that might make this clearer:
central to the debate in the pages of Man over the function
of gossip was determining its exact function/origin:
individualistic, purely social, performative. Obviously, a
perspective that went unnoticed by the theorists is that
gossip can be all of those things at once, and none of them
necessarily or essentially.
To spell this out more concretely: I might discuss the
possible nomination (and eventual ascension) of William
Bulger to the presidency of the University of Massachusetts
with friends for personal reasons (we are affiliated with
the University; we may speculate on possible changes in our
jobs, pay levels, student enrollment as a result) , for
social reasons (we are trying to measure or take account of
the University's status in the public -- how prestigious or
degrading might it be if William Bulger will be president?
How relevant is this for non-UMASS people?), and of course
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for performative reasons (for surely the appointment
inspires sarcastic speculation on follow-up appointments —
Whitey Bulger as Vice-Chancellor for Administration and
Finance?). More to the point, in each of these capacities
of gossip we can see crossover and interstices -- Whitey
Bulger jokes are not simply performative, but themselves
measures of social status and commentary on political
situations, just as analysis of the Bulger appointment and
its repercussions is both personal and social ("how will my
job change" is clearly both a personal and social question)
.
In short, what we think of as "purpose" cannot be reduced to
the narrower "agenda, " for in so doing we dramatically
reduce the context and nuance implicit within conversation -
- this reduction produces similarly straitened analysis.
Correlat ively
,
I reject definitions of gossip as
necessarily idle, which many gossip theorists favor, because
they are both too strong, and too universal in their
characterization. Look: no doubt some talk we might think
of as gossip is idle in a loose sense, in the sense that it
might not be guided by a well-defined agenda. Think of John
Beard Haviland "fishing" for gossip on town luminaries in
his Gossip, Reputation, and Knowledge : he simply asked
people to tell him stories about particular people, with no
clue as to what he might hear. Further, it might be easy
for us to hear some gossip as particularly idle, because we
are outsiders to the conversation; we cannot imagine a
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purpose to this storytelling. Recall Sarah Miller's
descriptions of women telling pointed fables to each other
in her dissertation; to the stranger, these stories might
have no purpose other than entertainment or humor (the only
purpose usually ascribed to "idle" gossip)
,
but as Miller
deftly demonstrates, those stories were indirect arguments
for or against particular marital matches -- negotiating
sessions in addition to and through entertainment.
The problem with calling gossip necessarily "idle" is
that it rules out any significant motive or direction behind
the talk -- it a priori renders the gossip trivial and
uninteresting. Exactly why I like the looser categories of
investigative, speculative, and evaluative is that I think
they both allow for the breadth of motives one might
encounter, and more importantly, they invite the auditor to
dig into the context and layers of the conversation, rather
than to reduce it to simplistic readings. Finally, they do
not prohibit the necessary degree of casualness and fun that
I think is generally intrinsic to gossip, while not robbing
gossip of possible functions and purposes. Think again of
the introduction to Sarah Miller's dissertation, where she
confesses herself unwilling to "commit violence" to the
conversations she overhears by assigning them narrow
content-categories, as that would reduce complicated and
lengthy conversations to simplistic and inaccurate
narratives. The thick-descriptiveness that Geertzian social
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science aims for, to my mind, demands these more adaptive,
less directive, kinds of definitions.
If we reject reductive definitions of gossip, then, I
must be able to defend my particular broad definition of
gossip as informal, intimate, and evaluative/speculative/
investigative conversation. What these three conditions
capture to me is the essence of gossip: gossip is the
conversation of friendship. Friendships are informal; we
don't need to stand on ceremony with those we know well and
who know us. Similarly, because we are with people with
whom we are comfortable, we can venture out of familiar
conversational territory -- we can investigate ideas we
might not believe in, discuss people or events we are
curious about but might otherwise be unwilling to reveal
those curiosities, explore riskier lines of thought and
belief 4 . Friendship is not universal -- we're not friends
with everyone we encounter -- but by the same token it's not
necessarily prohibitive or exclusive. We don't always, or
even often settle ourselves into snug corners or Cones of
Silence to trade scandalous stories --we run into
colleagues or casual friends or neighbors, and as we talk
about filing papers or town developments or lawn-mowing, we
also weave in and out of gossip (and the gossip, let me make
4
I am hardly the first person to suggest this; but most
explicitly, Susan Hutson points out that "informality in
behaviour implies equality, familiarity with and knowledge of
the other person" (in Bailey, Gifts and Poison 44)
.
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clear, may overtly or covertly be about the filing papers or
town developments or lawn-mowing, or anything else)
. The
gossip is intrinsically connected to, springs from, and is
related to, the general conversations we have within and
between communities. Also, the combination of "intimate"
and "informal" suggests the playful, not entirely serious
tenor that conversations between friends can take on (which
acts as a nice counterweight to the condition of purpose) .
When talking to a familiar, trusted intimate, I am free to
be playful even as I explore potentially threatening,
depressing or frightening possibilities (might I be fired?
might my new neighbor be a harassingly loud bore with a
vigilante attitude towards street pets?)
.
Now obviously, "the conversation of friendship" is an
enormous conversational category, and could rightly be
called too hopelessly vague and enormous to be of any
philosophic merit. But hear me out; more importantly,
reflect for a moment on the kinds of conversations you have
with your friends. Depending on how you know your friends
(from childhood, school, work, politics, hobbies,
neighborhood), how long you've known your friends, how well
you know them, you can talk about a wide or narrow variety
of topics with them. More particularly, there are no doubt
some topics you can discuss with some friends but not
others
.
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The point of all of this is not to suggest the high
categorizability of friendships, but ultimately how
impossible friendships themselves are to categorize or to
order (for example, for each of these categories I have just
listed, surely it is not too difficult to think of friends
who have breached the categories; friendships that have been
enduring but shallow, friendships that once involved much
conversational territory but now are limited to a narrow
range, workplace friends with whom you can discuss anything
but work-related topics, etc.)
.
In short, friendship itself
cannot be reduced to a series of content-conditions; less so
can the conversations that mark it. It seems to me that if
anything marks a friendship it is the comparative lack of
boundaries. Within a friendship, one can discuss topics
that one cannot discuss elsewhere (or perhaps, cannot
discuss in the same informal manner), true; but that does
not mean that only those conversations mark friendship, or
only those conversations are relevant. Those idiosyncratic
and intimate conversations happen in the midst of banal
conversations, may stem from hostile conversations, or
relate to other conversations. It is the very fact that
friendships are both intimate and informal that they can
carry with them such wildly varying conversational themes,
contents, styles, manners. "Conversations" have many
themes, many topics, and many threads. To isolate the
stereotypically gossipy moments out of the conversations
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within a friendship and say that these and these alone mark
the friendship is absurd.
Now that I have established some of the reach of gossip
(what it includes)
,
let me at least preliminarily draw some
limits to gossip. First, and most importantly, where do (or
don't) rumor and gossip overlap? As I have suggested in
earlier chapters, some theorists (most notably Brison) use
the terms so loosely that they are clearly interchangeable;
still others (most clearly Scott) arrive at arbitrary
distinctions between gossip and rumor (gossip is about
people; rumors are about events) . I would like to position
myself between these extremes; while I think that in
general, rumor and gossip are roughly coexistent (both are
unruly social formations, both are evaluative/investigative/
speculative)
,
I think that rumors tend to display these
characteristics more weakly. Rumors can be very informally
passed (I could spread a rumor to a virtual stranger did
you hear 50 % of the student body is sick with the flu?"
relatively unknown TAs have said to me, and I have to them,
standing in line for the xerox machine) . As this example
shows, rumors can be more general - interest than gossip; we
can spread rumors to comparative strangers because their
topics can be less located, less tied to a community
(someone might not need to have too much local knowledge to
understand or be interested in a rumor)
.
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More importantly, rumors are less necessarily tied to
conversations, and conditions of conversation. We can
easily imagine spreading a rumor to another person quickly,
without a surrounding conversation (the flu example above is
a clear demonstration) ; however, it is harder to imagine
just stopping and gossiping with someone without surrounding
layers of communication. This is so because gossip, while
not more dangerous than rumor, is more intimate; we gossip
with people because we know or suspect that they might be
interested or have a perspective we want to hear. While I
have general reservations about the social transactive
analysis so many writers wish to ascribe to gossip (where
gossip simply becomes an item of social currency to be
exchanged)
,
rumors come closer to fitting that analysis than
gossip. It is easier for me to imagine passing that flu
rumor, without too much discussion, to all sorts of
audiences (undergraduates, graduates, staff, faculty,
townspeople) ; whereas in a gossip situation an initial
"item" might begin an entirely different frame of discussion
that travels a variety of topics and evaluative paths,
ing on the group, their interests, their backgrounds,
their intentions.
A second limitation, which I only briefly addressed
above, is the distinction between printed and spoken gossip.
As I said earlier, some written forms of gossip such as
email and Internet chat rooms are clearly no different from
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verbal gossip conversations other than in their
inscriptiveness, and therefore should be treated similarly.
The fact that the conversation is printed on screens rather
than directly oral changes little about the flavor of the
conversation 5 . But more troubling are gossip magazines and
television shows, where no apparent community of friendship
exists. It is true that in all of these other situations, a
kind of intimacy is being presumed -- many gossip
commentators have observed the "insider" assumption gossip
magazines make about their readers, that of course readers
know background information about the story at hand.
However, what does distinguish gossip magazines,
television shows and colums in particular from these other
forms of gossip is their one-sidedness; here the more
general definition of gossip as conversation becomes
paramount. Conversations are necessarily social --at least
two people must talk with each other. While Bergmann
regards gossip as little else than one person telling a tale
to at least one intrinsically passive listener, if we
consider gossip genuine conversations, then we must allow
for genuine back-and-forth contribution between
5Certainly, written conversation is absent the facial
contortions and vocal intonations that mark conversations
(hence Bergmann ' s energetic attempt to capture all the extra-
linguistic qualities of his taped gossip-conversations) . But,
as any email habitue will attest, capitalizing letters,
creative punctuation, and those annoying typographical facial
expressions [e.g. ;-)] can contribute much, if still
artificially, towards a simulated conversation.
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participants. Contribution is more possible in electronic
fora, than in essentially fixed gossip media (columns,
magazines, television shows) . While, as I have argued
earlier, audiences can (and do) interpret the material in a
variety of fashions with a variety of attitudes, their
intimate connection to the material is more selective. In
short, of the 20 or so articles in a recent issue of People
.
only one may be of real interest to me (say, the speculative
piece about Jodie Foster's sexual orientation) . The piece
interests me because it resonates with the immediate world
around me; as such, it becomes material for my
interpretation of myself and my surroundings (I am trying to
establish my own beliefs about the propriety of "outing").
Because of the context of my set of background beliefs, my
current interest in the topic, I will read this article
differently than I will read others in that issue -- I will
be more attentive. As such, I will be in a position to
"talk back" to the article -- I will use the article one way
or another in the life I lead. Because I see the article as
having bearing on me, even though I do not really know any
of the principals in the piece or its author, and have no
way of determining whether or not the article has any claim
to veracity, I will use it as gossip in a way I would not
use the other pieces in the magazine
6
.
Further, others I
6Let me note that even this mild example of readers
thinking about gossip critically seems beyond even the most
advanced work on gossip magazines and their readership. In
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know may have read or will read this article, and we might
share our differing or overlapping perspectives. In this
sense, while my individual reaction may have no resonance
with the principals or the author, I as a member of a
community will affect and determine the reception of this
kind of material 7 . So, items in gossip columns and
magazines, and on gossip television shows, may indeed
function as gossip, but they are audience-specific (and
audience-dependent) in a way that makes them even harder to
distinguish as gossip than conversational gossip, and which
for our purposes makes them difficult as research resources.
Let us return to the objective of this section:
challenging the current orthodoxy of gossip
conceptualization. Even after all of these defenses and
her Reading Women's Magazines (1995) , Joke Hermes does
differentiate between those who read gossip mags "seriously"
and "campily" (121) , but not only is her differentiation a
bifurcation (serious and camp readings may never
interpenetrate)
,
her use of "serious" is a misnomer, self-
consciously borrowed from Patricia Meyer Spacks . Hermes'
readers' seriousness seems limited to pleasure, and "an
imaginary sense of power" (123-124, emphasis mine) . In short,
we can't do much with gossip other than distract ourselves
from the outside world, and delusionally . The idea of a
gossip reader using gossip critically, even as s/he—enjoys
herself gossiping , escapes Hermes' ken.
7Perhaps a more orthodox philosophical defense of this
position would be to invoke Derrida' s attack of the artificial
division (and privileging) of speech over the written word,
which hypothesizes not only an absolute and essential
difference between the two, but to each an absolutely
referential relationship to an always-existent , always outside
Truth. See his Dissemination , especially 164-168.
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explications of my definition, some readers might still
challenge my attempt to contradict the bulk of the
literature on gossip. To return to the etymological
argument for a moment, I would ask readers to examine how
"gossip" gets expressed in different languages. In his
dissertation, Ori Bet Or presents definitions of gossip in
12 different languages (Arabic, English, French, Filipino,
German, Hebrew, Italian, Portuguese, Polish, Russian,
Spanish [314-322]); in her research, Miller discusses the
word's Nepalese meaning (345)
.
In general, there are no
strictly positive words for gossip (in many languages there
is no direct cognate)
,
in many languages all the words for
gossip are more and less negative in connotation, and often,
there is no one word for gossip (i.e., several of the
Romance languages have two or three words for gossip, in a
sliding scale of moral severity, including variations on
'defamation' and 'calumny'). What strikes me as
Bergmannesque about other gossipists' caving in to
linguistic tyranny is that there's this assumption again
that the vox populi is both easily readable, and a
mandate
.
Now before this simply sounds confused (i.e., I'm
writing about gossip, and how gossip makes truth, and yet I
want to say that what people actually say doesn't have
anything to do with truth)
,
I think that words people use to
express concepts are simply necessarily loose, and don t fit
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particularly well the ideas or things we are trying to
describe. Simply looking at the evidence I just quickly
presented will demonstrate this fact. As I have shown, many
writers on gossip and rumor use those words interchangeably;
more particularly, "gossip" doesn't have one meaning across
the world -- indeed, in most non-English languages, people
more directly describe their talk according to its tone than
to the simple constructions of how many people are there and
whether or not it has truth (the standard gossip evaluators
use to identify gossip's presence) . Consider as an analogue
the fact that our modern 'wimp' derives originally from
'wimple' . At this point, "wimp" has its own independent
connotations; we don't think about nunnish headdresses when
we contemplate someone's alleged wimpiness. But at least
one point to etymology can be to show that words are not
necessarily good fits to what they describe. Similarly, I
would argue that our "official" understanding of gossip
doesn't match what many people colloquially understand by
the term; I think it is time to bring the academic
literature up to date. Depending on the language you
examine, what we may consider to be "gossip" has many
linguistic origins - ties of friendship or kinship, spying,
chat, slander. If there are origins both good and bad,
connotations both womanly and manly (i.e. god sibbs weren t
a particular gender, but as of the 18 th century gossip
became identified as a woman's activity), why do we hold
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narrowly to some of the definitions or linguistic
genealogies rather than others? More to the point, why do
gossip writers in English tend to combine all of the
derogatory analyses of gossip in their understandings of
what it is and how it functions, collapsing away many of the
fine distinctions non-English definitions of gossip observe?
It is clear that gossip, the English word has until
relatively recently had both positive and negative
connotations, but that the emphasis since the eighteenth
century, in the academic writing, has become simply
negative. That doesn't mean that we must stay slave to
linguistic tradition and order (hermeneutic delay on a
linguistic level) . Again, as the evidence of many cultures'
evident comfort with and reliance upon gossip for social
sustenance and vital information makes clear (cf. the
conversations reported in Brison, Miller, Haviland) , for
academics to invert the gossip definition away from this
punitive trend would not be a rebellion against the common
tongue, but rather a realignment of analysis to current
informal linguistic and social practice.
In other words, "the conversations of friendship,"
while being minimally qualified (again, conversations that
are comparatively intimate, informal, and investigative,
speculative or evaluative), should necessarily remain our
amorphous boundary of gossip, and is adequate as it stands
- to construct a more rigid boundary is to suggest an
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artificial changing of tone, attitude and purpose to
conversations where we cannot necessarily mark one, and
ultimately, to suggest a legitimacy and a historical
necessity to an arbitrary moral agenda.
3.2 Why (and How) Epistemology Might Be Informal
Why ought we reconceive gossip; why might it be
important to throw out conventional definitions of gossip
for a newer, vaguer notion? Most pertinently, reconceiving
gossip is a lens by which we can come to a thicker
description of conversation; conversations should not be as
typified as theorists so generally wish 8 . Rethinking
conversation, of course, has resonance within the field of
epistemology; if how we behave when we chat with each other
is not so easily recognizable as truthful or false, serious
or idle, than how it is we come to "know" something through
conversation may be more complicated than theorists of
knowledge might have us believe.
Throughout this dissertation, I have repeatedly
suggested what I consider to be the simple fact that
contemporary epistemology has no means with which to
8Even advanced conversation theorists such as Erving
Goffman, in his distinction between ''front -stage" and "back-
stage" performance in The Present ation
—
of
.
Sel
_f—in
—
Everyday
Life (1959) , can only conceive of two possibilities^ for social
behavior (though these may be inter-mediated, and differently
received by audiences, as the theatrical metaphor suggests)
.
In short, conversation is still too conventionally considered
dialectically (and a closed dialectic at that)
.
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evaluate or even recognize informal knowledge, such as that
reached through casual conversation, chatter, gossip. That
knowledge -- understandings we reach about people,
institutions, objects, events, via series of casual
conversations and investigations -- informs to a much
greater degree our real-world behaviors, mores, and
principles than do the carefully-deliberated philosophic
axioms and definitions so prevalent in today's technical
journals. It is in part because no academic contemplates
the very real possibility that we come to know things
informally that so much of the ethnographic and humanist
gossip research is so limited in scope; researchers can only
come up with trivializing explanations for gossip simply
because they cannot imagine more substantive alternatives.
To expand the possibilities for social science and
humanistic research, epistemology itself must broaden in
scope. Informal knowledge, conversational knowledge, must
be reckoned with; it cannot be ignored, as if North American
philosophers were actually a cluster of socialites at a
cocktail party, and gossip the polyester-clad intruder with
severe halitosis and attenuated social skills.
Of course, to make such a claim is to beg the
philosophic response. Certainly, we get some sort of
information from gossip, rumor and other informal channels,
my elite interlocutor might say; and indeed, many people
might even go so far as to call it knowledge (as his nose
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turns up). But surely we professionals shouldn't actually
confuse such addled, scattershot, illogical, petty, or mean-
spirited doggerel that is gossip with Actual, Authoritative
Truth. Theatrical asides we exchange over coffee cannot be
the same as Justified True Belief. As Aristotle argues in
the Politics
,
even though we know there's moral goodness to
be had in both the political and the contemplative life, the
reason why we must figure out which has priority is so that
we can choose the one true life, the best life. Similarly,
even though there might be claims to knowledge in gossip and
rumor, we still must determine which is closer to truth,
chatter or rigorous philosophic argument. And that choice,
my hypothetical interlocutor would say, is of course no
choice at all -- the answer is clear, only rigorous argument
can have any substantive connection to truth. Only rigorous
argument can actually meaningfully consider possibilities,
rationally evaluate them, and (as Aristotle would so admire)
calmly select the best among them. Gossip simply consists
in random speculation, or vengeful agenda-promoting.
This isn't simply a thought-exercise on my part
(although it is of course that first; I am nothing if not a
product of my training) . My point here is to illustrate
what I think is the overwhelming, hard to ignore reaction to
any comparison of gossip and (real) knowledge. Whenever I
have discussed the topic of gossip with friends or
acquaintances, and its relation to knowledge, even those
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people most sympathetic to such a project are inclined to
voice their sympathy in a very noncommittal way. It is as
if gossip can occasionally be coincidentally related to
knowledge (you just happen to uncover a juicy, true,
personal or institutional scandal; you just happen to
evaluate someone's motivations for doing something
inexplicable correctly; you just happen to be able to
forecast what might happen next in a particular situation)
;
but that only the rational pursuit of knowledge can
systematically, reliably produce truth. Even gossip's most
empathetic advocates (e.g. Code) are guilty of this
assumption. Gossip is at best the accidental cause of
knowledge, philosophy its essential cause.
I think that this particular fact points to a more
general failing (and perhaps, an inevitable one) within
epistemology, one that has been tidily expressed by Jacques
Ranciere in The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991) . In short,
when we are trying to determine something, we are still
caught up in the Enlightenment mindset of seeing only the
goal of truth -- both while we progress towards that goal
and afterwards as we rewrite the story of our progress, we
regard the goal as the defining object that characterizes
and organizes our endeavors -- errors along the way are
simply wiped from the slape of group memory, as if they
never occurred. Hence it becomes easy to speak in
retrospect of rigorous (not to say rigid) philosophical
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thinking as the "essential" cause of truth. Ranciere's
modest observation 9 is that this linear, narrat ivizing
approach isn't what's happening when the process of
knowledge-seeking is occurring (it can't be)
.
We don't know
what it is we'll find where we're looking to figure out
something -- enquiries into the nature of existence may lead
one to a scrupulous study of calculus -- and that we're not
wholeheartedly dismissing our searching as it continues.
Just because I spend two years of my life in an extensive
study of much of the literature on gossip and rumor only to
decide that it's deeply flawed doesn't mean that I should
say that I wasted my time, or that I learned nothing
(neither of which, of course, I would say anyway) . And yet
that is, on balance, how we treat our attempts. We look
only for certitude, or ambiguity that is provocative because
we just know that somewhere in its nest certitude is
resting, passively awaiting our acute detection.
The error I'm seeing professional knowledge-gatherers
make is simply ordering (and re-ordering) what we do and
think and believe and try according to a straightforward
(not to say reductive) test of "does/did it hold true?"
10
90ne that is echoed by Bob Ackermann in his "On
Hermeneutic Delay" (1989) .
“Fervent defenders of the integrity of contemporary
analytic epistemology (none of whom, perhaps, sit on this
dissertation committee) would disagree with this formulation
.
I would direct their attention toward Harvey Siegel (1995) ,
who in his defense of "traditional" epistemology against
Quine's argument for "naturalized" epistemology replaces that
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This is not to say that we need to become (equally
reductively) warm embracers of "errors" of all sorts, that
since a little truth is in everything we should just do as
we please and believe what we will. Such an attitude is
naive and delusive (as well as frankly impractical) . The
point is simply that we do ourselves no favors when we
pretend that errors have no point in figuring out truth, and
that those things that are portentous of truth are somehow
easy to determine in advance. Indeed, by sharply
discounting the value of half the dichotomy we are trying to
live with we show that we can't even handle dichotomies (we
can't see or acknowledge a relation between truth and
falsity, yet rely on the existence of the second to buttress
our belief in the first) . Surely this should suggest that
at least some of our convictions in knowledge are misplaced
and inappropriate.
To hypothesize as to why this deep antipathy towards
gossip (and more particularly towards that which is not
easily ascertainable as true) exists, I would begin by
observing the more general discomfort philosophers have
expressed towards conversation as a productive channel of
knowledge. On the face of it, this might seem a surprising
standard "justified true belief" chestnut with only slightly
vaquer conditions: "epistemic justif cation, criteria o
justification. . .and the possibility of knowledge" (49) . Even
traditional epistemology's allies only reformulate
conf irmat ional attitudes towards truth; they do not reconceive
them
.
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claim: after all, philosophy has at least part of its
origin in Plato's dialogue (conversational) form, and indeed
dialogues and conversation remain a fecund topic for more
contemporary philosophers. And certainly, some philosophers
present themselves as defenders of conversation as the road
to truth. However, I would contend that philosophers are
only comfortable with the notion of oral knowledge to the
extent that they minutely parse up conversation into the
important versus the trivial; the purposive contra the idle;
and needless to say, men's important discussions against
women's nonsensical nattering.
This suspicion is borne out in the philosophic
literature on knowledge through conversation. Martin
Heidegger, who in Being and Time (1962) presents an
extensive argument for the existential, not essential,
character of speech [Sprache] (203), must still make a
distinction between speech that can more perfectly reveal
Being (difficult speech, struggling, speech, rational
speech)
,
and "fallen" or "thrown" speech, which can only
reveal Being by presenting an (always-receding) possibility
of its existence (214)
.
Importantly, Heidegger has three
illustrations of fallen or thrown speech: idle talk
[Gerede, later synonymous with gossip], curiosity, and
ambiguity. Even more importantly, idle talk is clearly
privileged among the three examples. Heidegger sees the
need to begin only the section on idle talk with a
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disclaimer as to his intentions ("The expression 'idle talk'
is not to be used here in a 'disparaging' signification"
[211] ) , suggesting that only here are his intentions harder
to ascertain by his prose. Further, when Heidegger sums up
the three examples, it is clear that only idle talk has an
effective claim upon the other two channels that far
surpasses those the other two have on him ("idle talk
controls even the ways in which one may be curious" [216] )
.
And sure enough, it would be difficult to read his arguments
in this section as anything other than disparaging. For
even though he repeats the importance of "fallen" or
"thrown" speech for revealing "everyday" Dasein (i.e. Dasein
as we experience it in our non-contemplat ive lives) , surely
he ascribes little value to that Dasein. Witness this
remark
:
...The average understanding of the reader will
never be able to decide what has been drawn from
primordial sources with a struggle and how much is
just (sic) gossip. The average understanding,
moreover, will not want any such distinction, and
does not need it, because, of course, it
understands everything. [212]
Heidegger demonstrates that the "average" understanding
works only "superficially" and "approximately" (ibid) . So
while Heidegger apparently thinks that certainly, idle talk,
curiosity and ambiguity are of use to the everyday
understanding, the everyday understanding itself is to be as
deprivileged as possible. Heidegger describes the general
307
atmosphere created when we operate with idle talk, curiosity
and ambiguity as one in which
. . .everyone is acquainted with what is up for
discussion and what occurs, and everyone discusses
it; but everyone also knows already how to talk
about what has to happen first -- about what is
not yet up for discussion but 'really' must be
done. Already everyone has surmised and scented
out in advance what Others have also surmised and
scented out. This Being-on- the-Scent is of course
based upon hearsay, for if anyone is genuinely 'on
the scent' of anything, he does not speak about
it. [217]
Gossip flavors everyday understanding, and a thin, weak
flavor it is; those in search of genuine understanding had
better avoid those natterers and focus on deep internal
reverie. All of this, of course, is within the domain of
not being "disparaging"
.
Heidegger's dismissal of language generally, and gossip
most particularly, as uninstruct ive of anything more than
"everyday" Dasein is extreme, but linked to the more general
dismissals of gossip found throughout the philosophic
literature. Kierkegaard, in his The Present Age, describes
talkativeness as "the doing away with the vital distinction
between talking and keeping silent," and that "mere gossip
anticipates real talk, and to express what is still in
thought weakens action by forestalling it" (49) .
Talkativeness and gossip, in short, are conversation about
nothing; they perpetuate themselves incessantly because
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silence reveals only the emptiness of the surrounding
chatter ( 50
)
11
.
Friedrich Nietzsche alludes to some sort of power to
gossip when he writes in The Gay Science that
What we know about ourselves and remember is not
so decisive for the happiness of our life as
people suppose . One day that which others know
about us (or think they know) assaults us -- and
then we realize that this is more powerful. It is
easier to cope with a bad conscience than to cope
with a bad reputation. [115]
While this comment might at first seem at least a bit
supportive of gossip (remembering Nietzsche's sustained
argument against a notion of an absolute, removed truth, one
might infer that he could actually be praising gossip as as
good a route as any towards individual subversion of
constricting social mores)
,
a closer reading makes it clear
that Nietzsche is contemptuous of idle chatter. First,
Nietzsche's comment that others "think they know" about us
is at least partly a clear reference to his own anguish at
his writings being misrepresented and ignored throughout his
lifetime. Nietzsche believes quite clearly that some people
(free spirits) can never be properly understood by the mass
of herd folk; Thus Spoke Zarathustra is nothing if not a
“Of course, the enormous irony throughout Kierkegaard's
writings that bear directly or indirectly on gossip is the
striking contrast they present with his own life. It is a
commonplace of his biography that he did most of his
philosophic writing late at night , preferring to spend his
days strolling around the town or sitting in cafes, gossiping
away with friends and people-watching. Kirmmse ' s Encounters
with Kierkegaard (1996) provides plentiful evidence in this
regard (see especially 89-98) .
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long jeremiad against such perpetual confusion. Therefore,
Nietzsche's evaluation of reputation-talk as perpetually
incorrect must be read as corrosively disdainful. Further,
the terms of the fragment demonstrate that in this passage
he is not making a value distinction between a good
conscience and a good reputation; Nietzsche dismisses both
(he is describing how one might "cope" with both a bad
conscience and a bad reputation; clearly, the "us" Nietzsche
wants to be writing for — Ubermenschen — would have no
need for "coping") 12 . I bring up this triad of popular
Continental writers 13 in large part because they are chiefly
12Skept ics should consult Nietzsche's HjTBn AIJ JE&JAnBp. fragment
562, which rakes it quite clear that gossip about others is in
tact not
even about its ostensive objects, let alone accurately attacking those
others
.
13The fact remains that even the original prcnoter of
conversation as
the road to truth, Plato, clearly has qua I i f i cations
about Wtat kinds of
conversation produce genuine versus unjustified knowl ^9e
f .
J" ^
rVtmias . Socrates challenges the sophist Gorges bothi to
def ine
nrofess ion and to justify it (why should we practice rhetoric).
After
™ch bantering, Gargias challenges Socks' s'^absmSs p'r^em
irritatingly pointing out that in short, Socrates
abstract ions re ni
him from achieving a rreaningful understanding of the
world and othe s
(544).
9
Socrates a^ires Gargias' *
^
disavow the rebuke, and continues on the rest of the
dialogue netera ng
the lust oursuit of rhetoric as a path to true knowledge.
I ndeed , tow rds
ilose of the dialogue Socrates and Cal I icles are
debating hew best be
truth iray be ascertain in disputes and bo^warldly
re^Jlat^ aHects u^.
^'fr^^nTacrard'i^ tolblvSS'.VWW false, report ions,
an eye towards justice it helps ush naked souls" (583-585).
^
CU
pTa
i
^ic^t" ,t^r0dfs JSSp, but it £ f|"ift
regu'lait^product iveKV
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responsible for so much of the shifting in our attitudes
towards truth; each of these three philosophers has
differently and complementarily challenged a notion of
fixed, and absolute truth. More particularly, each writer
influences contemporary intellectual trends such as
deconstruction in part by promoting (more and less directly)
an agenda of perpetual interpretation; if absolute truth
does not exist and what is left is merely eternal
signification, it is in our interests as philosophers to
promote more and more challenging signification (e.g. "God
is dead") . In addition, each writer differently challenges
the predominant philosophic privileging of rationality as
the absolute tool to knowledge. Taken together, these
are
powerful challenges to the ways in which we do philosophy,
and indeed, the effects of these thinkers are still
being
played out in myriad ways both inside and outside
the
philosophical canon. If we cannot have an eternal
truth, we
must at least have creativity.
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The problem with this seductive argumentation is that,
just as we have seen in the first two chapters, eternal
interpretation is only possible when some interpretations
are a little more equal than others, and that equality is
predetermined. To flesh this out: it is a truism that
subjects make decisions between competing interpretations of
almost any event (both consciously and unconsciously) , and
that of course we constantly reject interpretations either
completely or partially. The difficulty with these three
Eurochallenges to how we do or don't choose to believe ideas
is that the ground is fixed -- if we think some thing
because we heard it from someone else than of course it must
be idle, vicious and no doubt false, Heidegger, Nietzsche,
and Kierkegaard would whisper conspiratorily in our ears.
The implication is that we can only choose some freedoms in
interpretation; parameters of plausibility and reasonability
still exist 14 .
14Granted
,
there has been at least one recent attempt to
challenge this kind of reading of at least Kierkegaard as
straightforwardly anti-chatter. Peter Fenves, m his
remarkably sophisticated and complicated analysis of
Kierkegaard that is Chatter (1993), presents
_
himself as '3
defender of idle talk, arguing that "chatter 'itself' can be
clarified only if emptiness and idleness command respect, it
they are treated as traits of language..." (4), and arguing
approvingly for a loosening of language that allows epistemic
merits to concepts like rumor and hearsay (14) . Incidentally,
it's important to note here that chatter and gossip are
not
synonymous concepts for Fenves; in a footnote, he points out
that gossip can have a purpose (social control or resistance)
that chatter cannot (253-254) . As the bulk of his analysis
makes clear, Fenves' Kierkegaard grants import to chatte ,
failure, idleness because of their function as caesura ^
undercut the whole notion of seriousness by seriously
failing
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The philosophic literature on conversation, then,
mirrors the larger tendency within epistemology that I would
like to challenge. Given that, the purpose of my analysis
and definition of gossip, is to demonstrate one of the ways
in which our knowledge -gathering may be both less orderly
than we might otherwise have supposed, but still no less
reliable; correlat ively
,
if we acknowledge the great extent
to which people colloquially rely on gossip, hearsay, rumor
and testimony when developing beliefs and conceptions, my
challenge to the formality of existing theories of knowledge
is further underscored.
Let me return briefly to those authors whose work on
gossip and rumor I surveyed in my previous two chapters.
The vast majority of writers attribute no meaningful
epistemic content or function to gossip -- either it is
strictly false or so distorted as to be epistemically
to make failures, idleness, chat, significant. We can only
think of talk as teleological, Fenves asserts; but this
teleology is not a reasoned move of criticism, but language
talking about itself. In short, Fenves values idleness and
chatter for their very frivolity, and somehow the reemphasis
of one half of the seriousness- idleness dialectic
fundamentally undermines the notion of the dialectic itself,
and both its terms. This reading, it seems clear to me, does
nothing if not further (albeit indirectly) reify the
importance of seriousness (and indeed displace a notion of
seriousness onto an ethereal plane -- if language is always a
site of failure of seriousness, it can only be so because
there does indeed exist a more distant seriousness not humanly
attainable) . Because chatter can never be more than the
stepping-stone to seriousness (chatter signifies the break,
the failure of communication, chatter opens up the way for
silence which is what is truly communicative) , chatter itself
cannot be serious -- only the absence of all conversation
( 44 ) .
313
useless, or else the knowledge it could convey is of so
subjective a nature that it doesn't relevantly challenge
"major" epistemic issues, and writers don't portray it in a
truth context. While some authors attribute a social
constructivist power to gossip, it is clearly power of a
very secondary nature; "real", purer knowledge that is less
assailable by common opinion still exists in the world, and
gossip is simply the (not entirely satisfactory) substitute.
It is relevant to reintroduce this line of thinking
here because the philosophers, sadly, fall into that last
category -- both Code and Coady from the last chapter can
only lend an attenuated epistemic power to gossip. Code
insists that gossip can only be productive of knowledge to
the extent that it is chaotic and therefore defiant of
rationality; Coady allows knowledge power towards testimony,
but only with the proviso that it is strictly regulated, to
cull out the questionable third-party information. The
qualifications to their theories undermine the central
discomfort philosophers have with a notion of gossip as
influential of knowledge: that gossip can be unruly,
difficult to control or predict.
Of course, if we pause for a moment and reflect upon
that characteristic, it should immediately become clear that
while it can certainly be true of gossip and rumor, it is no
less true of conversation in general, and still more
generally scientific experiments, political elections,
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academic conferences, "straight" news reporting, and other
standard social constructs we now regularly attribute as
creative of knowledge. Theories of knowledge grow ever
unrulier (at least, most theories of knowledge) ; however, as
with the Continental triad, modest unruliness is permissible
only because some boundaries of knowledge remain (at least
tacitly) impermeable. Epistemic brinksmanship remains the
order of the day, even within social constructivism.
Analyzing gossip and assessing its epistemic merit
challenges our notions of orderly knowledge on a more
fundamental level
.
One example might demonstrate this more concretely.
Both analytic and Continental philosophers of knowledge
spend much of their professional time arguing about what it
is that knowledge is, and presenting and defeating wildly
various conditions or lack thereof for knowledge. What
gossip fundamentally demonstrates is the ways in which
people individually and anarcho-collect ively can choose to
read words differently than the professionals. Return to
Harvey Siegel ' s claim for what it is that epistemology
accomplishes: ascertaining epistemic justification, through
criteria of justification and ratification, and determining
the possibility of knowledge. This seems little more than a
straightforward definition of epistemology. But when we
combine it with Siegel's other contention, that epistemology
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can be independent of the particular framework from which it
seeks to comment on, analytic slippage occurs.
Here is where an example (albeit a slightly nutty one)
becomes relevant. An epistemologist commenting on popular
acceptance of the thesis that Lee Harvey Oswald worked with
others in his assassination of John F. Kennedy might argue
that belief in this thesis is misplaced, given the
alternative hypothesis produced by the Warren Commission and
the murky evidentiary waters that surround this historical
tessara. Hypotheses might be infinite but certainty in this
area is infinitesimal. Of course, while such an argument
might persuade fellow epistemologists , it would have no
purchase with the not insubstantial number of Americans who
believe some version of a conspiracy theory. The problem
here, which I think it would be fair to say that Siegel
would not regard as a problem, is that "knowledge,"
"certitude," and "justification" themselves are community-
dependent. Theories about the JFK assassination do indeed
abound, and the "evidence" produced to support them is
similarly variant. But the point is that "knowledge' here
is cumulative, not propositional. Many people believe some
form of conspiracy theory in part because they disbelieve
the evidence presented them to justify the lone-killer
theory. Their knowledge might not so much be the
accumulation of positive, direct proof (say, interviews with
those involved, physical or forensic evidence, to say
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nothing of the veritable smoking gun) but rather the
aggregate of indirect nonproof of alternatives, the
seriously suspicious nature of official denials (the
blatantly silly "magic bullet" theory), and indeed the
entire social context during and since the assassination
(secret and not-so-secret wars thinly justified as the
defeat of communism, lying and dissembling government
officials, martial interferences in local communities and on
college campuses) . I think it's fair to say that at the
very least, if this kind of evidence doesn't establish one
or another particular conspiracy theory as reasonable, it
certainly suggests the viability of maintaining a strict
skepticism regarding the lone-gunman theory.
As a professional, Siegel could (and no doubt would)
simply stand aside, independence personified, and aver that
we might have belief here but justification is nonexistent.
But exactly what an example like the JFK assassination mess
shows is that popular conceptions of belief and knowledge do
not follow professional standards, and that professional
standards are a hopelessly wrong fit in any knowledge
decision that is less than straightforward (in other words,
in most knowledge decisions we care about making) . The fit
is wrong because the professional assessment of this sort of
situation (which no doubt would ride on the fact that so
much of the "information" people use in their assessments
would be unverified, perhaps unverif iable , and not coming
317
from transparently "reliable" sources, and hence -- quasi-
juridically -- inadmissible) simply disregards the vast
majority of information that has vast significance for many
citizens, and from which they may draw a wide of variety of
conclusions. Siegel (like Coady before him), in his quest
for relative certainty, simply asserts the continuing
validity of professional standards, without allowing for the
possibility that the standards themselves may evolve,
transform, or that communities outgrow different standards
or languages. In short, Siegel fails to raise the
possibility here that epistemological definitions themselves
(what "knowledge", "belief", "ratification", "criteria for
justification" could mean) might not be static, independent
of their grounding framework, or fallible 15 .
In his attack on the sense-data distinction, J.L.
Austin's Sense and Sensibility offers a linguistic analysis
for such a community-dependent theory. While Austin, in his
attack on Ayer and sense-data theory, still holds to
15Ed Gettier's (1963) refutation of the justified true
belief theory of knowledge fits this analysis perfectly. In
his first counterexample, Gettier argues that A does not in
fact know that B is getting a raise, even though he heard from
C that someone in the room was getting a raise (and hence is
justified in believing that B was getting a raise, since A and
B are in the room together), and even though C's statement is
true (as A in fact gets a raise) . Gettier's argument (which
rests upon a necessary vagueness with what we think we know
and what we conclude from what we know) only presents a
knowledge mistake if how we operate in knowledge is to make
very precise knowledge conclusions from very vague
information, and ignores all other less particular examples
(or more blatantly, the idea that we might come, to accurate
if vacrue -- conclusions from accurately vague information)
.
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analytic biases that in fact seem to directly contradict
Nietzshean irrationalism (e.g., Austin thinks we clearly
couldn't accept that waking thought and experience can be
dreamlike [49]
,
and he wants to hold to the notion that
there are things to be empirically described by science
[4]), at the base of Austin's provocative book are the clear
notions that there is no one conception of reality, that
ordinary language makes the subtlest distinctions in
observing and recording experience, and hence, that ordinary
language in all its subtlety is far more appropriate for
reality-pondering than philosophy- talk with all its
dichotomies. Austin argues that fans of sense-data pose
sense-data and material things as an absolute dichotomy,
which simply isn't supportable. "Why shouldn't we say that
material things are much spryer than we've been giving them
credit for -- constantly busy, from moment to moment, in
changing their real shapes, colours, temperatures, sizes,
and everything else?" Austin argues (58). His point here is
that the dichotomy isn't justified; that there's no reason
to bifurcate sharply everything into apparent versus real,
and that our ordinary terms suggest much more complexity and
continuity in our perceptions that such a dichotomy can ever
convey. Therefore, why should we move from a more complex
to a less complex system, if in particular the less complex
system doesn't bring us any additional understanding?
Austin makes this point plainly:
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. . .there will sometimes be no one right way of
saying what is seen, for the additional reason
that there may be no one right way of seeing it
.
[ 101 ]
For Austin, this kind of epistemological pluralism is as
close as we can get to foundationalism. Ordinary language
is quite capable of articulating the fine distinctions
between concepts, subjects, beliefs; creating conceptual
dichotomies or triads merely obfuscates what was formerly
clear
.
This variety of arguments against epistemic
brinksmanship
,
of course, sets us up for a serious
challenge. If we accept that distinctions between knowledge
and belief are community-dependent, that certitude,
justification, and truth are such hopelessly murky and
abstract concepts that they can have no bearing on knowledge
claims outside a particular context, then we are left with
the significant difficulty of explaining how it is we do
come to make knowledge decisions, and more importantly, how
we can defend those decisions from community to community.
In short, how do we escape absolute epistemic relativism?
I am hardly the first to make the critique of epistemic
brinksmanship that precedes this difficulty -- Coady '
s
careful treatment of testimony is simply the fullest
analytic treatment of this issue. The problem, and this
5ig5iin is why I consider so many of these criticisms to be
simple brinksmanship, is that the majority of the critics I
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have read here 16 simply sidestep the clearly unsettling
issue of epistemic relativism, uncertainty, or aporia by
reendorsing a removed notion of absoluteness, certitude,
infallibilty
.
Let me begin to address this issue by asserting, no
doubt troublingly to some readers, that in fact I do not
think that this is a "problem" to be "solved." By this I
mean that if we genuinely accept that argument that notions
of knowledge, certitude, and justification are community-
dependent (which I think several of the anthropological
works discussed in Chapter One have persuasively
established)
,
we must resign ourselves to a necessarily
looser theory of knowledge, and a certain amount of "give"
in our differing opinions on what it is that we know
(whomever "we" might be)
.
Community-dependent knowledge
means that to some extent our knowledge (s) is (are)
pluralistic; there can be many truths to one situation 17 .
16To get specific, I would include Coady, Code, Fenves,
Siegel, and Cherniak in this group.
17At this point .some readers might accuse me of
brinksmanship ; in other words, am I not simply further
displacing the notion of certitude by affirming a removed
certitude (many certitudes, community certitudes)? My
response to this criticism would be that I think
epistemological pluralism changes our notion of certitude
itself; since "community" itself is such a provisional and
loose term (how many communities would any one person claim
membership in? local, professional, familial, ethnic,
religious, gender, etc. , etc. ; and how stable are any of these
communities in turn?) , the notion of certitude, I think,
becomes such a localized and temporalized idea that in fact
new language is needed, because community certitude can no
longer itself be so certain.
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The job of epistemology, then, becomes in my mind more
ethnographic in nature -- ascertaining who believes what
under what sort of social, psychological, political, and
economic conditions -- and determining what sorts of forces
are more knowledge- inf luential in different sorts of
situations. The goal of this analysis can hardly be to
establish new "standards" of knowledge, for clearly this
ethnography can be of limited predictive use. In contrast,
I think the goal of looser epistemology is simply to
establish frames of reference and comparison for new
knowledge situations.
This might sound like a simple Foucauldian genealogical
approach to knowledge; in other words, that all "truths"
are equally externally constructed (in other words, even
those things we think of as so straightforwardly abstract
ideas -- "truth," say, or less controversially, "triangle")
are determined for us by external forces that serve, to
greater and lesser extent, to constrain us (we accept
categorization) . Indeed, I accept the bulk of this
analysis, and think that Foucault's genealogical approach is
a necessary counterweight to orthodox, "great man" theories
of history. Foucault demonstrates both with his practical
analyses (see Discipline and Punish [1977] ) and his more
theoretical works ( The Archaeology of Knowledge [1972] and
The Order of Things [1970]) that an intellectual's job is in
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part to ascertain the history of concepts -- how they arise,
achieve discursive power and become naturalized.
But it is central to the thesis of this section that
Foucault ultimately stands with his more analytic
compatriots, in that the sources he relies upon for his
genealogical work are strictly authoritative, and his
analysis is too individuated. In short, Foucault commits
the same error of analysis I find peppering the history of
epistemology -- an assumption that knowledge-construction is
defined more by positive, documented steps than by the
casual misstep, the offchance, the unattributed remark.
Foucault ' s very power and competency as a historian
(exhaustively researching and documenting our changing
attitudes towards punishment, sexuality, madness) end up, in
their aggregate, suggesting that already-empowered
communities (consciously and subconsciously) construct or
define social norms; that the people who don't make the
papers, in short, don't utilize, conform, or modify terms
for their own usage (or do not do so "meaningfully"); that
the "audience" of social construction is composed of
generally passive receptors of structural wisdom 18 .
18This analysis resonates with Jacques Ranciere's critique
of current trends in history in his The Names of History
(1994) . Ranciere astutely notes that the modern fashion of
writing history in the name of the voiceless ("the people"),
is simply another means of writing standard narrative history,
we cannot escape the narratization, f ict ionalizat ion of
history, and that that indeed is both its allure and its
disciplinary strength (36-38)
.
I agree with this, and see my
analysis of gossip as an application of this thesis. Gossip
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Gossip, I think, is an explicit and concrete means for
us to understand the chaotic, social acquisition of
knowledge, the ways in which knowledge is constructed not
simply by transparently "empowered" communities but by the
disempowered, both individually and organizationally; it
provides us with a(nother), critically important tool to do
this sort of ethnographic work. Without gossip, we risk
either a uselessly abstract conception of gossip (the range
of analytic epistemology) or a one-sidedly materialist
notion (social constructivism as it currently stands) . It
seems to me that no philosopher working today has yet to
give a satisfactory account of what knowledge -gather ing
really operates like: in short, accounting for both its
social aspects, its chaotic aspects, and yet describing the
ways in which we do in fact produce knowledges that we
assess as more and less secure, that we do not simply wallow
in a linguistic/semiotic swamp.
3.3 How Informal Epistemology is Inherently Gossipy
What is gossipy about informal epistemology? Gossip is
fundamentally an investigative activity. No matter what its
topic, its setting, or its external or additional
motivations (psychological, financial, political,
shows us that we can tell all sorts of stories; history,
philosophy, and science, should be written in a variety of
voices, rather than simply the omnipresent tone of
rationality
.
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interpersonal, professional, several of the above), what to
me seems clear is that we undertake the activity of gossip
because we are trying to make sense out of something. What
that "thing" might be is not (yet) relevant - but what I
think is relevant is that this impulse to understand doesn't
come out of nowhere. Gossip originates from dissonance. We
need to gossip because facts we're getting, or perceptions
we're having, aren't making sense - we can't tell a story
from the world. Gossip is quite literally us telling
stories about the world.
Obviously, and as Ranciere's analysis of history
suggests, we tell stories through and as particular
communities -- a group, no matter how big or small, how
loosely or tightly constructed, wants to make sense of what
it sees as a particular string of events, causes, effects,
problems, goals. If we grant the epistemology is more
informal, in the sense that it is more community-dependent
than otherwise analyzed, the tactcs of community should be
more foregrounded in our understanding of knowledge.
Gossip, as an essentially communitarian activity (for what
is the conversation of friendship if not at least a
community-maintainer [as well as occasionally a community-
dissolver] ?) , is a critically important part of how
communities tell their stories about the world.
What's surprising about this locution, of course, is
how close it comes to the humanists ' usage of gossip I so
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decry. But what makes this phrasing to me more powerful is
simply the emphasis I'm placing on the stories themselves.
Gossipists of all stripes paint those stories as necessarily
false (or at best only accidentally true) -- distorted,
malicious, fanciful, outright invented. They're sharply
opposed from the truth, which is sought in an objective,
rational fashion. Exactly what I'm trying to say is that
those processes are one and the same - when we gossip we are
simply more concretely, more particularly (and sometimes
less concretely and particularly) trying to come up with a
cohesive explanation for the world. If informal
epistemology grants us some freedom in sourcing and
evaluating our knowledge, it is only reasonable to conclude
that folk knowledge like gossip, rumor, hearsay and folklore
would each be relevant contributors to community and
individual knowledge explanations.
A comparison I think is worth setting up -- what is the
distinction between gossip at the knowledge point and gossip
that gets left behind? In other words, if we take as a
starting point that gossip can create knowledge instead of
being an aberration from it, and we further assume that not
everything that is said as gossip just gets swallowed up as
knowledge (a not unreasonable claim) , how do we tell the
difference? I would (imperfectly) phrase it this way - the
difference is in the appellation itself. When gossip
attains the status of knowledge, we don't refer to it as
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gossip anymore -- it's simply a fact. (Naturally, I'm
stealing from Laboratory Life here 19
.) Correlat ively
,
and
much more interestingly to me, I think that gossip that has
yet to, or definitely will not attain the status of
knowledge is precisely that which is forcefully referred to
as "gossip" 20 . Since gossip is still a perjorative term
(for Americans at least), it's clear that one way of
discounting something as a truth claim is to call it gossip:
"it's just gossip," we say and hear, as a means of
comforting someone (this can't be true), or de-emphasizing
something (no one can take this seriously, this idea isn't
going anywhere)
.
Gossip, because it is both public and private, because
it is cementing and critiquing of social relations, because
19And, of course, from Shibutani (1966), who points out
that "when an unverified report turns out to be true, no one
notices its obscure source. When subsequent events reveal a
report to have been unfounded, the item is dismissed as having
been 'only a rumor'" (3)
.
20While it should be obvious, let me make it clear that
these distinctions only apply to the American usage of the
term. Clearly, as much of the anthropological work I'm citing
demonstrates, much of the world takes gossip far more
seriously, and already lends it knowledge status, than
Americans. If it's not transparent at this point, I'm writing
for an American audience - for it seems to me that only
Americans at this point are still so Puritanically obsessed
with propriety and virtue in speech (while happily violating
it all the while) , and that only Americans are similarly so
obsessed with empirical, verifiable definitions of truth and
falsehood. While most of my anthropological sources are in
Latin America or Asia, anyone who wonders if the Europeans are
as Puritanical about speech or knowledge need only refer to
the acceptance and mainstreaming of gossip magazines in Spain,
France, Italy and England (Meiser)
.
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it is both idle and purposive shows the ways in which our
knowledge doesn't come "either" from external sense
perception or internal abstract ideas, the ways in which
gossip is neither simply descriptive or normative. Gossip
is all these things at once (I sound like an advertisement),
because knowledge is all of these things at once. We always
turn around on our knowledge-constructions after they have
already been made, and try to sort out the different
components of them (ok, here's where the evaluative mistake
was made -- if we can just not do that the next time we'll
have a much more rigorous equation of ethical euthanasia)
.
But gossip to me is a marker of the ways in which our
knowledge-gathering is hopelessly chaotic, and how that's
not a bad thing, it's an inevitable thing. The bad thing is
not so much when we try to make rational, teleological order
out of the disorder (for that seems to be the inevitable
philosophic, if not human impulse), but when we in turn try
to inscribe inevitability to the teleological order we've
just put forth.
How does gossip straddle these categories: how does
gossip show our knowledge-gathering to be chaotically
purposive? Gossip's functions are twofold: first, to
select (fast-track to decide what avenues to pursue, and
which to discard) , second, to synthesize (in gossiping we
can make connections, draw conclusions more freely than we
can in other arenas, we can put facts and possibilities
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together that we might otherwise not think about)
. Gossip,
in short, is a kind of playing field for the mind -- many
bets are off, and we can act with whimsy. But if gossip is
a kind of playing field, it is only so not because so much
of other knowledge -work is so distinctly opposite
,
but
because other knowledge-work is so related -- in short, more
"orthodox" knowledge is a playground: more organized and
rigid than the kind of play that might take place on a big
field, but nonetheless, pretty sloppy and unpredictable. I
think the problem is that we think of easy opposites; it's
initially alluring to imagine gossip as some sort of daring
subversive agent to oppressive aboveground, controlling,
dictatorial, disciplinary information, but I think the fact
is that control and dictatorship are neither so
straightforward nor so defined. Surely, if that were the
case, they'd be much easier to detect and resist.
Gossip, then, fulfills these two particular functions
that are essential in knowledge-gathering, but not
uniquely -- for surely we select hypotheses for knowledge in
a variety of social behaviors, to say nothing of
synthesizing ideas. The point is that we do so differently
when we gossip, we do so (even) more freely in gossip than
when we, for example, theorize in seminars, debate
opponents, or argue with colleagues or employers. Gossip is
a community tool for exploration and evaluation; a not-
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directly traceable one, to be sure, but one whose resonances
can be inferred from even "authoritative" texts.
Nota Bene: I now proceed, both in this section and in
the following one, to give examples of how gossip works
concretely. I very deliberately choose two examples that
are contrary to each other; one very traditional accounting
of gossip (in science, using documented sources), one very
nontraditional accounting (a very authentic oral gossip
item, very authentically undocumented) . Even though the
first example consists in textual readings, it is important
to observe at the outset that both of these examples cannot
be considered "proof" in the typically philosophically
rigorous fashion; for after all, what defines gossip is
nothing if not its untraceableness
,
its unruliness, its
inherently oral character. In neither example could we say
that we "know" the gossip; that the "knowledge" of gossip
has been definitively proven. I would say, perhaps
paradoxically, that this lack of traditional rigor cannot be
considered a failure of proof but rather its evidence. For
indeed, gossipy conclusions and inferences in even
authoritative texts demonstrate alternate readings and
theses; further, as the second section demonstrates, gossipy
anecdotes demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional
narrative to supply complete, sensible accounts of beliefs
and their justifications. With that, let me dish some dirt.
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3.4 How Gossip Selects
"Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a teeming
multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call
simple sensations are results of discriminative attention,
pushed often to a very high degree" (Vol
. 1:224). William
James' statement, here from The Principles of Psychology
(1918) is a conviction that we shape the world; that our
perceptions are more than simple passive receptors of data
(sense-data enthusiasts aside) . Indeed, a little further
James writes that "what are our very senses themselves but
organs of selection" (Vol. 1:284) . James' thesis, adapted
in turn from David Hume, is that the phenomenal world as
such does not really exist in any knowable sense; that human
agents shape the world according to their individual
perceptions, which are determined by categories. Gossip, I
think, is a more particular, more field-specific means of
this selection.
In The Double Helix (1969) , James Watson briefly and
clearly tells the story of his discovery, along with Francis
Crick, of the structure of DNA . Watson, to his credit,
attempts nothing less than an entirely honest depiction of
the events of 1951-1953; not only does he present very
complicated genetic and biochemical theory simply for the
lay person, he freely admits to professional and personal
vice. Not only does Watson almost eagerly attest to
freguent bouts of laziness and distraction from work with
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some of the more lurid attractions of London, but more
seriously, he acknowledges his sexist and condescending
attitude towards Rosalind Franklin, a crystallographer in
another laboratory. In part due to this (naive)
unselfconsciousness from Watson, considerable controversy
has arisen over The Double Helix
, and more significantly the
discovery of the structure of DNA itself. Several authors
(Lwoff, Sayre) have charged that Watson and Crick
underattributed the contributions of others (namely Maurice
Wilkins and Rosalind Franklin) to their discovery.
Correlatively
,
others have responded (Bernstein, Olby) that
the credit of DNA rests appropriately with Watson and Crick.
While the detail of this spat is interesting to me,
what is more relevant to us here is the methodology these
various sources reveal about the creation of science.
Watson opens his book by quickly describing the morass of
genetic theory in 1951 -- how widely different hypotheses
and methods of study were proposed as paths to the discovery
of the structure of DNA (22-23) . More particularly, Watson
describes the ways in which particular rumors in the
scientific community -- casual chat passed between different
lab workers -- served to focus attention on one particular
method or another. One key rumor was that Linus Pauling had
discovered the structure of proteins -- the alpha-helix
(30). While Pauling's structure could not be directly
applied to DNA structures, his model influenced the path DNA
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research took (Pauling used a helical structure, DNA
researchers focused on possible helical structures for DNA)
More generally, the environment of scientific research
in the immediately postwar Western world was highly
competitive. The scientific community is a small one, and
one that contains a lot of interdiscussion about each
other's professional and personal behavior. Labs in the
U.S. and the U.K. competed against each other for national
credit, and lab credit, for making significant discoveries.
Pauling's son Peter came to work for Watson and Crick's lab
at Cavendish during this struggle, and Watson details a
letter Pauling sent to his son making mention of DNA
discoveries he was on the verge of, but giving no details
(93) . Similarly, when Watson and Crick are on the verge of
unraveling the DNA structure (in point of fact they are
pursuing an incorrect model, but one that is closely related
to the correct model), Watson writes a long letter to his
friend Delbriick bragging about his impending success, and
similarly -- and no doubt f rustrat ingly -- avoiding detail
(insert 10-15)
.
(Of course, as Watson himself notes, in
retrospect it is fortunate he did that, saving himself
embarrassment
.
)
When Watson and Crick are in the thick of unraveling
DNA structure, they make a point of pumping Peter Pauling
for dirt on the goings-on in his father's lab (101);
frustrat ingly , they again get vague ideas from Peter but no
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detailed information (ibid, 99)
.
But at each moment of this
stage, what is clear is that Watson and Crick are using
their casual relationship with Peter (for Watson's book does
nothing if not exhaustively demonstrate his extensive and
attentive socializing with his coworkers, Peter Pauling
especially [99, 111, 114]), for insight and direction into
further research on DNA -- Watson and Crick look to the
world-reknowned "expert" for correlation or correction to
their hypotheses, they count on reputation leading to
accurate scientific process.
More precisely, informal chatter is the necessary
channel by which they can get the confirmation or
disconf irmation they want. Formal professional enounters
with Pauling senior are pretty much limited to conference
papers and publications; they rely on their back-channel of
Peter Pauling to find out the direction of future research,
rather than what has already been done. In addition, as
Watson's frequent allusions to rumors in the science world
attest, the speed of scientific publication and conference
paper delivery cannot hope to keep up with the actual
research trajectories in laboratories. Following the gossip
is crucial towards doing accurate (read community-accepted
research) ; even though Watson and Crick think they are
headed in the right direction, gossip on alternative
approaches is enough to throw them off onto another scent.
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This analysis should recall my precis of Laboratory
Life; I certainly see a parallel between these different
accountings of how science is done. Latour and Woolgar
demonstrate definitively that a virtually accurate thesis of
the composition of TRF (H) can only be accepted when it is
presented by an "expert"; in short, someone with the right
disciplinary qualifications, who has self-consciously
redefined the field and conditions of research, who has
established a reputation as the authority. Reputations'
informal negotiation help determine which hypotheses get
pursued and which are left behind. Correlat ively
,
we can
speculate that at least part of the reason Watson and Crick
ignore Rosalind Franklin's (again, virtually accurate)
thesis about the structure of DNA is due not simply to
sexism (though that certainly plays a role)
,
but to her lack
of an established reputation in this field (she, like Watson
if not Crick, is a comparative newcomer to gene research)
,
and her failure to negotiate actively a reputation with
colleagues (her outsider, loner status -- which of course
must be also partly due to her position as a woman
researcher in a virtually all-male field) . As Latour and
Woolgar themselves say in Laboratory Life , this analysis
does not delegitimate the status of fact that the structure
of DNA or TRF (H) have, it contextualizes them -- looking
back at the gossip, we can tell why information became
viable as knowledge when it did. More particularly, the
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gossip was the channel by which information was able to
become foregrounded to the point where it could more widely
be accepted. In these ways, gossip selects.
3 . 5 How Gossip Synthesizes
I see gossip's functions as synthesizing and selecting
knowledge to be highly complementary of each other.
Earlier, I used the example of a playground versus a large
field when talking about how gossip works to synthesize
knowledge. The gloss is simple: when we are trying to
figure something out, we typically follow preordained routes
of analysis and deduction, depending on the kind of
operation we are carrying out. If I am a historian, trying
to ascertain what Indianans thought of the Treaty of
Versailles, my discipline and training will lead me down a
reduced number of paths. I might look at national
newspapers and magazines for some national context (looking
only at the articles on the treaty) , and then dig more
deeply into the locality, examining not only local
publications but private writings (letters, diaries) that
might discuss the Treaty. I no doubt will explore
ethnographic data (the population, their ethnic, religious,
national, economic backgrounds). More pointedly, I will not
probably look at entries and accounts of events other than
the treaty for analysis of the treaty itself; while I might
consider a contemporaneous event for "context," I would not
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for the text itself. In other words, I might look at the
rise of the second Klu Klux Klan in Indiana to compare
awareness of the respective events (for example, the number
of articles devoted to the treaty versus the number of
articles devoted to local elections where Klan influence was
widely suspected or assumed)
,
but I most probably would not
look to reporting on the Klan to explain the reception of
the treaty, or vice versa. The rules of the game of doing
history, where connections must be easily established and
where artif actual, documentary evidence is mandatory for
credibility, prohibit otherwise.
This is the sense in which doing history, as with most
investigative activities, is like playing on a playground.
There are particular apparati you may choose to use, and
there are definitely modest ways in which you can adapt the
apparatus in question to your own ends. For example, a
child might stand facing inward at the top of a slide and
run in place against the slant of the slide, trying to
maintain balance for as long as possible and not fall down
the slide (painfully) , instead of simply sliding down
according to the design of the equipment 21 . Similarly,
more daring historians might invoke some non-textual
speculation to make theoretical inroads in the game of
history; Kathleen Blee '
s
history of the development of the
women's Klan discusses "whispering campaigns," which she
21Thanks to Kimberly Adkins for demonstrating this point.
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can only partly document, to explain the Klan's power. But
just as a child on play equipment may not be too free in her
adaptations of the equipment without violating the tacit
rules of acceptable playground behavior (for example, if a
child is using the slide in this way, another child cannot
simultaneously try to walk up the slide bottom-end first,
which might unlodge the first child from her precarious
balance)
,
there are only so many professional rules one can
bend, break or adapt at any one time. Contorting or
ignoring too many at once causes one to be drummed out of
one's professional ranks; one is no longer "doing history,"
but writing a novel, or interpreting a social theory22 .
By contrast, when we play on a large field, rules of
play may still develop, but much more randomly, and more
negotiably. For instance, we may begin by deciding to play
a simple game of Tag, but quickly adapt it to Freeze Tag, or
invent new rules all our own (Calvin and Hobbes' elaborate
and constantly evolving games amuse us precisely because
they are so remindful of how children do play with each
other) . The play is not entirely anarchic, but the set of
rules governing it cannot be totally iterable; neither will
it remain the same nor evolve in predictable ways. This is
22While this last year has brought with it a spate of
genre -bending theoretical works (Callaso's Ruin of Kasch ,
Demos' The Unredeemed Captive ) , which have indeed received
favorable reviews, the reviews themselves are marked by a
decided unwillingness to categorize. Historians are not fully
interested (yet) in taking these hybrid works in as history
per se .
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how we gossip because this is how we come to know things;
this is the way in which gossip synthesizes. Depending on
the "terrain" of the field (in short, everything we may be
talking about in the conversation)
,
we may adapt our
conversation one particular way or another, may make some
connections rather than others, but importantly, the
connections we make aren't strictly bound by rules of
investigation or operation -- credibility does not prohibit
us from considering particular kind of information or
speculating in different directions. Similarly, gossip's
synthetic power is important here precisely because it
allows us to make connections we might be forbidden to
otherwise. If professional courtesy, or the burden of proof
prohibits us from speculating on a peculiar combination of
events or behaviors, gossip permits us to indulge the
speculation, with others, and quite possibly to further it
in meaningful ways
.
I present this lengthy analysis and illustration so
that my example of gossip synthesizing information might
have more resonance. Michael Hooker (himself a Ph.D. from
the Five Colleges in philosophy) was named to the presidency
of the University of Massachusetts system in 1994. Hooker
was effusive about his excitement at returning to his alma
mater, and spoke grandly about big plans for transforming
the budget -bedraggled University into a "Harvard with a
subsidy." About six months after his ascension, while I was
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chatting with a friend of mine, he mentioned that he had
heard from a friend of his that Michael Hooker was
interviewing for a job as president of some other
university. Needless to say, we were both surprised. I
started circulating this item in the gossip hopper --
passing it along to numerous friends of mine, one of whom
happened to work as a lobbyist for one of campus
constituencies
.
While we (and others, no doubt) serially discussed the
possibility that this might be true, we did so by evaluating
what we knew of Michael Hooker. Each person had different
information or impressions of Hooker to offer -- one person
reminded me that Hooker's sole achievement during his short
tenure at Bennington had been to sell the campus buildings
off to rich alumni; others discussed his George Bush-like
history of multiple two- or three-year terms at
universities; one friend recounted Hooker's aggressive
behavior towards his dissertation committee while a doctoral
condidate in philosophy; still another recalled Hooker's
self -description in the campus newspaper of his career as a
faculty member at Harvard, hands behind his head and feet
atop desk, yet still feeling dissatisfied with his
achievements. Different events and impressions were
compared and analyzed, with the purpose being to discover
what kinds of actions would be believable. More than
anything else, what emerged from these discussions was that
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Michael Hooker was profoundly motivated by ambition, and
willing to disregard quite a few social conventions in the
process of getting where he thought he might like to be, and
that clearly, a land-grant university like UMASS, with its
perennially controversial national reputation and uncertain
state funding, could not be Hooker's ultimate aim.
Two years later (early spring of 1995)
,
shortly after
Hooker released a ten-year plan for the university, gossip
about Michael Hooker's imminent departure from the UMASS
presidency again began to circulate. This time, it was
borne out by the facts -- Michael Hooker left to assume the
chancellorship of the more prestigious University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
The point here, a la Turner, is that we do not know if
in fact Michael Hooker had interviewed for that other job so
shortly after his arrival. The belief that he certainly
would do so, however, had a wide variety of reasonable
evidence to justify it, and indeed, his later actions
exactly proved the accuracy of those initial suppositions.
Does this make the earlier gossip untrue? This point is
impossible to resolve -- the history simply doesn't exist on
this issue. What is does demonstrate is the ability of
gossip to construe plausible and viable theses where other,
more traditionally reliable channels might fail" 3 .
23A relevant historical note here: when the new Hooker
information began to circulate, I noticed that of^ the people
I talked to, those with whom I hadn't been gossiping about
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Why did it make sense for those of us who had heard the
earlier rumor to believe that Hooker was indeed not long for
the UMASS presidency? An initial hot rumor sparked
lengthier, more drawn-out, more reflective analyses of
Hooker, from a wide variety of perspectives. Analytic
philosophers would say that at no point did we gossipers
know that Hooker would leave UMASS; we could not, because
the knowledge could not be usefully verified, or because our
justifications were pathetically unrelated to the matter at
hand (who cares if Hooker sold off Bennington buildings to
alumni? Harvey Siegel might say) . But the point is that
these stories of gossip, the bulk of which were largely
unavailable through standard media (newspaper accounts of
Hooker did not reflect on his erratic administrative career;
the earlier rumor of outside interviewing appeared nowhere)
,
were the sole channel by which a plausible account of Hooker
could be constructed, a story that resonated with both past
and future events
.
In other words, gossip's synthetic function works in
part to link analytic categories of justification and belief
together -- they are importantly psychological states, and
this earlier leave-taking possibility were floored (albeit
relieved) by the hearsay, unlike those of us who had
previously considered the likelihood of this occurrance . To
be precise, when I took part along with other student leaders
in an interview with a prospective administrator, and I
mentioned Hooker's announcement of his leaving UMASS (as it
had been on the radio earlier that morning) , one student in
particular, whom I knew to be very actively involved with
campus politics, was shocked (delightedly so) by the news.
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not simply philosophical conditions. But the point is that
they each, separately and together, can contribute to us
having positions we would consider to be knowledge that
simple issues of truth and falsity could never cover (to say
nothing of logical analyses of conjunctions or
disjunctions)
. Gossip, by selecting from fields of
possibilities and allowing freer combinations of ideas and
speculations, shows the ways in which we construct knowledge
in unorthodox, community-dependent, provisional ways.
3 . 6 Applications of Analysis and Conclusion
What would be my practical recommendations for gossip?
I don't think, a la Gluckman, that we ought have schools for
scandal, nor do I think we should loosen up libel laws, or
recreate Centers for Rumor Control (or create correlates for
gossip, CGCs) . The problem with these suggestions (even if
the first is [at least partly] tongue-in-cheek) is that they
all suggest that gossip can somehow be reduced, eliminated,
defused or controlled by public confrontation. In short,
they all follow Felix Frankfurter's dictum that "sunlight is
the best disinfectant." "Disinfectant" is indeed the
appropriate image here, for again gossip retains its tainted
character under these various prescriptions. (How do we
disempower gossip?)
Rather, if we look at examples like those Turner
inovokes, where she suggests that companies facing rumors
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try to analyze them according to their possible structural
causes and remedy for those (e.g., hire more minorities in
positions of authority, market products in a less racially
targeted fashion, lower the prices of some products)
,
the
purpose here -- well, is exactly to make gossip less
powerful. Her intuition is that the rumor is grounded
structurally, and if you change the structural conditions,
the rumor will simply fade away --no one will have anything
at stake in spreading it anymore. That may be true for
particular rumors (even allowing for the fact that those
with ostensive power in these situations are interested in
changing structural conditions, which as Turner's exegesis
shows is generally not the case)
,
but it cannot be true for
rumor itself. (The same is true for gossip.) We can
attempt to attack particular rumors or particular gossip
items that we think unfair, or unwanted (regardless of their
truth value!), but we cannot control the channel itself - it
is a necessity, and a valuable one. If gossip is a
fundamentally community tool, a bottom-up tool that serves
at least locally to challenge orthodox readings and
theories, than no amount of structural alteration can
eliminate the tool, simply because communities, while always
shifting and realigning, will always exist.
Turner's other recommendation is more useful for my
concluding purposes . She suggests that it is important for
historians to take into account less orthodox sources of
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information, like rumor, folklore and myth, when they
construct historical accounts of events and time periods. I
have a correlative suggestion for knowledge workers. Taking
seriously gossip, considering it as a valid source of
knowledge, means simply that we recognize that how we go
about deciding we know something is more complicated than
professional epistemologists would have us believe. While
analytic argumentation about knowledge is certainly sound
and valid, it is not at all the means by which most of us go
about deciding whether or not we believe something. Nor
does it inspire me to change the ways by which I make my
epistemic decisions.
And ultimately, this is my goal here. While most
directly I would like it if social scientists began to
approach the concept and definition of gossip with more
sophistication and more opened ears, ultimately it seems to
me that there are popular applications for this analysis.
One way in which someone could attack this line of thinking
is by arguing (as has been frequently and enthusiastically
proposed -- see the Harper '
s
forum [1986]) that there are
only a surfeit of gossip and rumor when people have no faith
in institutional channels. Gossip and rumor have been
increasing linearly over the years because of a deepening
cynicism over trust and honesty from institutions (e.g.
post-Watergate "malaise”); their increasing presence doesn't
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mean they're true or truer, or that this is something to
permit or applaud.
But of course, as the various historical work (notably
Hellyer) shows, it's not the gossip and rumor themselves
that are increasing, it's our notice of them. Gossip and
rumor are persistent and omnipresent features of society;
they are some of our tools of communication and
understanding. More to the point, the very construction of
the above argument suggests that it is proper and sensible
for people to have faith in institutional channels, that
gossip and rumor are unnecessary and detrimental sidetracks
by nature. There are two avenues for exploration here --
first, that people's faith in institutional channels is
declining for a reason, because institutional channels are
less trustworthy, people do have (rational) reasons to trust
non- institutional channels. The second possibility
(eminently less shocking, I think) is that people have never
had absolute or total (or even simply 'high levels of')
faith in institutional channels; information is always
pluralistically attained and critically evaluated from a
diverse and divers collection of sources. Or, as Shibutani
more succinctly suggests, the very existence of
institutional channels necessarily suggests an important
augmentation of subterranean grapevines.
Gossip and rumor aren't necessarily superfluous, self-
indulgent, reductive, transparent, or wrong - we just choose
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to read them that way. In 1963, Max Gluckman, with tongue
not fully in cheek, advocated the establishment of "schools
for scandal," where youths would be taught how to gossip
(which, by his analysis of gossip, meant teaching people
awareness of social distinctions and how they are made)
.
I'd take this argument further -- we need to learn to read
our gossip and rumor, in all of their (seemingly serious and
frivolous, benign and malicious) forms, not simply to figure
out social orderings but more basically to understand
ourselves -- what do (the different) we (s) know and believe?
What makes us think we know something instead of merely
believing it? (These basic issues of epistemology are
simply phrased, but I do believe gossip and rumor have
purchase on the answers of these questions.)
If epistemology needs to take a more ethnographic turn,
part of that turn I think must be to acknowledge the more
subterranean channels by which knowledge develops. This
means, as I have tried to suggest in the last few sections,
letting go of more transparently documentarian impulses in
hard and soft science; but doing so does not leave us in a
freefall of epistemic relativism. If we supplement (not
substitute) "harder" information with the "softer"
information of gossip (for surely, as the Hooker anecdote
reveals, that is exactly what gossip consists in) then we
can arrive at more complete stories of why it is things
happen. More particularly, taking gossip seriously means
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taking communities seriously, taking individuals seriously,
and taking non- seriousness seriously. If we accept that
different groups might have different understandings of why
it is something happened, we open ourselves up for gossip-
stories -- for gossip can be frank, humorous, strident, and
even acidically critical in ways in which traditional soft
science cannot. To take an obvious example, charts of
surveys' results of a group's opinions on some subject may
demonstrate a range from Strongly Disagreeing to Strongly
Agreeing, but even if the range leans heavily towards one
side, the content (and even the range) of those categories
will be unclear without more microscopic, more informal
analysis. And more particularly, a respondent to a survey
might be more self-conscious, more judicious, more strategic
in filling out her Scantron than if she is freely evaluting
the survey's topics with friends.
All this is not to say that the knowledge of social
science, or hard science, or even philosophy is completely
irrelevent. At a minimum, however, it is incomplete; it
tells partial stories only. The stories of gossip, though
they might seem wildly divergent from "conventional"
understandings, and wildly unjustified, if unpacked, can
demonstrate plentiful justification and import, and indeed,
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contradictions for "aboveground, " more authoritative
knowledge
.
APPENDIX
A MODEL GOSSIP 24
24The material contained in the appendix was judged too
scandalous by the dissertation committee for its inclusion, in
library copy; those interested in this archival material
and commentary should make application to the author.
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